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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Here I present my story, connecting the dots of my academic life. I began thinking about 
pursuing a PhD in 1991, when I was an undergraduate student at Slippery Rock 
University (SRU) in Pennsylvania, USA, on a Sweden–America Foundation scholarship. 
Several informal talks with one of my undergraduate professors helped me weigh the 
pros and cons of an MBA versus a PhD. Being a bit ambivalent about the decision and 
wanting to keep both doors open, I elected to go for a bachelor of science degree in 
economics. Upon graduating summa cum laude in 1994, I was still ambivalent, so I 
returned to Sweden, where I took a job assisting Professor Lars Oxelheim at the 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN, then known as IUI) in writing a book 
about the deregulation of the Nordic financial markets and its effect on Nordic interest 
rates as compared to a global interest rate (Oxelheim, 1996). Professor Oxelheim and I 
also discussed me potentially pursuing a PhD, but back then I did not know what 
research focus I was interested in, nor did I realize that embarking on a PhD is one of the 
more entrepreneurial ventures in which a person can engage.  
The experience at IFN led to my next job as a researcher at the Boston Consulting 
Group (BCG), where I specialized in corporate valuations and a corporate performance 
framework known as Cash Flow Return On Investment (CFROI), developed by HOLT 
Value Associates (Madden, 1999). The experience at BCG motivated me to take a master 
of science degree in economics and finance from the Stockholm School of Economics 
(SSE). This was one of the best career decisions I have made and gave me many valuable 
contacts with whom I still interact today. In 1998 and 1999, after graduating, I tried 
starting a couple of businesses. One was an online database for financial analysis services 
called MIG (Management Information Group) and the other a business promoting 
stand-up comedians and speakers, called IGNITE Infotainment Professionals. Both 
firms had high-flying visions (seen in the pluralistic nature of the names) but made 
meager progress. Despite the tough times, the experience was enjoyable, and I learned 
more about business in these two years than any school could have taught me. 
Specifically, I learned that perseverance, along with a strong personal conviction, is 
important, but that luck is probably also part of the equation. The experience and 
knowledge gained through these years are also shown throughout this dissertation.  
 In 2005, having spent five years as a financial advisor on global equities at Credit 
Suisse, I became a portfolio manager at DNB Asset Management, responsible for global 
cyclical firms (materials, transportation, automobiles, and commercial services). However, 
in 2008, this work came to a sharp halt with the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the 
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layoff of many in the financial industry, including those of us at DNB. I discussed with 
Professor Carl Fey starting a PhD, but I still felt ambivalence about the prospect. I had 
previously written an academic paper with Professor Fey and Professor Ingmar 
Björkman based in my master thesis at SSE. The article is today cited 49 times according 
to Google Scholar (Fey, Engström, & Björkman, 1999). However, I did not pursue the 
opportunity, as this was not an area of interest close to my heart, and I therefore again 
missed how incredibly entrepreneurial it is to undertake a PhD.  
Instead, I worked for three years as chief financial officer at the Swedish Mission 
Covenant Church, which not only gave me a better understanding of civil society and 
organizations based on the popular movements from the late 1800s and early 1900s but 
also a lot of experience in managing people, creating control systems, and managing a 
budget process and different type of assets, such as properties and foundations. The job 
involved a lot of responsibility and creativity, but it was also very entrepreneurial. It gave 
me a good glimpse at how small businesses are run and governed, since the church was 
involved in several small and large businesses.  
One of the investments the church had made was a small footnote on the balance 
sheet, Oikocredit, that was not earning any interest for the church. As the financial assets 
I was responsible for were a guarantee for the future pensions of several employees, I 
was keen to ensure the assets were managed in the best possible way. Not getting a return 
on investment was unsatisfactory to me. I therefore investigated Oikocredit and visited 
an annual general meeting in 2011 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, where I learned about 
microfinance. I observed how controversial the idea of paying investors a market interest 
rate was; some owners there argued frantically that this was morally wrong. In 2011, the 
interest investors could receive from lending money to Oikocredit was at most 2%. In a 
scenario where inflation is running at 3%, I as an investor would lose 1% by investing in 
microfinance. The argument against a higher return to investors was that there was also a 
return to society, a social return, upon which investors should look favorably. The return 
was not close enough to the cost of capital required by the pension fund, which was the 
foundation of the church assets, and thus microfinance did not seem as a good 
investment to me at the time. Now, with global interest rates at record low levels, many 
investors are turning towards microfinance as an alternative asset class, in hopes better 
returns.  
The experience in Tanzania sparked my interest in this controversial topic, and I 
immediately contacted Professor Lars Oxelheim again, with whom I had kept in touch 
with over the years. The decision to contact Professor Lars Oxelheim was also inspired 
by my friend Klas Palm, who had just initiated his PhD studies on innovation and quality 
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management related issues. My research interest then was how interest rates are affected 
by the increased rate of return required by investors. My hypothesis was that the interest 
rate would not change to the end user, as the local market sets the interest rate. What I 
therefore wanted to research was the degree to which the microfinance investment 
vehicles like Oikocredit, which operate between the investors and the local microfinance 
banks, could absorb a higher required rate from investors, and whether this would 
pressure them to become more efficient in order to preserve a low interest rate. Little did 
I know that my topic would be completely different a year later. 
I believe it is also worth mentioning that about a year prior to me beginning at the 
University of Agder, I became friends with the beat artist Michael Bowen and his family, 
who had moved from Hawaii to Sweden (Collin, 2006). On a few occasions, I played the 
saxophone while Michael spoke or painted. It was inspirational to meet with Michael, 
who was very positive and encouraging of my talents. Tragically, Michael passed away in 
2009. However, his memories live on and are, in fact, scattered all over the University of 
Agder. He has more than 100 art objects installed at the university and the nearby 
Kristiansand Cathedral School. I have obtained permission from his widow Isabel Paoli-
Bowen to use his paintings as article separators in this thesis. Michael was a pioneer in 
combining music and painting (art), known as performance art, and building on these 
ideas, I would like to emphasize the long-standing relationship between research and art, 
and the inspiration both music and art are to my endeavors. 
After my first year of PhD studies, during which I learned about current and 
historic research and methods and interacted with many students and faculty, my interest 
had turned to how microfinance impacts the microentrepreneurs. I had experienced being an 
entrepreneur previously, and the topic of microfinance and the microentrepreneurs 
seemed a lot more interesting than doing research on the sensitivity of interest rates. 
“Come on,” as my supervisor Trond Randøy would say. I also had access to unique data, 
since one of my supervisors, Professor Roy Mersland, had helped build a leading 
microfinance institution in Ecuador (Banco D-Micro). I am especially grateful to Carolina 
and Hans Martin Espegren, for a successful collaboration in gathering data in Ecuador. We 
spent several weeks collecting and analyzing the data together, but we also had fun 
visiting the coast, surfing, cooking dinner together, or going for an evening run. 
I would also like to express my gratitude to my supervisors. First of all, a big 
thank you to my main supervisor, Professor Trond Randøy. Working together with Professor 
Randøy has been truly enjoyable from the start, and I am grateful for not only the 
professional collaborations, but also for the personal friendship we have built over the 
years, including a few jazz jam sessions, hikes in the mountains, canoeing around 
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Kristiansand, international research conferences, and entrepreneurial ventures in 
Tanzania. An indirect result and spin-off from this PhD endeavor is the creation of MTI 
Investment AS (www.mti-investment.com), a venture capital firm investing in the growth 
of eastern Africa. In MTI, all of my previous undertakings and experiences are combined 
and maximized, and every person with whom I have ever worked is connected somehow 
with this business.  
One of Professor Randøy’s previous PhD students, Professor Roy Mersland, was my 
second supervisor. He became a professor within five years of obtaining his PhD. I am 
grateful for having met Professor Mersland and seen the dedication, passion, and focus 
with which he carries out all work. Professor Mersland was instrumental in getting me 
access to Banco D-Miro data, which form the skeleton of my PhD. My third supervisor 
is Dr. Leif Atle Beisland. Dr. Beisland and I had many discussions about performance 
measurement that were instrumental in focusing the thesis on return on assets. I would 
also like to express a special thank you to Professor Oxelheim who has followed my 
academic progress and with whom I have written several debate articles with during these 
three years (Engström & Oxelheim, 2013a, 2013b, 2014). Professor Oxelheim has an 
inner energy and passion for research that is truly inspirational. Just like my supervisors 
did, I wrote this thesis during numerous flights, on various airport buses and trains, 
sometimes in a hotel room in a foreign country such as in Tanzania, sometimes in the 
office in Kristiansand, and sometimes in the office at the Stockholm School of 
Economics (SSE), with which I was affiliated during the last year of my thesis. 
I also would like to thank all the faculty members at the University of Agder, in 
particular Professor Otto Andersen, Dr. Bjørn-Tore Flåten, Dr. Rotem Shneor, Professor Andreas 
Falkenberg, Professor Joyce Falkenberg, Andre Tofteland, Anne Line Omsland, Dr. Burak Tunca, 
Dr. Daniel Göller, Daudi Pascal Ndaki, Diana Trydal, Professor Ellen Nyhus, Erik Arntsen, Geir 
Haaland, Gro Anita Homme, Professor Emeritus Harald Knudsen, Professor Ilan Alon, Irfan Irfan, 
Professor Jan-Inge Jensen, Dr. Kjetil Andersson, Dr. Kristin Dale, Kristina Walker Pedersen, Bandula 
Galhena, Amila Sirisena, Harald Stokkeland, Lisa Whitehead, Dr. Naima Saeed, Dr. Neema Mori, 
Dr. Gibson Munisi, Nertila Stringa, Professor Stein Kristiansen, Dr. Stina Torjesen, Stina Øyna, 
Stine Bårdsen, Unni Henriksen, Inger-Lise Myrvold, and Målfrid Tangedal.  
In addition to the above-mentioned individuals, I also owe a thank you to many of 
the faculty members and PhD students from other schools, such as Professor Dale Duhan, 
Professor Arent Greve, Professor Terje Moen, Professor Yaakob Weber, Professor Kirsten Foss, Dr. 
Gry Alsos, Professor Tommy Clausen, Professor Johan Wiklund, Professor Karl Wennberg, Professor 
Carin Holmquist, Professor Sara Carter, Professor Hans Lundström,  Dr. Espen Isaksen, Dr. 
Marianne Steinmo, Dr. Maj Munkefjord, Dr. Sølvi Solvoll, Marianne Arntzen-Nortquist, Marit 
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Breivik Meyer, Karin Wigger, Oxana Bulanova, Nhien Nguyen, Thomas Lauvås, Siri Jakobsen, Are 
Jensen, Dr. Terese Strand, Nedim Effendic, Dr. Nadav Rotemberg Shir, Beldina Owalla, Kajsa 
Asplund, and Professor Alex McKelvie. 
Apart from academia I am also grateful to the Norwegian Alliance Microfinance 
and their CEO Andreas Andersen for allowing me to work with Banco D-Miro in Ecuador. 
At Banco D-Miro, I am thankful to all the support and help from the CEO Carlos Viteri 
and the marketing director John Pacheco in creating the survey instrument and in 
motivating and instructing the local call center. I am also grateful to Johnny Villavicencio 
and colleagues for helping me in retrieving longitudinal (historic) data from the Banco D-
Miro database. When in Ecuador, I was also fortunate to get to know many wonderful 
people from the local Alliance Mission group, including Hans Martin and Caroline Espegren, 
Isak Holmen Sørensen, Maria Andreassen, Rebeckka Andreassen Garcia, Daniel Garcia, Maria 
Andreassen, Ingunn Skutlaberg Valbø, Bjørnar Valbø, Rita Franco, Lily Macias Ramos, and many 
more. Gathering data without this group of individuals around would simply not have 
been the same experience. Thank you all. 
Last but not least, I would like to thank my close friends and family for 
supporting me every step of the way. I wish I could thank my aunt Kajsa Tunér, who is 
not with us anymore, but she definitely was an influence, and I still to this day remember 
when she earned her PhD in 1986 when I was 15 years old (Tunér, 1986). The same must 
also be said about some other important people who are no longer with us, like my 
grandparents on both my mother’s and father’s sides. My brother Johan Engström has been 
an inspiration in his hard work to become a radiologist, and also my sister Hedvig Engström 
Jakobsson, who earned her PhD in 2011 (Engström Jakobsson, 2011). I would like to 
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Kajsa who, who during these three years, have had to speak to their father on Skype and 
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my dear and greatly missed father, Per Engström, who had been a surgeon. This 
dissertation is therefore made in memory of my father and dedicated to my three 
children. 
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INTRODUCTION AND ESSAY SUMMARY 
 
1. Introduction 
Policies implemented by the UN and the World Bank build on the idea that microfinance 
is a tool to fight poverty (UNCDF, 2005). Despite claims by Nobel laureate Professor 
Muhammad Yunus that all people can become entrepreneurs, given the right resources 
(Yunus, 2013a), few researchers have specifically tried to connect the availability of 
financing with microenterprise performance (Webb, Morris, & Pillay, 2013). In this 
dissertation, I will address this research gap in the entrepreneurship literature and argue 
that the provision of financing to poor microentrepreneurs provides unique lessons on 
entrepreneurship.  
Given some of the broad criticisms of microfinance and claims of having no 
impact (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010; Duvendack et al., 2011), there are multiple 
contributions of this thesis. It specifically addresses the impact of microfinance on 
microenterprise performance through the lens of research-based theory (Barney, 1991) 
and human capital theory (Becker, 2009), while also examining the impact of financial 
literacy (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014) and role models (Bosma, Hessels, Schutjens, Praag, & 
Verheul, 2012). In addition, this thesis will investigate the role of entrepreneur (e.g., 
human capital and financial literacy) and firm characteristics in financial decision making. 
Noteworthy, by borrowing the ideas of financial literacy from research on consumer 
behavior and savings, and applying it to entrepreneurship research and the informal 
economy, our approach links to the knowledge-based focus approach which is often used 
in entrepreneurship research (Landström, Harirchi, & Åström, 2012). 
Another unique feature of this study is the context in which microfinance is 
provided, typically referred to as the informal or 'shadow' economy (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & 
Obloj, 2008; Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009; C. C. Williams & Nadin, 2012). 
Microenterprises are commonly overlooked because they operate mostly out of sight of 
government regulations, government statistics, and interaction with established 
institutions. For developing countries of many sizes, including such diverse economies as 
Ecuador, Tanzania and India, employment in the informal economy affects more than 
80% of the population (ILO, 2013). Furthermore, the importance of such informal 
economic microenterprises is shown by the fact that such activity is seen as the modus 
operandi of individuals seeking to exit poverty (Bruton, Ketchen Jr., & Ireland, 2013). This 
thesis thus also provides an illustration of or guide to how research on microenterprise 
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performance in the informal economy can be done, including the use of survey 
questions, data from various providers, and longitudinal panel data. 
Based on this study, I suggest that research on the informal economy is 
undeveloped. In fact, a recent survey among the editorial board members of the Strategic 
Entrepreneurship Journal shows that one of the most interesting research questions lies 
at the intersection between the formal and the informal economy (Ketchen, Ireland, & 
Webb, 2014). The rise of microfinance allows for the first time many informal businesses 
to be linked to a formal institution, which provides for an interesting research interface. 
This thesis specifically addresses the intersection between the formal and the informal 
economy and is divided into three empirical essays with a total of eight separate research 
questions (see Table 1). 
My first essay, co-authored with my supervisor Professor Trond Randøy, deals 
with how microfinance affects the performance of the microenterprises. Using a unique 
dataset, we respond to three recent calls for research: microenterprise funding (Moss, 
Neubaum, & Meyskens, 2014), the impact of microloans on performance (Berrone, 
Gertel, Giuliodori, Bernard, & Meiners, 2014), and the need for a stronger theoretical 
underpinning to informal economy research (Webb, Bruton, Tihanyi, & Ireland, 2013). 
With these three motivations in mind, the following four research questions are 
addressed: (1) Does the “resource” of debt enhance microenterprise performance in the 
informal economy? (2) Do economies of scale exist, as an indicator of aggregate 
resources? (3) Does education/experience, as an indicator of enterprise competency, 
enhance performance? (4) Does the access to human resources (number of employees) in 
the enterprise moderate the relationships (1–3) presented above? Our findings suggest 
that microcredit does not help microenterprises grow or achieve higher return on assets 
(ROAs), but it helps add more income to the business. Economies of scale are found to 
follow a U-shaped pattern, and human capital investments (education and age) are not 
found to contribute towards improved performance, nor do we find any consistent 
results in relation to number of employees. 
 My second essay, which seeks to explain strategic financing decisions made in 
microfirms in the informal economy, responds to recent calls for more research on the 
funding of microentrepreneurs in the informal economy (Berrone et al., 2014; Moss et al., 
2014; Webb, Bruton, et al., 2013). In this essay, I extend pecking-order and tradeoff 
theory to provide new insights into human capital theory, specifically focusing on 
financial literacy. This study investigates two interrelated research questions: (1) What are 
the determinants of the decision to seek external debt financing (or not)? (2) What are the 
determinants of the capital structure, also commonly referred to as leverage (debt-to-
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equity ratio)? In particular, we explore the role of entrepreneur characteristics in light of 
the informal economy context and how the role of the entrepreneur and the microfirm is 
intertwined. My findings indicate that entrepreneur characteristics and firm characteristics 
are important drivers of the financing decision. Importantly, I show that those who are 
more financially literate are more likely to seek debt financing, thus illustrating the 
importance of developing human capital by teaching financial literacy. 
 
Table 1. Research questions and related research. 
Research question Essay Related research 
1 Does the “resource” of debt 
enhance microenterprise 
performance in the informal 
economy? 
1 (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010; 
Barney, 1991; Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert 
& March, 1963; D. S. Evans & 
Jovanovic, 1989; Honig, 1998; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thapa, 
2015; Webb, Morris, et al., 2013)  
2 Do economies of scale exist, as an 
indicator of aggregate resources? 
1 
3 Does education/experience, as a 
indictor of enterprise 
competencies, enhance 
performance? 
1 
4 Does the access to human 
resources (number of employees) 
in the enterprise moderate the 
relationships (1–3) presented 
above? 
1 
5 What are the determinants of the 
decision to seek external debt 
financing (or not)? 
2 (Becker, 1994; Cassar, 2004; Frank & 
Goyal, 2008; Gartner, Frid, & 
Alexander, 2012; Lusardi & Mitchell, 
2014; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Titman 
& Wessels, 1988) 
6 What are the determinants of the 
capital structure? 
2 
7 What is the impact of financial 
literacy on firm performance? 
3 (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986; Bosma et 
al., 2012; Bruhn & Zia, 2013; Bruton, 
Khavul, & Chavez, 2011; J. S. 
Coleman, 1994; Honig, 1998; 
Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014; March & 
Olsen, 1976; Minniti, 2005; S Shane 
& Venkataraman, 2000; Thaler, 
1985; Unger, Rauch, Frese, & 
Rosenbusch, 2011; Webb, Bruton, et 
al., 2013; Webb, Morris, et al., 2013; 
Wood & McKelvie, 2015) 
8 Does the existence of successful 
role models positively affect 
microenterprise performance in 
the informal economy? 
3 
 
My third essay, co-authored with Professor Alexander McKelvie from Syracuse 
University, draws on resource-based theory (Barney, 1991) and human capital theory 
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(Becker, 1994).We specifically address the left tail of human capital to understand how a 
human capital resource, financial literacy, affects performance and how role models 
alleviate this deficiency. We ask the following two questions: (1) What is the impact of 
financial literacy on firm performance? (2) Does the existence of successful role models 
positively affect microenterprise performance in the informal economy? Our findings 
show that financial literacy has an impact on some measures of microenterprise 
performance (ROA and profits), while the impact of role models primarily affects ROA. 
We did not find a significant effect from either financial literacy or role models on 
growth. In this thesis, I therefore extend the research agenda, understanding 
entrepreneurship in the informal economy, to examine the impact of debt on firm 
performance, the determinants of debt structure, and lastly, that of entrepreneurs’ 
financial literacy in conjunction with the importance of role models. The research gap is 
considerable, and this dissertation is therefore specifically an answer to recent calls for 
more research on the funding of microentrepreneurs in the informal economy (Berrone 
et al., 2014; Moss et al., 2014; Webb, Bruton, et al., 2013).  
 This thesis is organized as follows. First, there is a discussion about microfinance 
and the informal economy. Second, I discuss entrepreneurship theory and some of its 
important stages through the lens of the informal economy. Third, I discuss 
microenterprise performance before, fourth, explaining the methodology, including the 
background, empirical setting, unit of analysis, and data collection (ethical issues, 
interviews, and survey design). Fifth, a summary of the dissertation is provided, including 
a schematic illustration of how the research questions fit into the previously discussed 
theory of entrepreneurship, which is followed by concluding discussion. Lastly, the actual 
empirical essays are presented. 
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2. Microfinance and Poverty Alleviation 
Microfinance is the practice of extending financial services to areas where traditional 
banks are not reaching out. These areas are often collectively called the informal or 
shadow economy, and it is where many microenterprises operate out of sight of 
government regulations. Microfinance essentially involves the funding of 
microenterprises, but increasingly also includes other related services such as insurance, 
savings, health care, and business training. The 2006 Nobel laureate Professor 
Muhammad Yunus is an active promotor of microfinance and builds his conviction from 
his own field experience. In 1974, he experimented by extending a small loan, USD 27 to 
42 female basket weavers at subsidized market rates. The loan created the “spark of 
personal initiative and enterprise necessary to pull themselves out of poverty” (Grameen 
Bank, 2013). Through these small loans of so-called microcredit, often provided at 
subsidized market lending rates (Morduch, 1999b), he laid the foundation for the growth 
of the microfinance industry.  
However, since the late 1990s, the microfinance industry has suffered many 
disappointments, such as the Bolivian credit crisis in 1999 where borrowers became 
overindebted and microfinance institutions suffered severe losses, or the crisis in Andhra 
Pradesh in 2010 with alleged unethical collections, stealing savings, high interest rates, 
and in general very poor governance (CGAP, 2010). Microfinance has as a result been 
heavily criticized by journalists (Heinemann, 2013) and researchers (Armendáriz & 
Morduch, 2010; Bateman, 2011; Duvendack et al., 2011) for not delivering what it once 
promised—the alleviation of poverty (Yunus, 2007).  
The crises that have occurred in microfinance have led to increased risk control by 
practitioners and a more commercial attitude among the microfinance providers, led by 
for instance ACCION (Chu, 2007). The changes in organizational form and structure are 
challenging the original mission of microfinance. In the 1970s, for instance, Latin 
American microfinance organizations were criticized for advocating the idea that interest 
rates needed to be set at a level that covered costs plus inflation (Chu, 2007). While the 
microfinance is changing its business model to meet the demand for tighter control, a 
review of the literature reveals that entrepreneurship researchers have largely shied away 
from studying this issue; most research is done from a developmental perspective, or an 
institutional focus, including socioeconomic factors, and a gender focus. The purpose 
behind this thesis is therefore to draw attention to how businesses are affected by 
microfinance, from the perspective of entrepreneurship theory, but specifically through 
theories such as the resource-based view, human capital, and financing (pecking order 
and trade-off choice) as well as concepts such as financial literacy and the effect of role 
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models on performance. Entrepreneurship theory, as presented here, marries both the 
character of the individual with the environment in which the entrepreneurial 
opportunity exist – two aspects that are central to microfinance. As an important 
contribution, this thesis focuses primarily on the stage between discovery and 
exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities, the evaluation stage (Mckelvie, 2010). 
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3. Entrepreneurship Theory 
To understand the roots of entrepreneurship and how this relates to microentrepreneurs 
in the formal economy, the financing of these, and the capabilities, we need to review and 
position their activities and behavior within the entrepreneurship literature. The first 
mention of an entrepreneur goes back to the writing by Richard Cantillion (1680–1734). 
The concept was further developed by Jean Baptist Say (1767–1832) in the early 1800s, 
but it really is Joseph Schumpeter and his 1934 book, The theory of economic development, that 
makes up the foundation of modern entrepreneurship theory (Van Praag, 1999). If one 
considers the rather poor economic conditions of Europe in the late 19th and early 20th 
century, the setting in which this book was originally conceived is comparable to the level 
today of many developing countries. Germany had, for instance, a GDP per capita of 
USD 5,630 expressed in today’s unit of purchasing power,1 a figure that is comparable to 
that of Ecuador, which has a GDP per capita of USD 6,091, according to recent figures 
by the World Bank. This implies that the theory of economic development is very much 
applicable to developing countries and in the evolution of entrepreneurship theory 
(Landström, 2015) the informal economy as a context may potentially hold many new 
and interesting insights. 
 Schumpeter portrays a dynamic framework in which demand and supply interact 
in a circular flow, striving for equilibrium but interrupted by change (Schumpeter, 1934). 
New products, new customers, new technologies, etc., alter the balance, and lead to new 
opportunities. New structures destroy the old ones, which Schumpeter calls the “process 
of creative destruction,” which is “what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist 
concern has got to live in” (Schumpeter, 1950,  p. 83–84). Central in his theory is the idea 
that individual wants drive the supply, and in finding ways to meet these wants the 
entrepreneur innovates. This means that the entrepreneur is working in an environment 
where risk and uncertainty is part of the game. For instance, a baker will not know for 
certain how much bread will be consumed. Uncertainty is also key to economic 
development (Knight, 1921), and through the uncertainty comes economic profit. In 
addition to risk and uncertainty, ambiguity may also hinder an entrepreneur from taking 
                                            
 
 
 
 
 
1 According to Bairoch (1976), GNP in 1910 in Germany was estimated to be USD 45 billion expressed in 1960s 
dollars. Expressed in 2016, this amounts to USD 366 billion. With a population of roughly 65 million in 1910, this 
amounts to USD 5,630 per capita. In 2014, the GDP per capita in Germany was roughly USD 45,000 per capita. 
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action (Minniti, 2005), a phenomenon this thesis will deal with specifically in Essay 3 with 
regard to the informal economy. 
Schumpeter (1934) writes that “entrepreneurs are a special type” (p. 84), which 
may explain why one stream of research is concerned with the description of who the 
entrepreneur is. Numerous studies find common characteristics among entrepreneurs 
including low risk aversion (Brockhaus, 1980; Kihlstrom & Laffont, 1979), high 
independence/autonomy (Beugelsdijk & Noorderhaven, 2005; J. A. Hornaday & Bunker, 
1970), willingness to adjust to change (Sexton & Bowman, 1985), possession of an 
internal locus of control (Brockhaus, 1982), having an achievement need (McClelland, 
1967), tolerance for ambiguity (Schere, 1982), and persuasiveness (Sexton & Bowman, 
1985), to mention a few. 
When solely focusing on the nature of the individual, one neglects to capture the 
variety in the identified entrepreneurial opportunities and how this affects the decision to 
start a business (Gartner, 1990). Shane and Venkataraman (2000) writes that: 
 
 “empirical support (or lack of support) for attributes that differentiate entrepreneurs 
from other members of society is often questionable, because these attributes confound the 
influence of opportunities and individuals.” (p. 218) 
 
A second stream of entrepreneurship research has looked at the role of the 
environment, seeking to identify the circumstances under which entrepreneurship will 
take place. Examples include the dynamics of an industry (Hannan & Freeman, 1993), 
the market structure (Acs & Audretsch, 1990),  the dynamics of technological change 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986), and the sociocultural status of entrepreneurship (Begley & 
Tan, 2001). This research also fails to adequately explain entrepreneurship as solely 
focusing on the environment excludes the mediating affect of the entrepreneurial 
individual (Shane, 2003). Being an entrepreneur in the wrong context is not particularly 
helpful, nor is having the most conducive environment but lacking entrepreneurial 
individuals. The past century of economic development and research suggests that 
entrepreneurship occurs at the nexus of promising opportunities and enterprising 
individuals (Venkataraman, 1997). Instead, this thesis turns our attention to a nexus 
where the overall conditions are not nearly as promising as in a developed country text, 
focusing instead on the “left tail”, concerning entrepreneurs with weak formal 
competencies. 
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3.1. Merging Two Streams of Entrepreneurship Research 
In order to bring about a coherent view of entrepreneurship, Shane and Venkataraman 
(2000) propose a conceptual framework for entrepreneurship that combines the existence 
of entrepreneurial opportunities in a certain setting with the individual’s ability to 
discover and exploit these opportunities. Figure 1 is an illustration of the framework. The 
framework does not imply that discovery leads to the decision to exploit, but it implies 
that the decision to exploit follows the discovery, which follows the existence of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. This process is the basis for how, in this thesis, I am 
conceptualizing entrepreneurship, and as illustrated in Figure 1, this thesis is mostly 
concerned with the discovery and decision-to-exploit phase. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Conceptual framework for entrepreneurship. 
Note: Illustration based on an interpretation of Shane and Venkataraman (2000). 
 
 
3.2. Defining Entrepreneurship 
The term entrepreneur stems from the French word “entreprendre,” which means “to 
undertake.” Its first half, “entre,” means between, and the other half, “prendre,” means 
to take. In other words, at the center of economic development is the entrepreneur, who 
through innovation mixes the available resources, such as markets, products, and 
production methods, into new combinations (Schumpeter, 1934). However, if a product 
market is in a state of perfect microeconomic equilibrium, where every factor of 
production as well as output is fully priced, there would be no need for an entrepreneur 
(Hayek, 1948). It would be like a future state of research, where all possible research 
questions have been answered, and hence no need for a doctoral dissertation. 
In terms of researching microentrepreneurs, are clients of a microfinance 
institution entrepreneurs? Are Yunus’ basket weavers from 1974 entrepreneurs? What 
about street vendors in Bangalore, India (Williams & Gurtoo, 2012)? Schumpeter (1934) 
distinguishes between two kinds of individuals: “mere managers and entrepreneurs” (p. 
83). Being entrepreneurial is “not a profession and as a rule not a lasting condition” (p. 
78). A static non-evolving small business is not a form of entrepreneurship. Rather, 
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entrepreneurship involves the creation of something new. Entrepreneurship occurs at the 
nexus between good opportunities and enterprising individuals (Venkataraman, 1997). 
Combining Schumpeter’s view of an entrepreneur as a “special type” with the 
concept of entrepreneurship occurring at the nexus between individuals and valuable 
opportunities, we can define entrepreneurs as individuals who through a process of discovery and 
exploitation seek change, which can be manifested in many ways: a new product, a new market, societal 
change, cultural change, etc. Such a change can include improving a small business or 
changing a life situation to the better. As such, Mohammad Yunus’ argument that “all 
human beings are born entrepreneurs” (Yunus, 2013b, p. 4) is valid, at least in situations 
where humans seek to better themselves, or to achieve change through a goal-directed 
process. Yunus’ argument is that many do not even have the chance to go through such a 
process: “Some get a chance to unleash that capacity. Some never got that chance, never 
knew that he or she has [sic] that capacity” (Yunus, 2013b, p. 2). 
 
 
3.3. The Existence of Entrepreneurial Opportunities in the Informal 
Economy 
The existence of entrepreneurial opportunities means that the product market allows for 
products and services to be sold at a price greater than the cost. Importantly, in the 
creation of new products or services, there is a belief by the entrepreneur that there is a 
profit to be made. Schumpeter (1934) referred to this as the entrepreneurial profit. It implies 
that there is imperfect information about costs and prices, which allows for mispricing. 
In addition, the absence of competition from other like-minded individuals is crucial to 
the chance of reaping an entrepreneurial reward (Casson, 2005). The literature provides 
two different views on how entrepreneurial opportunities come to exist. Schumpeter 
(1934) argues that they come about through changes in technology, politics, 
demographics, and the surrounding environment, which create new information that 
then can be used to form new products and services. The alternative view is that the 
opportunities exist, but that the information held by different individuals leads to 
different discoveries (Kirzner, 1973). These two views come together in Shane and 
Venkataraman, (2000), who argue that they represent two different forms of 
opportunities. 
The informal economy is characterized by being somewhat more economically 
isolated than in a formal economy, from a business perspective. While, for instance, 
actors in the informal economy buy goods and services from the formal economy, the 
opposite is not necessarily true (Böhme & Thiele, 2012).  In addition, drawing new 
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customers from nearby villages or neighborhoods is costly. The competitive situation is 
also intense—many engage in similar activities, such as construction or wholesale and 
retail trade. In such markets, the firms are operating in local “monopolies,” but their 
market power does not extend very far (for example, within a 10-minute walk of the 
shop). As a result, entrepreneurial opportunities quickly erode. For instance, an individual 
may see that a neighbour is making a profit on his or her brick-making business, so the 
individual decides to start a business. As soon as he or she starts, the cost of raw material 
used to make bricks goes up, and since more bricks are being created, the price of bricks 
drops. Hence, the entrepreneurial opportunity may cease to exist. 
 
3.3.1. Money as Medium of Exchange 
In many areas of the world, the lack of financial institutions creates obstacles to 
entrepreneurial opportunities. In a barter economy, the lack makes for high transaction 
costs when goods are exchanged. How many goats are needed in an exchange for a cow, 
for instance? Savings is also difficult. Just imagine saving some fresh meat for a purchase 
at a later stage.  Hence money, as once argued by (Smith, 1776), even mobile money such 
as M-PESA in Kenya, acts as a medium of exchange and makes exchanging goods and 
services more efficient, with less time spent on searching for suitable exchange partners 
(Jack & Suri, 2011; Jones, 1976; Saving, 1971). Through lower transaction costs, it allows 
for more entrepreneurial opportunities. 
3.3.2. Capital Availability 
Various studies on the impact of capital on start-ups exist (see Table 2, below). Some 
researchers argue it has a positive impact (Gaspar, 2009; Pennings, 1982; Samila & 
Sorenson, 2011), whereas others argue for a reverse causality, i.e., that it is the number of 
start-ups that drives the availability of capital, not the other way around (Kreft & Sobel, 
2005). Perhaps it is as Steve Jobs once said: “A lot of times people don’t know what they 
want, until you show it to them” (Business Week, 1998). Introducing money, such as the 
mobile currency M-PESA, makes people think about what they can do with the money. 
This is further exemplified by a study in Nigeria, where funding was available but had 
little impact; as it turned out, many of the entrepreneurs were not aware that funding 
existed (Oyefuga, Siyanbola, Afolabi, Dada, & Egbetokun, 2008). The existing research-
based literature lacks studies on the effects of capital availability on entrepreneurship in 
the informal economy (Webb, Morris, et al., 2013). 
Both groups of researchers may be correct, as there may be a causal direction 
going both ways, i.e., the availability of capital may be supply induced and demand driven 
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at the same time. On the one hand, we have the capital providers (supply), and on the 
other hand, we have the microentrepreneurs (demand). An increase in capital availability 
shifts the supply curve to the right (see Figure 2, where P is the cost of capital and Q is 
the capital availability of, for instance, microloans). The effect is a lower cost of capital, 
which thereby increases the odds of creating entrepreneurial profits. Having subsidized 
funding has the same effect as increasing the supply (as when the donors request less in 
return)—the capital availability is increased. Research shows indeed that the demand 
curve is downward sloping and quite steep (Karlan & Zinman, 2008), though perhaps 
slightly flatter than I have illustrated in Figure 2, below. A flat demand curve could exist, 
for instance, if the clients are not well versed in financial terminology. After all, interest 
rates on loans provided to microfirms in the informal economy can vary widely, from 
30% to over 100% per annum. However, if the bank charges too high of an interest rate 
despite the insensitive demand, the bank will eventually find its portfolio of loans has 
gone bad. Hence, there is a correcting mechanism built in. However, if demand is 
insensitive to interest rates, then extending more capital into the market will not 
necessarily have much impact on interest rates. This therefore starts to beg the question 
of how sensitive microentrepreneurs are to interest rates, but it also explains why many 
view credit and debt as a last resort (Magill & Meyer, 2005), since borrowing money with 
high interest rates will put some individuals in financial trouble.  
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Figure 2.  Illustration of an increase in the capital availability lowers the lending rates. 
3.3.3. Reluctance to Debt 
Several studies have shown that not all people are interested in taking on debt (Johnston 
& Morduch, 2008; Magill & Meyer, 2005; Navajas & Tejerina, 2006). It may be that many 
are not financially literate, and as some individuals make bad financial decisions and take 
on too much debt, the fear of microcredit spreads. In one study, less than half of the 
eligible households took out a loan, and many also relied on other forms of informal 
sources of credit (Karlan, Morduch, & Mullainathan, 2010). Such behavior creates an 
inelastic demand curve (see my illustration in Figure 3) where an increase in the capital 
supply creates a lower capital cost but has no impact on, for instance, the number of 
microloans offered. Financial literacy may also have something to do with the way the 
demand curve is shaped. For instance, if clients do not understand interest rates or 
cannot do simple numerical exercises, the decision to finance will be based mostly on a 
following the herd mentality, or listening to or emulating successful role models. 
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Figure 3. Illustration of how an increase in the capital supply with an inelastic demand curve has little 
effect on the outreach. 
3.3.4. Market Imperfection 
When the market fails, Keynesian economic theory often points to government 
intervention (Keynes, 1936). Previous studies show that imperfect capital markets 
adversely affect entrepreneurship (D. S. Evans & Jovanovic, 1989; D. S. Evans & 
Leighton, 1989), thus warranting government intervention. Non-profit organizations may 
also play an important role (Weisbrod & Dominguez, 1986). In the case of the growth of 
the microfinance industry, both non-profits and governments have been active. For 
instance, one of the largest microfinance investment vehicles in the world is Oikocredit, 
which is a non-profit organization founded by churches. Another example is the 
Grameen Bank, which since its start had strong financial backing from the central bank 
of Bangladesh, the Ford Foundation, and the Norwegian government.  
Government involvement in the case of a non-functional financial market benefits 
the state, as the alternative will be to pick up the social cost of high unemployment. 
China is another example (Zhou, Xing, & Tong, 2009) where government has initiated 
several microfinance programs. Even the growth of the venture capital market in the US 
was made possible with the help of a government initiative and the Small Business 
Investment Act of 1958 (Brewer III & Genay, 1996; Coles Jr., 1973). The EU is currently 
pushing forward with some initiatives to foster better funding for microenterprises. 
While this thesis is concerned with the funding of microenterprises in the informal 
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economy of a developing country, some of the insights are likely also relevant to many 
situations in Europe, for instance, in terms of financing an improved integration and 
employment situation for asylum seekers, or the younger generation, many of whom are 
full of ideas but lacking in wealth. 
 
 
3.4. The Discovery of Entrepreneurial Opportunities in the Informal 
Economy 
3.4.1. Risk, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity 
While there maybe several entreprenurial profit opportunities in existance in any given 
market at any given time, there is also a need for the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
In a world with perfect information, all products and services are sold or bought at prices 
that are at equilibrium and there are no entrepreneurial opportunities to be discovered, as 
the invisiable hand have already “discovered” them all. However, rarely are decisions 
made in such a way that resources are optimally allocated. Part of an entrepreneur’s 
reality is the uncertainty of the future (Knight, 1921) wherein resources may not always 
be allocated optimally. Knight (1921) separates risks and uncertainty, arguing that risk 
pertains to situations where we have knowledge of the probabilities, whereas with 
uncertainty we do not know the probabilities. Risk-taking research is split in two avenues: 
1) risk-taking skills sit with the entrepreneur (Knight 1942); and 2) risk-taking sits with 
the capital provider (Schumpeter, 1934). Knight’s view implies that it is the entrepreneur 
who best understands the risks and uncertainty, whereas in Schumpeter’s view the 
capitalist makes that decision by comparing risk to the expected return. While a 
microfinance institution will make that judgment based on a credit assessment, I side 
with Knight in this thesis and argue that, lacking financial capital constraints, the 
entrepreneur will “use a suboptimal amount of capital” (Evans & Jovanovic, 1989, p. 4). 
Apart from risk and uncertainty, an entrepreneur may also refrain from acting 
because of ambiguity (Minniti, 2005). This implies that while the range of outcomes is 
known, the future road may still be too fuzzy or complex to embark on, especially if one 
lacks education, experience, or other relevant training. Financial decisions are typically 
complex, even in the formal economy. Therefore, financial literacy is a skill that 
specifically addresses an individual’s ability to process economic information (Lusardi & 
Mitchell, 2014). 
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3.4.2. Role Models and Access to Information 
Lacking the skills and know-how about what decisions to take, the entrepreneur may 
benefit from knowing role models for inspiration and support. The presence of role 
models helps provide social cues (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986), thereby reducing the 
potential ambiguity in a decision (Minniti, 2005). Other potential helpers may very well 
include the credit officer. In the case described earlier with the basket weavers, 
Muhammad Yunus facilitated the creation of an entrepreneurial profit when lending 
money at a subsidized interest rate. We do not know if it was he who first saw the idea or 
if it was the group leader, but the fact that he was part of the project may have influenced 
the basket weavers positively. Yunus had the knowledge and experience to see that by 
offering a loan at a competitive rate, an entrepreneurial opportunity would emerge for the 
basket weavers. What makes it possible for one person to discover an opportunity and 
another not is that one holds information that the other does not (Kirzner, 1973). Indeed, 
differences in access to information can come from many different sources in life, such as 
through experience, education, social networks, information searches on the internet, 
business education, role models, and credit officers.  
3.4.3.  Recognizing the Opportunity 
The cognitive nature of the entrepreprenurial discovery process implies a strong reliance 
on the individual, but also on the role models and the social cues and acceptance they 
provide (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986). In microfinance, as exemplified in particular in 
Bangladesh by the Grameen Bank, the use of group lending demands unique capabilities 
from the individuals and in particular the group leader, whose role is vital in the 
performance of the group (Hermes & Lensink, 2007; Paxton, Graham, & Thraen, 2000). 
Assuming entrepreneurial opportunities exist, why are some people more likely to 
discover an opportunity than others? Research in the US highlights two key aspects 
behind the discovery: absorptive capacity and cognitive processes (Shane, 2003). The idea 
behind absorptive capacity is that an individual, through prior knowledge, knows about 
markets and how to serve them. Cognitive processes of importance are “intelligence, 
perceptive ability, creativity and not seeking risks” (Shane, 2003, p. 60). 
With relation to microfinance-funded entreprenurers, often the human capital 
and/or business experience is limited primarily as a result of a poor education system. 
Studies have suggested that the human capital may be a stronger limiting factor to 
microenterprises in an informal economy than financial capital (Bjorvatn & Tungodden, 
2010; Berge, Bjorvatn, & Tungodden, 2011; Berge, Bjorvatn, Juniwaty, & Tungodden, 
2012). Berge et al. (2011) found in randomized field experiment that: 
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 “training had a significant effect on the business of males, increasing profits by around 
20–30 percent, whereas we do not find any evidence of the training improving profits of 
the businesses of females” (p. 11).  
 
To conclude, discovering entrepreneurial opportunities in the informal sector 
requires an understanding of the markets and intelligence or perceptive ability. We may 
expect that role models play a role in compensating for the lack of experience and market 
knowledge. Financial literacy, with which we are also concerned, does to some degree 
also deal with the issue of cognitive processes, as shown in Lusardi, Mitchell, and Curto 
(2010), since an individual must be able to consider an opportunity and relate that 
opportunity to the cost of interest, the potential return that opportunity will yield, and 
the potential risk involved in the project.  
 
 
3.5. The Decision to Exploit Entrepreprenurial Opportunities in the 
Informal Economy 
The mere discovery of an opportunity is not enough to explain entrepreneurship. There 
must also be a decision to exploit the entrepreneurial opportunity. This decision is made 
with regard to the expected value from the opportunity. Financial literacy is vital in this 
regard (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014). In deciding to exploit an entrepreneurial opportunity, 
the potential individual entrepreneur must weigh the opportunity against the opportunity 
of doing something else, such as pursuing education or employment. Both monetary and 
psychcological costs need to be incorporated into the equation, in addition to a 
compensation for the risks involved (an uncertainty premium). To a poor person, 
however, there may not be many other opportunities. Therefore, this may create 
situations where entrepreneurship is pursued despite a neutral entreprenurial opportunity, 
at best. We may call this form of entrepreneurship necessity driven, i.e., a person is pulled 
into entrepreneurship because of lack of other options (Reynolds, Camp, Bygrave, Autio, 
& Hay, 2002). Research has shown that necessity-driven entrepreneurship does not lead 
to economic development at a national level (Acs, 2006), but to the individual it is better 
than the alternative—unemployment. 
Since 2000, a growing amount of research has focused on the bridge between the 
discovery phase and the decision to exploit an opportunity. This phase is called the 
evaluation phase, and four parts of this process have emerged as important (Wood & 
McKelvie, 2015): 
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1. Mental models—emphasizing the cognitive aspects and the entrepreneur’s 
ability to predict and evaluate the potential feasibility of the business idea 
(Keh, Foo, & Lim, 2002). 
2. Integration—the ability to visualize and individuate that this is an idea that he 
or she can pursue (Wood, McKelvie, & Haynie, 2014). 
3. Congruence—the drive to understand how one’s conception of an 
opportunity compares with others’ conceptions (Murnieks, Haynie, Wiltbank, 
& Harting, 2011). 
4. Action orientation—the ability to evaluate what one has that he or she can 
contribute, and what resources are needed (Haynie, Shepherd, & McMullen, 
2009).  
 
In the evaluation phase process, in the informal economy, financial literacy links with the 
mental model, as it directly touches on the individual’s numeric ability, but also his or her 
ability to comprehend basic financial concepts such as return and risk. Role models have 
the ability to influence points 2, 3, and 4 by acting as a social cue, a sounding board, and a 
source of inspiration. 
3.5.1. Industry and Environment 
Research in Britain has shown that the type of industry has an effect on the likelihood of 
new firm formation (Taylor, 1996). Within an industry, there are many conditions that 
influence opportunity exploitation, including knowledge conditions, demand conditions, 
industry life cycles, and industry structure (Shane, 2003, p. 121). In a relatively more 
capital intensive industry such as agriculture, microfinance may play role, as the more 
capital intensive an industry is, the fewer firms are founded (Audretsch & Mahmood, 
1995). In the informal economy, there is a tendency to find heavily concentrations in 
certain industries. For instance, manufacturing, repair services, and trade is typically 
numerically as important as wholesale retail. Therefore, in analyzing the informal 
economy, it is vital to take note of differences in industry classification as compared to 
the formal economy (United Nations, 2008). 
3.5.2. Wealth 
Personal wealth allows for self-financing of ventures, which enables the entrepreneur to 
maintain more control over the direction of the new venture but is nonetheless a 
challenging balancing act (Saxton, Saxton, Steen, & Verreynne, 2010). Several studies 
suggest that people with more wealth are more likely to become entrepreneurs 
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(Blanchflower & Oswald, 1990; D. S. Evans & Jovanovic, 1989; Jackson & Rodkey, 1994; 
Paulson & Townsend, 2004). Goldstein (1984) proposes that under-capitalization 
improves the firm-level efficiency of entrepreneurship as it, on the one hand, vows for 
increased cost consciousness and, on the other hand, allows for less diversified 
ownership. However, a key feature of the informal economy is the lack of wealth. In a 
microfinance perspective, it may seem awkward to discuss wealth, but research indicates 
that savings is important, as it allows for increased productivity and income, investments 
in education and health, and reduced illness (Dupas & Robinson, 2009, 2011). 
3.5.3. Economic Stability and Capital Availability  
A stable economic environment is positive for entrepreneurship (Harper, 1998). One 
worry is inflation and an unstable currency, particularly as it adds to the uncertainty when 
buying a good at one point and selling it later. In many of the countries where 
microfinance is used, inflation is running high, which may be a hindrance to 
entrepreneurship.  
The decision to exploit an entrepreneurial opportunity will also be affected by capital 
availability. As discussed earlier, previous research supports the proposition that capital 
availability affects new firm formation rates (see Table 2). In the conceptual framework 
of entrepreneurship, the availability of capital both affects the existence of 
entrepreneurial opportunities and the decision to exploit. 
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Table 2.  Selected studies on the impact of entrepreneurial funding. 
Author Country Method Findings 
Pennings (1982) USA Regression analysis Capital availability increased firm 
formation rates 
Dobbin & Dowd 
(1997) 
USA Multiple regression analysis The British capital market had a 
positive impact on new railroad 
ventures in the US 
Kreft & Sobel 
(2005) 
USA Granger–Sims causality test on 
data between 1991 and 2002 for 
43 US states 
Entrepreneurial activity results in a 
capital inflow 
Oyefuga et al. 
(2008) 
Nigeria Qualitative study, 
questionnaires and interviews 
Although the scheme had been helpful 
to some SMEs, most of them were not 
aware of its activities and potential 
Gaspar (2009) Portugal Questionnaire 74% of entrepreneurs who obtained 
funding from venture capital would 
not have started a business without 
that support 
Samila & 
Sorenson (2011) 
USA Panel data: 329 US 
metropolitan areas from 1993 
to 2002 
Increases in the supply of venture 
capital stimulates the production of 
new firms 
 
3.5.4. Non-Psychological Factors 
As discussed earlier, one research stream has attempted to identify psychological 
characteristics that explain entrepreneurship (Begley & Boyd, 1987). However, these 
factors alone do not make individuals undertake entrepreneurial opportunities. It has an 
influence but is not a direct cause. Despite all the right psychological characteristics, a 
person may still not make the decision to exploit.  
Non-psychological factors include education, business experience, age, and social 
position. Education increases the likelihood of exploiting an opportunity because it 
improves the expected return. The understanding of the entrepreneurial process 
improves (Casson, 1995). Moreover, Isaga (2012) studied 300 small- and medium-sized 
entrepreneurs in Tanzania involved in the the furniture industry and found that 
demographics (i.e. the age distribution of individuals) have a positive effect on business 
growth. In addition, previous work experience improves the ability to discover an 
opportunity. Therefore level of business training is also an important factor in the 
decision to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities. 
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Over time, as a person obtains more business experience, the opportunity costs of 
pursuing alternative strategies may rise, i.e., one may have a job somewhere else with a 
high salary, or a family situation that requires less risk be taken. Starting up a business 
takes a lot of time. Therefore, age of the entrepreneur is a factor influencing the 
likelihood of entreprenurial discovery. Shane (2003) claims that “age has a curvilinear 
relationship with the likelihood of opportunity exploitation” (p. 89). From a certain age 
onward, depending on context, the willingness to bear risk typically decreases. 
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4. Methodology 
 
4.1. Background 
The Norwegian Christian organization Mission Alliance is engaged in microfinance in 
several countries, including Bolivia, Ecuador, Vietnam, and most recently, Liberia. Loans 
are offered to individuals, families, or groups who seek to “create their own business, 
develop their existing production or improve their living conditions” (Mission Alliance, 
2015). Given the above discussion of who an entrepreneur is, I argue that Mission 
Alliance’s microfinance recipients, in the selected context used here (see section 4.2 
below), meet that definition well.  
These customers typically do not legally own any property, nor do they have a 
documented income or verifiable credit history. Because of this, they are not eligible for a 
loan through a regular commercial bank. However, this does not imply that the 
microfinance institution will accept any client; customers must undertake some basic 
business management training, be serious about their venture, and be willing and capable 
of repaying a loan. Mission Alliance often performs a thorough application process in 
which the credit officer, in dialogue with the credit branch manager, decides whether the 
business idea and the income it is expected to generate will allow for the individual to 
repay the loan. The bank does not discriminate based on ethnicity, gender, religious 
beliefs, cultural beliefs, or physical handicap. 
Through my contact with the Norwegian Mission Alliance, I was able to 
collaborate with the microcredit organization Banco D-Miro in Ecuador as part of an 
internal study. I had the academic lead, including the research design, and I worked with 
two team members, Hans-Martin and Carolina Espegren from the Norwegian University 
of Science and Technology (NTNU) in Trondheim, Norway, intensely over a period of 
two months, creating a survey, interviewing several clients (transcribed interviews), 
executing the survey, and maintaining a close relationship with the call center. These two 
months were then followed by several months of analyzing and also accessing more 
historical data. 
 
4.2. Empirical Setting 
Banco D-Miro in 2013 served roughly 40,000 clients in mostly the poor coastal regions 
of Ecuador (red area in Figure 4), with a gross loan portfolio of USD 56.6 million. 
Average monthly loan balance was USD 1,391.40. It also had USD 17 million in deposits 
and 43,422 depositors. It is one of the most respected microfinance institutions in South 
America and is ranked as the Number 1 microfinance institution by the Multilateral 
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Investment Fund and the Microfinance Information Exchange (Martínez, 2014). When 
we began working with D-Miro, their rating with Microfinanza was BBB+ but today it is 
A-.  
 
Figure 4.  Map of Ecuador and researched area. 
Source: Adapted from University of Texas (2008) with my own markings in red. 
Note: Red marks the provinces and the areas from which the microentrepreneurs in this study stem. 
 
4.3. Ecuador and the Informal Economy 
As given by its name, Ecuador is located on the equator, on the west coast of South 
America. It has a population of roughly 16 million (United Nations, 2015) and has a land 
area of about 85% the size of Norway. The capital is Quito which is located in a generally 
safer and mountainous area, as compared to the largest city, Guayaquil. The US state 
department rates Ecuador as Critical in terms of criminality, including crimes such as 
armed robbery, sexual assault, and even murder or attempted murder. In Guayaquil it is 
fairly common with what is known as express kidnappings, which locally is known as 
secuestro express. In fact, part of my research team experienced this at one point. The US 
state department writes the following about these incidents: 
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Shortly after the passenger enters a taxi, the vehicle is typically intercepted by armed 
accomplices of the driver, who threaten passengers with weapons, rob passengers of their 
personal belongings, and force victims to withdraw money from ATMs. Increasingly, 
victims have been beaten or raped during these incidents. (U.S. Department of State, 
2015) 
 
The population growth has remained high, nearly tripling over the past 50 years. The 
labor market in Ecuador is characterized by being widely informal with about 80% 
affected (ILO, 2013). During recent years the country has been negatively affected by the 
weather phenomenon El Niño and more recently the major earthquake with a magnitude 
of 7.8 on the Richter scale with a death toll of more than 650 people. The poor living 
conditions, often in simple wooden housing or semi-finished brick houses, commonly on 
steep slopes, contribute towards the high death rates.  
 
Much of the country has remained largely agrarian, but over the last three decades the 
population has increasingly urbanized with today 64% living in urban areas (United 
Nations, 2014). As a result of the urbanization, not unique to Ecuador but common in 
many developing countries, is the creation of slums, which by some scholars are referred 
to as poverty traps, which limit the development of human capital, leads to investment 
inertia, and holds little value to politicians (Marx, Stoker, & Suri, 2013). In addition to 
poverty, many are also informally employed or carry our informal businesses. By informal 
businesses, this thesis considers “businesses operating out of sight of government 
regulation, either completely or in some small capacity” (Enriquez, 2015). These 
businesses operate outside of formal institutional boundaries (Webb, Bruton, et al., 
2013),  but do not comply fully with all legal, regulatory, and tax requirements (Perry et 
al., 2007; Portes, Castells, & Benton, 1989). By informal businesses, we are not 
considering activities that would otherwise be considered illegal, such as the production 
or distribution of illicit drugs. 
 
4.4. Unit of Analysis 
The sample of 755 randomly selected microentrepreneurs, among the approximately 
40,000 clients at the end 2013, are mostly from the urban areas near Guayaquil—
Portoviejo, Machala, and La Libertad. Thirty-five percent had only completed primary 
school, while 59% had finished or had some sort of secondary school degree. Only 4% 
attained a degree beyond secondary school. In a similar study, Magill and Meyer (2005) 
found that for urban Ecuadorian enterprises, 46% had only finished primary school, 41% 
had at least some secondary education, and 12% had gone beyond the secondary 
education. They note that these levels are higher than for the general population.  
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4.5. Data Collection 
Various sources for data have been used. One of the sources is a survey, described below 
in more detail. Another is the microbank and the credit analyses they perform prior to 
extending a loan. A third is national credit bureau data, which helps in obtaining a full 
picture of the firm’s financial position. Finally, the thesis makes use of Statistics Ecuador 
and the United Nation’s industry classification scheme for the informal sector (United 
Nations, 2008). 
 
 
4.6. Survey Design 
The complete survey incorporated a total of 83 questions, but no respondent answered 
more than 60 questions, depending on what type of client answered the survey (see 
Appendix 1). Since the PhD research project was in collaboration with the bank’s own 
internal analysis, several questions were asked that did not relate to the PhD dissertation 
project but may be used in subsequent publications. Most questions, apart from Section 
A, were based on various academic studies (see note at the bottom of the survey). All in 
all we made 3,468 phone calls reaching 756 microentrepreneurs. These clients were 
drawn from three different pools of clients: 1) clients with payment difficulties; 2) clients 
who had not renewed their loan; and 3) clients with no payment difficulties. The 
individuals were in general happy to talk to a representative of the microbank and were 
also incentivized to help out in the survey by getting a free calendar at the nearest bank 
office. It took approximately 20 minutes to carry out the interview with each individual, 
with all of the interviews taking place in December 2013. The complete survey is shown 
in Appendix 1, but for this thesis the only sections used were E , F, and G. Section H of 
the survey dealt with entrepreneurial success, but yielded little variability in responses and 
therefore was not appropriate to use. The other sections are intended to be used for 
other related articles following this thesis. 
 In close cooperation with the local call center and their marketing director John 
Pacheco, Hans-Martin and Carolina Espegren and I executed the overall survey. The 
local call center team, John, Hans-Martin, and Caroline provided valuable input into the 
survey design, and we discussed the wording of some questions intensely to make sure it 
was correctly translated and understood by the person at the other end of the telephone 
line. Each call lasted 20 minutes. While Hans-Martin and Carolina were initially asked to 
look at two other bank-related issues unique to Banco D-Miro, my role was to lead the 
academic part of the survey. An initial test survey of roughly 60 interviews was first 
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carried out to make sure we obtained reasonable and varied answers. Research on the use 
of a five-point versus a seven-point scale has shown that both scales produce the same 
mean score once rescaled; the use of a ten-point scale format tends to produce slightly 
lower means (Dawes, 2008). However, we discovered that the individuals did not 
understand a numbered scale, as we obtained little variability in the answers. If given a 
choice of 1 to 5 (or 1 to 7), typically they would all answer with a 5 (or a 7). Thus we 
changed the wording to better describe the various options (see Table 3Error! Reference 
source not found. below) and were able to obtain more variability in the answers. 
 
Table 3. Example of question using Likert scales. 
R. Role models 
 Indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. 
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R1.- I am personally familiar with successful entrepreneurs      
R2.- In my network of friends and colleagues, there are successful entrepreneurs      
R3.- I regard some of the entrepreneurs I know as role models      
R4.- Some entrepreneurs I know have been a source of influence for me      
 
 
4.7. Practical Activities Relevant to the Research Process 
In order to better understand the microentrepreneurs, we also carried out in-depth 
interviews with approximately 30 individuals, of whom 10 were videotaped and partially 
transcribed. These were random clients from the areas near Guayaquil and included 
clients with no payment difficulties, clients with payment difficulties, as well as former 
clients. The interviewss helped better address the research questions in light of both 
entrepreneurial performance and also in terms of why the individuals sought financing. 
All visits were made together with a credit officer,  which gave us an opportunity to talk 
more about how the credit evaluations were done and how the clients were selected. 
When we did the interviews, the credit officer was not present, to allow the clients to talk 
freely. We also did an online survey of the 100 credit officers with the bank, which 
helped in better understanding the clients. 
 
 
4.8.  Ethical Issues 
During the survey, we did not get the impression that clients felt provoked or intimidated 
by our questions. When we did the on-site interviews, we sometimes encountered 
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individuals who had difficulties in their business and who found it difficult to talk about 
these issues. Some of them even cried a little when telling us about how, for instance, 
someone had stolen a car used to transport bread, which meant they had fallen behind in 
paying the interest on the loan used to purchase the car. Requiring loan recipients to have 
insurance against theft may therefore be an option for the microbanks to consider, 
although it may be difficult and costly to enforce. 
 
 
4.9. Microenterprise Performance 
Schumpeter (1934) describes performance in terms of an entrepreneurial profit. The 
empirical entrepreneurship literature uses different ways of expressing firm performance. 
In one of the pioneering studies on the relationship between financial capital and 
performance, Honig (1998) used income as an indicator of performance, as did 
Copestake et al. (2001), who also used profit growth and quality of life. In a quantitative 
study on Malaysian microenterprises, Mahmood and Rosli (2013) use a subjective scale 
from 1 to 7 to measure performance, including such measures as sales revenue, profits, 
enterprise stability, employment growth, reduction in production costs, customer 
satisfaction, market outreach, value of business assets, business networks, efficiency, 
growth, profit, size, liquidity, success/failure, and market share. Of these measures, 
efficiency, growth, and profit are most often used (Murphy, Trailer, & Hill, 1996). Table 4 
below shows some studies that have looked at the connection between finance capital 
and microenterprise performance. Increasingly, researchers are also using a return-to-
capital measure (De Mel, McKenzie, & Woodruff, 2008; McKenzie & Woodruff, 2008). 
While there are comprehensive measures of performance to be used, such as cash flow 
return on investment (Madden 1998), access to detailed data is one of the biggest 
obstacles when analyzing informal microenterprises, suggesting that simpler measures 
may need to be used. This thesis makes use of three measures of performance: 1) 
operating efficiency measured as ROA; 2) income generation measured as profits; and 3) 
sales growth to capture the momentum in the business. 
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 Table 4.  Research on the role of financial capital on the performance of microenterprises. 
Reference Journal Constructs Dependent 
variable 
Sample Findings 
Webb, Morris, 
and Pillay (2013) 
JDE Credit line Sales growth 156 
microentrepreneurs in 
South Africa 
Finds a negative relation 
between receive a credit line and 
sales growth 
Mahmood & 
Rosli (2013) 
MRR Microcredit Subjective 
performance 
measurement 
756 micro and small 
enterprises in Malaysia 
Microcredit is positively and 
significantly correlated with 
performance 
Hietalahti & 
Linden (2006) 
PDS Loan size Profits 21 microentrepreneurs 
in South Africa 
A strong positive correlation 
was found between loan size 
and profits 
Bosma, Van 
Praag, Thurik, & 
De Wit (2004) 
SBE Financial 
capital 
Survival, profits, 
employment 
1000 new business 
founders in the 
Netherlands 
Finds that capital constraint at 
the start has a negative impact 
on survival times and earnings 
Copestake, 
Bhalotra, & 
Johnson (2001) 
JDS Loan size Profits and 
household 
income 
Survey among 420 in 
Zambia 
Borrowers who obtained a 
second loan experienced 
significantly higher growth in 
business profits and household 
income. 
Honig (1998) JBV Financial 
Capital 
Average 
monthly profit 
215 Jamaican 
microenterprises 
Model explained 30% of the 
differences in income, R2 of 
33.9% for all cases. 
Note: JBV—Journal of Business Venturing, MRR—Management Research Review, SBE—Small Business 
Economics, PDS—Progress in Development Studies, JDS—Journal of Development Studies, JDE—Journal of 
Developmental Entrepreneurship. 
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5. Summary and Conclusion 
In the mid-1970s, microfinance began a new era of growth, pioneered by the work of 
Professor Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank, with a mission to eradicate poverty 
from the face of the earth. In 2006, when Yunus and the Grameen Bank received the 
Nobel pieze price for their work, Yunus expressed his vision in the Nobel lecture: 
 
I firmly believe that we can create a poverty-free world if we collectively believe in it. In a 
poverty-free world, the only place you would be able to see poverty is in the poverty 
museums (Yunus, 2006). 
 
Presently, more than 200 million individuals globally have a microfinance loan, 
compared to 13 million in 1997 (Reed, Marsden, Ortega, Rivera, & Rogers, 2014). 
Microfinance is today synonymous with external entrepreneurial finance in the informal 
economy, and it is beginning to reach magnitudes where significant population groups 
are being affected. However, research has struggled to find support for the argument that 
microfinance helps individuals get out of poverty (Roodman & Morduch, 2013), and 
critiques by some journalists and researchers have been harsh on microfinance (Bateman 
& Chang, 2012; Heinemann, 2013). This thesis therefore adresses several firm-level 
drivers and issues of microenterprises, the modus operandi in the informal economy. 
The informal economy can be assumed to follow a similar entrepreneurship 
process (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) to the formal economy, although it is also 
somewhat more isolated, since few buyers from the formal economy ever buy goods or 
services from the informal economy (Böhme & Thiele, 2012). Further, many 
microentrepreneurs in the informal economy become involved in similar business 
activities to their friends and neighbors, particularly construction, wholesale and retail 
trade, and restaurants. This creates an environment where competition is high and where 
it may also be difficult for entrepreneurship opportunities to exist, especially if the cost of 
borrowing capital is excessively high. Through the rise of microfinance institutions, 
capital can potentially be provided at more affordable interest rates than those offered by 
local loan sharks. 
If money is not available, engaging in trade or general business activities will 
involve high transaction costs, which hinder the formation of entrepreneurial 
opportunities even further. By introducing money as a medium of exchange, transaction 
costs are lowered, thus enabling more entrepreneurial opportunities to exist. The same 
holds true for the increased use of mobile money. 
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Discovering an entrepreneurial opportunity requires keeping a close eye on the 
market and understanding what customers need. This study was performed on 
microentrepreneurs in Ecuador, clients of Banco D-Miro, who have been running a 
business over some years and can be assumed to be somewhat experienced at this. A 
common characteristic for all individuals in our sample is that they have at one point 
approached microfinance institutions to seek a loan for their microenterprise. We argue 
that that act is a symbol that this individual is following an entrepreneurial process and 
has decided that taking out a loan is a priori good for their business. In addition, our 
sample includes individuals who previously have had a loan, but are not longer clients. To 
sum up, there are a number of key lessons learned from this thesis: 
 
1. Risks of failure leads to risk aversion in borrowers 
Those who decide to take on debt earn a higher ROA and have higher sales growth as a 
form of insurance against the risk of default. These results are partly based on prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) which suggests that since individuals tend to 
exaggerate the fear of failure in comparison to a sure gain. In the informal economy, we 
see a high variability in performance level. 
 
2. Microdebt has no impact on ROA or growth, but impacts profits positively 
The panel study shows that in microenterprises a higher leverage is positively related to 
increased profits, but has no impact on the operating efficiency (ROA) or sales growth. 
This implies that the provision of microdebt is adding more income to the 
microentrepreneurs, income that will be used on improved housing or education. 
However, using debt does not improve the operating efficiency nor does it help the 
business grow, thus hindering the poor microentrepreneur on his or her path out of 
poverty. The resource-based view (Barney, 1991) predicted that resources are key to the 
performance, as have others researchers (D. S. Evans & Jovanovic, 1989) but as shown 
here in the informal economy, microdebt is only impacting profits, not ROA or sales 
growth. These findings imply that microdebt as a resource is not helping the 
microenterprises create a competitive advantage, but it does add extra income to the 
bottom line. 
 
3. Firms face a curvilinear (concave) relationship between size and performance 
My findings indicate a curvilinear (concave) relationship between the size of the 
microenterprise and ROA on the one hand and between size and profits on the other. 
No affect is measured on sales growth. This findings illustrates the challenge of growing 
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a small business. As the size increases, the profits and profitability may actually decrease 
initially and later increase, but before the microentrepreneur will likely have given up long 
before reaching that stage. This links to previous resources that suggest diminishing 
economies of scale (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010), a finding contrary to observations of 
formal firms. However, my findings suggest that the relationship is concave and the 
positive economies of scale, as Adam Smith once predicted, kick in at a later stage. 
 
4. Human capital investments (education/age) are not enhancing performance 
The results show no impact from education on microenterprise performance. In fact, the 
other parameter of human capital, experience (measured as age), is seen to be negatively 
correlated which could be a cohort effect, or may illustrate that younger 
microentrepreneurs take more risks than older. This suggests that human capital in the 
informal economy is not a resource that helps microentrepreneurs improve performance. 
 
5. The relationship between debt and performance is negatively moderated by 
number of employees 
The cross-sectional study shows a negative moderating effect on the relationship between 
leverage and performance, such that leverage has less impact on performance in smaller 
firms than larger firms. In previous studies (Honig, 1998) it was found that the 
relationship varied depending on number of employees. This study achieved somewhat 
similar results. 
 
6. Both entrepreneur characteristics and firm characteristics matter in the 
decision to finance 
Drawing inspiration from human capital theory and the resource-based view, the results 
indicate that, contrary to previous research, entrepreneur characteristics matter more in 
the informal economy than in the formal economy. I find that being older, not married, 
and more financially literate increases the likelihood that microdebt will be undertaken. 
Traditional firm characteristics such as size, asset structure, and performance (ROA) are 
also positively linked to the decision to finance. For the informal economy, it was found 
that growth intent was also a key driver in the decision to finance, which is typically not 
found in research in formal economies. In terms of leverage, those who are financially 
more literate are more likely to take on more debt. Among the firm characteristics, it was 
again found that size and performance impacts leverage positively, but it was also found 
that asset structure is negatively related with leverage. 
 
 48 
 
7. Financial literate microentrepreneurs achieve higher ROA and profits 
The findings show a strong positive relation between financial literacy and ROA and 
between financial literacy and profits, suggesting that financially literate 
microentrepreneurs make better investment decisions. This illustrates again how a key 
resource, in this case a skill, helps microentrepreneurs earn higher returns. However, 
when relating to sales growth, financial literacy was not seen to have any impact. Perhaps 
other skills such as marketing (Webb, Morris, et al., 2013) are more important for growth. 
 
8. Knowing successful role models helps the microentrepreneur achieve higher 
ROA 
My results show a significant relationship between those microentreprenurs who indicate 
that they know a succesful role model and their performance in terms of ROA, 
suggesting that the role model has a positive impact on the operating effiency and 
perhaps the microentrepreneurs’ ability to make more sound investments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Schematics of essay and theory. 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to address the impact of microfinance on 
microenterprise performance in the informal economy through research-based theory 
(Barney, 1991) and human capital theory (Becker, 2009), as well as an exploration of the 
Essay 1: How does Resource 
Abundance Enhance 
Microenterprise Performance in 
the Informal Economy? 
Existence of 
Entrepreneurial 
Opportunities 
Discovery of 
Entrepreneurial 
Opportunities 
Decision to Exploit 
Entrepreneurial 
Opportunities 
Essay 2: The Impact of 
Entrepreneur Characteristics on 
Financing in the Informal Economy 
 
Essay 3: Financial literacy, Role 
Models and Micro-Enterprise 
Performance in the Informal 
economy 
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impact of financial literacy (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014) and role models (Bosma et al., 
2012). In addition, this thesis also investigated the role of entrepreneur (e.g., human 
capital and financial literacy) and firm characteristics in financial decision making. The 
essays are summarized in the introduction of this thesis and are also illustrated in Figure 5 
relative to how they fit in with entrepreneurship theory. By positioning the practice of 
microfinance within entrepreneurship theory, I try to better explain successes and failures 
in using microfinance, and the critical interplay between the environment and the 
individuals. My thesis sheds light on the role microdebt has in relation to entrepreneur 
characteristics. I argue that while microdebt enhances ROA and profits, it does not affect 
sales growth. The thesis shows the importance of understanding the characteristics of the 
microentrepreneur and that relevant skills, such as financial literacy, do have an impact 
on the bottom line of microenterprise. After all, economic and social development is not 
created by external sources from above, but through “its own initiative, from within” 
(Schumpeter, 1934, p. 63). 
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7. Essays  
The following three empirical essays are presented in this section:  
1. Engström, P. and T. Randøy “How does Resource Abundance Enhance 
Microenterprise Performance in the Informal Economy? 
2. Engström, P. “The Impact of Entrepreneur Characteristics on Financing in the 
Informal Economy” 
3. Engström, P. and A. McKelvie “Financial Literacy, Role Models and Micro-
Enterprise Performance in the Informal Economy” 
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7.1. Research essay 1: How does Resource Abundance Enhance 
Microenterprise Performance in the Informal Economy? 
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How does Resource Abundance Enhance Microenterprise 
Performance in the Informal Economy? 
 
by Pontus Engström and Trond Randøy2  
___________________ 
 
Applying the resource-based theory of the firm, we study the performance impact of three 
resource dimensions: access and use of debt, asset availability (size) and human capital 
investments. To test our hypotheses we use a sample of 755 Ecuadorian microenterprises 
operating in the informal economy. These microenterprises were clients of a microfinance 
institution for at least there years in the period 2005-2013. Our findings suggest that 
access to microcredit does not help microenterprises grow or become more efficient, but it 
does increase their aggregate profits. We find that the entrepreneur’s level of education does 
not impact performance, and that experience in fact has a negative impact on performance. 
We observe that there is a U-shaped economies of scale in relation to asset abundance, and 
no consistent pattern in relation to number of employees. Our findings imply that in the 
informal economy simply adding financial capital is not sufficient to enhance 
microenterprise efficiency. One policy implication of this study is that capital providers in 
emerging markets should solicit larger microenterprises, with potential for economies of 
scale. 
___________________ 
 
 
Introduction 
Entrepreneurship research has largely overlooked one important part of the economy – 
the invisible or informal economy (Bruton et al., 2008), defined as businesses operating 
out of sight of government regulations.3 While the informal economy constitutes up to 70 
percent of the GDP of some emerging economies (Buehn & Schneider, 2012), research 
has largely been anecdotal (Webb, Bruton, et al., 2013), perhaps largely due to the inherent 
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3 The informal economy is commonly defined as income-generating activities "not declared to the authorities for 
tax, social security and/or labour law purposes when it should be” (C. C. Williams & Nadin, 2012).   
 69 
difficulties in obtaining reliable data.  This study addresses this problem using a unique 
dataset and responds to three recent calls for research; on the funding of 
microenterprises4 (Moss et al., 2014), on the impact of microloans on performance 
(Berrone et al., 2014) and the need for a stronger theoretical underpinning to informal 
economy research (Webb, Bruton, et al., 2013). Based on the above motivation we 
specifically addresses the following Wes: (1) does the “resource” of debt enhance 
microenterprise performance in the informal economy; 2) do economies of scale exist, as an 
indicator of aggregate resources, and 3) does education/experience, as a indictor of 
enterprise competencies, enhance performance and 4) does the access to human resources 
(number of employees) in the enterprise moderate the relationships (1-3) presented 
above? This is visualized in Figure 1.  
 The broader motivation for this study of resource in microenterprises, concerns 
the role of microfinance in providing resources to such enterprises. Previous research has 
shown that access to microfinance enhance the broader social performance of 
microenterprises (Bruton et al., 2011). While the positive relationship between access to 
finance among microentrepreneurs and (their) poverty reducing impact, in their 
communities, has been difficult to identify (Roodman and Morduch 2013; Khandker 
2005), past research has not addressed the impact on microenterprise financial 
performance. Microfinance institutions are unique in that they are formal providers of 
finance that mostly serve microenterprises in the informal economy. In our review of 
existing research we thus identify a gap in the literature that, given the growth of 
microfinance, the relative size of the informal economy in emerging economies, and the 
theoretical distinctness of microenterprises, should be of both theoretical and public 
policy interest. 
With our research design we try to alleviate methodological weaknesses of past 
microenterprise research (Duvendack et al., 2011). Specifically, by using unique hand-
collected data and a broad set of measures (firm-based as well as entrepreneur-based 
measures) in the context of a large-scale multi-year dataset, we increase our ability to 
assess the impact of microfinance (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010) and other resources on 
microenterprise performance. Previous research has commonly defined performance with 
a single measure, or somewhat vaguely, such as using monthly income (Honig, 1998),  the 
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entrepreneur´s perception of performance (Berrone et al., 2014; Mahmood & Rosli, 2013), 
or business knowledge as a proxy for performance (Bjorvatn & Tungodden, 2010). 
Instead, we are applying three financial measures of microenterprise performance in order 
to capture essential traits of performance; 1) operating efficiency, 2) profit generation, and 
3) sales growth.  
We use Ecuador as the empirical context of this study, arguing it to be particularly 
appropriate for studying financing of entrepreneurship in the informal economy (World 
Bank, 2012). First, there is an extensive informal economy (Canelas 2014; Schneider et al. 
2010; Albornoz et al. 2011). Second, there are well-developed and regulated microfinance 
institutions specifically targeting the informal economy. Third, through unique access to 
inside information from one major microfinance institution, we gain access to exceptional 
and detailed entrepreneur-level and firm-level data. Fourth, we have access to 
microenterprise data that allow us to separate the financing of business-related activities 
(our focus) from the financing of microentrepreneurs’ personal consumption.  
This article is organized as follows. First, there is a review of entrepreneurship 
literature relating to financing, human capital investments, economies of scale and firm 
performance in the informal sector. Second, the hypotheses are developed. Third, the 
research methodology is presented, including constructs and measures. Following this, we 
test the hypotheses using various multivariate regression techniques with both cross-
sectional and panel data. Lastly, we discuss and draw conclusions on the findings, their 
limitations and their implications for scholars as well as practitioners. 
 
 
Theory development and hypotheses  
 
The resource-based theory and microfinance 
Based on the resource-based theory of the firm (Barney, 1991) a microenterprise 
can be considered a collection of resources; specifically its assets, capabilities, including the 
unique network and knowledge of the microentrepreneur. These resources are then used 
to create a sustainable advantage in the market place, or merely a firm advantage in the 
context of microentrepreneurs as argued by some researchers (Webb, Morris, et al., 2013). 
While previous research has implicitly made references to the resource-based theory, 
relatively little explicit referencing is done despite our knowledge of interenterprise 
performance differences and the path dependent trajectory for a firm´s development, i.e. 
today´s opportunities are a result of yesterday´s decisionsH (Lockett & Thompson, 2001). 
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Thus, the resources available to a microenterprise in the informal economy are here 
argued to be partly determinants of its performance. 
With reference to classical literature on entrepreneurship, the Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur creates profit through a process of innovation (Schumpeter, 1934), in which 
access to resources is crucial. When lacking the necessary resources, entrepreneurs engage 
in a variety of strategies to overcome this resource gap, of which borrowing external 
capital is one (Webb, Bruton, et al., 2013). Financial capital represents one of the most 
easily convertible resources. However, in the informal economy, microenterprises in 
developing countries are commonly excluded from formal financing. If financing is 
available, it often comes at an exorbitant cost, from moneylenders or other kinds of 
informal providers of capital, a cost so high that it may deter entrepreneurs from making 
any investments (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). Microfinance institutions commonly 
pursue a “double bottom line” of financial sustainability and social impact, such that they 
typically charging much lower interest rates than informal moneylenders.5 Therefore, 
microfinance institutions have emerged to fill the institutional void in the capital market, 
bridging the gap between the informal and the formal sector,  
Beginning at larger scale in mid-1970s, though the initiatives of Dr. Muhammad 
Yunus and the Grameen bank, who both received the Nobel peace prize in 2006 for their 
efforts, the microfinance industry has grown rapidly. Since 2009 the year-on-year growth 
has ranged between 11 percent and 17 percent (MicroRate, 2013). Presently, more than 
200 million individuals globally receive a microfinance loan, compared to 13 million in 
1997 (Reed et al., 2014). Microfinance is today synonymous with external entrepreneurial 
finance in the informal economy, and it is beginning to reach magnitudes where 
significant population groups are being affected. 
 
Risk taking and firm performance in the informal economy 
To a traditional banker, the poorest clients in the world are also the worst client. 
Perhaps this is the reason why financing of enterprises at the bottom of the pyramid 
(BOP) and in the informal economy has taken such a long time to develop. In order to 
understand financing of microentrepreneurs, we think it is beneficial to consider how the 
                                            
 
 
 
 
 
5 The term moneylenders refers to informal providers of credit that commonly charge 100 percent or more per year 
in interest rates and apply harsh collection methods. 
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traditional research on risk-taking is split in two avenues: one attributing the skills in risk-
taking to the entrepreneurs (Knight 1942) and another to the capitalists – the capital provider 
(Schumpeter, 1934). The Schumpeterian view implies that in an informal economy, the 
capitalists decide that it is too risky to invest compared to the expected return, thus 
creating an environment without access to capital. The opposing Knighterian view is that 
it is the entrepreneur, who best understands the risks and uncertainty of his or her 
business, both measurable and not measurable, who makes the decision to finance based 
on the available cost of capital. In this article we side with Knight, and as Evans and 
Jovanovic (1989), we argue that capital, and in particular a lack of capital, constrains an 
entrepreneur, causing them to “use a suboptimal amount of capital” (p. 4) in starting up 
their business. 
If the entrepreneur is a specialist in taking risk or alleviating uncertainty (Knight 
1921), seeking an external financier is not only a sign of a lack of financial capital, but also 
reflects an interest in sharing risk and uncertainty. We argue that the adverse self-selection 
by the entrepreneur in pursuing external funding from the microbank, (partly based on 
asymmetric information that the other sources of funding do not possess), makes the 
entrepreneur better informed about his or her opportunities. In order to deal with such 
adverse selection by entrepreneurs, the microfinance bank will conduct careful credit 
screening and apply interest rates and fees in order to compensate for the uncertainty of 
overly risky and/or unprofitable entrepreneurial investments or activities, and also to deter 
such projects. If these interest rates are set too high, then none of the proposed 
investments will be undertaken; if set too low, the bank’s operations will become 
unsustainable. To circumvent this dilemma, microbanks commonly use the “double 
bottom line” approach. This way microcredit providers incorporate the concept of both a 
social and a financial return, which has become the dominant logic of microfinance 
operations around the world (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). If the entrepreneur and 
microfinance institution are successful in its evaluation of the business potential, the 
lending activity should result in the improved performance of the business. Despite that 
recent research has questioned the (positive) impact of microfinance on poverty reduction 
within a community (Roodman & Morduch, 2013), researchers have to our knowledge 
not addressed the firm-level drivers behind these results, specifically the impact of access to 
microfinance and human capital investments on microenterprise performance. 
Honig (1998) provided one of the pioneering studies on the relation between 
access to financial capital and income (as an indicator of performance) among 
microenterprises in the Jamaican informal economy. He showed that those 
microenterprises who had received a business loan had higher income, especially among 
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the solo self-employed, and his main argument behind this effect was the range, quality 
and technological capacity of the business. Copestake et al. (2001) find, in the case of 
Zambia, that business performance and household income improved significantly upon 
the taking of a second loan, but that nearly half of the clients studied who did not 
continue with a second loan fared worse. From interviews carried out, they speculated that 
the improvements were due to investments, increased sales and diversification, whereas 
those who did not continue with a loan attributed the drop to a lack of capital. A 
qualitative case study by Hietalahti and Linden (2006) on poor women in northeastern 
South Africa reveals that some of the poorest women had been able to improve living 
conditions modestly through access to microloans, but also highlights that impact was 
stronger among the poorest women, than among the slightly better off but still poor 
entrepreneurs. In a recent quantitative study on Malaysian microenterprises, Mahmood 
and Rosli (2013) find that microcredit has a significant impact on firm performance, when 
measured subjectively by the microentrepreneur, highlighting the added value a borrowed 
external resource, in contrast to the internal resources as argued by (Barney, 1991). They 
attribute this effect to the ability of the firms to engage in entrepreneurial activities and 
expand existing microenterprises, however without elaborating further on the concept of 
size. Overall the above studies suggest that access to financing has a positive impact on 
microenterprise performance, as this enables the entrepreneur to achieve economies of 
scale and better access to business critical resources.  
A number of recent studies applying randomized control trials (RCTs) provide 
unique opportunities for theory development, as these studies have conducted 
experiments related to the impact of business grants, another form of financing, on 
microenterprise performance. McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) find, in an RCT on 
Mexican microenterprises, monthly returns to capital of 20-33 percent, corresponding to a 
return between three and five times higher than the interest rate charged. The RCT did 
not adjust the returns for the opportunity cost of the self-employed entrepreneur pursuing 
an alternative activity, as deemed necessary by Shane and Venkataraman (2000). 
Therefore, we argue that the performance impact of debt is exaggerated in the Mexican 
RTC study. De Mel et al. (2008) find, in a study on Sri Lanka, a monthly return on capital 
of 4.6-5.3 percent (55 percent-63 percent annually), also higher than prevailing interest 
rates, with the opportunity cost of labour deducted in this case. In a study on rural firms 
in Kenya the authors find returns of over 100 percent, however with a lot of variability 
(Kremer, Lee, Robinson, & Rostapshova, 2010). Grimm, Krüger, and Lay (2011) find 
further support for the existence of very higher returns in western Africa, with rates of 50-
70 percent, notably higher among firms with small capital investments.  
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In the context of the informal economy, little attention has thus far been paid to 
how debt (the main instrument used in microfinance) relates to firm performance. One 
recent study found an opposite direction on the use of a credit line, linking it to a negative 
growth of microenterprises (Webb, Morris, et al., 2013). While several RCTs have been 
performed, the cash injections are typically small, which makes it difficult to generalize 
their findings to a broader spectrum of firms. For instance, Berge et al. (2011) look at the 
effects of a small business grant of USD 60. De Mel et al. (2008) use a sample of business 
grants of USD 100 to USD 200 made to businesses with a maximum asset size of USD 
1,000, where the sizes of these grants were in some cases equal to a value greater than the 
original capital invested in the business. However, the generalizability from these RCTs is 
limited by the fact that they use small amounts and the RCTs fail to take into account the 
different business needs. A relatively small grant to a larger microenterprise, for instance 
with assets worth USD 1,000, will have a relatively small impact in comparison to the 
same size of grant made to a very small microenterprise with, for instance, assets worth 
USD 100. Comparing the above figures to the current study, in which we include debt 
financing of up to USD 40,000, we believe that we capture more of the reality and 
complexity of microenterprise financing in the informal economy. 
Based on the above theoretical considerations and empirical observation, we 
suggest the informal economy differs from the formal economy in a number of key areas. 
Firstly, since the individuals are operating out of sight of government regulation, there is 
little protection in the case of business failure, particularly as there are no laws governing 
bankruptcies. Secondly, in small microenterprises, the role of the manager and the owner 
is interconnected, which means that the goal of maximizing the return for the business 
must be weighted against the personal risk of not having an income at all (Donaldson, 
1963). As discussed by Myers (1977), the risk of bankruptcy may deter the entrepreneur 
from seeking more financing, even with access to finance and with the existence of 
investment opportunities expected to produce a rate of return higher than the lending 
rate. To informal economy microentrepreneurs this implies that the risk of failure must be 
carefully weighted against success, both on a personal and a microenterprise level. While 
the Knighterian view on risk-taking suggests that the entrepreneur is best informed as to 
what potential lies ahead, prospect theory suggests that if the individual perceive the risk of 
failure to imply severe consequences for the individual, such a fear of failure may be 
exaggerated in comparison to a sure gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In the informal 
economy one can expect the risk of failure to be high (high variability of financial returns) 
and the impact of failure potentially significant economic hardship for the entrepreneur. 
This is exacerbated by the fact that there are no bankruptcy laws governing failures in the 
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legal “shadow” of the informal economy. Based on the riskiness of the microenterprise’s 
investment opportunities, it would be rational for a microentrepreneur to demand (a 
priori) a high financial return if they chose to expand their business activities by using 
(more) debt. Part of the demanded increase in return would reflect the increased risk of 
business failure, equivalent to bankruptcy in the formal economy. We thus argue that 
microentrepreneurs deciding to take up a loan, i.e. a self-selection process, require a higher 
expect financial return compared to those who do not.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Among microenterprises in the informal economy, there is a positive 
association between those who make use of microcredit and firm performance. 
 
In addition, as discussed earlier, in the resource-based theory of the firm, the firm´s 
resources are key to its performance, and if they are not imitable or easy to copy they will 
create sustainable businesses with returns above the average. The resource-based theory 
thus suggests that the operating efficiency, ROA, can be improved through higher 
margins and/or improved asset turnover. Lacking resources, the entrepreneur will turn to 
borrowing, and taking on debt financing can theoretically lift financial returns through 
improved operational performance, for example through the acquisition of inventory in 
larger quantities at lower costs or simply satisfying an unmet demand for a product or 
service. However, if the invention is not providing a sustainable advantage, the returns will 
revert to the mean. Lacking capital limits the available opportunity set to an entrepreneur 
(D. S. Evans & Jovanovic, 1989), thus hindering experimentation in general and the ability 
to use cash as a resource cushion (Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert & March, 1963). With lack of 
financial resources we expect that microentrepreneur displays lower risk-taking behavior 
and as a consequence we expect to see lower financial returns. Therefore our second 
hypothesis suggest that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Among microenterprises in the informal economy, there is a positive 
association between leverage and firm performance. 
 
There is a limited amount of previous research concerning the performance impact 
of microenterprises’ resource availability in relation human capital investments, such as the 
entrepreneur’s level of education. Honig (1998) investigates the effect in the informal 
economy of Jamaica, using the classic Mincer human capital equation (Mincer 1974). 
Considering the lower levels of education, it was found that those with only primary 
education performed better than those with junior secondary school experience, 
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speculating that additional work experience outweigh the returns from investing time in 
additional schooling. The Mincer equation used reads: 
 
log Yi = β0 + β1Ei+ β2Xi + E 
 
where Y is income, E is years of schooling and X is the year of experience. The reason 
that they use the log of income is the assumption that education is believed to have a 
multiplicative effect on income (Mincer 1958). This has been empirically been verified for 
most income levels, albeit with less impact around the minimum wage level (Fortin & 
Lemieux, 1998) where individuals in the informal economy often at best treads (Canelas, 
2014). Another more recent study on microenterprises in Nepal did however not find any 
impact from education on microenterprise performance (Thapa, 2015). The impact from 
number of year in schooling is generally assumed to be linear in relation to income, unless 
there is an extra layer of credential or “sheepskin” on top of the education (Lemieux, 
2006), such as graduating from a prestigious school, which will generally not be the case 
among entrepreneurs in the informal economy. Age is often used to capture the 
experience on an individual, but the findings from Nepal provide no support to age as a 
determinant of microenterprise performance (Thapa, 2015), possibly to be due similar 
businesses and common characteristics between the older and younger 
microentrepreneurs. In some research the experience variable is often used as a quadratic 
to capture the non-linear declining added value from on-the job training. However, recent 
research indicates that the quadratic term underestimates the growth in wages of the 
individual over the early 10-15 years of work, and then overstates the years post 25 years, 
with then a spurious decline among elderly. Instead, research suggests that a quartic 
variable is important to consider (Lemieux, 2006). We shall also for the informal economy 
consider the value of education and experience on firm performance such that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Among microenterprises in the informal economy, there is a positive and 
curvilinear  (convex) association between human capital investments and firm 
performance 
 
However, the growth trajectory of a small firm in the informal economy may be limited by 
other factors, such as a limited product market that easily becomes saturated. An informal 
economy is characterized by being an isolated economic system where supply and demand 
are held fairly constant over time. If anything research shows that while the informal 
economy buys goods from the formal economy, the opposite is not true (Böhme & 
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Thiele, 2012).  Many microentrepreneurs in the informal economy are also engaged in 
similar activities, such as construction or wholesale and retail trade. In such markets, the 
firms are operating in local “monopolies”, but their market power does not extend very 
far (for example within a 10-minute walk of the shop). Therefore, adding capacity does 
not necessarily improve economies of scale. Drawing new customers from nearby villages 
or neighborhoods are costly. The idea of economies of scale dates back to Adam Smith 
who in the 18th century argued that if a poor microentrepreneur, became a pin-maker, he 
or she could make only about one a day, but when the small microenterprises included ten 
persons they could each perform different tasks in making a pin, such that they together 
could make 48.000 pins in day (Smith, 1776). Penrose (1959) argued that larger firms 
having more varied capabilities are able to achieve better performance as compared to 
smaller firms. However, research on microenterprises suggests that microenterprises may 
face diminishing economies of scale (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010), which is contrary to 
research on formal publicly listed firms (M. Hall & Weiss, 1967; J. Lee, 2009; Ozgulbas, 
Koyuncugil, & Yilmaz, 2006). For instance, an example could be an expanding informal 
brick-making business, where an expansion may result in increased input costs, because 
the raw materials have to be sourced from further away, while output prices may fall as 
more bricks flood the market. However, Moreno and Casillas (2007), find that high-
growth firms are smaller in size than lower-growth firms, suggesting a negative 
relationship between size and firm financial performance. Evidence of diminishing returns 
to scale is also found in western Africa, where the slightly larger microenterprises (with 
assets above USD 150) earned one tenth the return on assets, 4-7 percent per month, of 
the smaller businesses who had monthly returns above 70 percent (Grimm et al., 2011). 
As a result, among microenterprises in the informal economy research points towards a 
negative association between firm size and firm performance. Furthermore, if 
microenterprise start to become relatively big, emulating regular businesses, we expect that 
they start to display the positive economies of scale of regular businesses. Thus combining 
the two effects, we suggest that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Among microenterprises in the informal economy, there is a negative and 
curvilinear (concave) association between firm size and firm performance. 
 
Lastly, as Honig (1998) concluded in his study on informal microentrepreneurship on 
Jamaica, it is important to consider the heterogeneity when assessing 
microentrepreneurship in the informal economy. He argues that informal firms with more 
employees are more complex and therefore require more human capital (education) to be 
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successful. In an organization with several employees it is possible for the leader to take 
advantage of the variety of skills and abilities present in the group, whereas in an 
organization of one, the leader is limited to his or her own cognitive skills. Honig (1998) 
finds a strong return from human capital investments among firms with multiple 
employees, whereas for firms with no employees (beyond the entrepreneur) a significant 
and negative relationship with performance is found. This may be a result of self-selection 
whereby individuals with higher human capital skills opt into businesses with higher 
market potential or that higher cognitive skills yield better returns. However, the Jamaica 
study suffer from one complication, which is that it includes microentrepreneurs with 
college degrees, which is not typical for the general population of an informal economy. 
In fact, research shows that high ability individuals are rather associated with formal firms 
(de Paula & Scheinkman, 2011). The world bank estimates that only 7% of managers in 
informal firms have a college degree whereas 76% have such a degree in formal firms 
(Porta & Shleifer, 2014). Instead, microentrepreneurs of the informal economy are rather 
endowed with lower to intermediate managerial skills, and including college-educated 
entrepreneurs would therefore stretch the results. In addition, the higher capital costs of 
the informal economy create lower capital-labor ratios, resulting in more single-employed 
firms. The fifth hypothesis reads: 
  
Hypothesis 5: Among microenterprises in the informal economy, the number of employees 
positively moderates the relationship between financial or human capital vis-à-vis firm 
performance. 
 
Figure 1: Hypothesized relations 
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Method 
Research design 
Researching poor microentrepreneurs in emerging/developing economies involves a 
number of inherent challenges. Obtaining detailed data from the informal economy is 
difficult as microentrepreneurs typically do not maintain financial records and in addition 
often mix family and business transactions. The challenges also include getting access to 
respondents, sample selection biases, the respondents’ weak knowledge of financial 
terminology, and microentrepreneurs’ limited ability to respond to surveys (with 
numbered Likert scales, to mention one such challenge). Many of these challenges have 
been overcome through our unique research design. 
In order to gain access to microenterprises, we collaborated with Banco D-Miro 
from Ecuador. This microfinance institution is regulated by the national banking 
authorities, and has 41,000 clients based in the coastal regions of the country, where a 
majority of the economy is informal. In January 2013, D-Miro’s net loan portfolio was 
approximately USD 56 million, with an average loan size to each microenterprise of USD 
1,391 (AMAS, 2014). Banco D-Miro is owned by the Norwegian NGO, Mission Alliance, 
a faith-based Christian organization. In practice, D-Miro and Mission Alliance work side 
by side, but they are separate legal entities with separate local organizations. 
Ecuador represents a suitable country when studying the informal economy. In 
Ecuador, 4.6 percent of the population live below the USD 1.25 poverty line, and 10.6 
percent below the USD 2.00 line (World Bank, 2014). Over 80 percent of the working 
population of Ecuador works in the informal sector (Albornoz et al., 2011; Canelas, 2014). 
As our study is focused on poor microentrepreneurs, working with a microfinance institution 
allows us to reach a sample of poor entrepreneurial individuals, for whom the act of seeking 
credit signals a willingness to grow, through an entrepreneurial process that includes the 
discovery of an opportunity and the subsequent decision to exploit it. Our data indicate 
that the median yearly net profit in 2013 (before subtracting the opportunity cost (of the 
entrepreneur’s own labour) was USD 8,280, which could have been used for personal 
consumption or reinvestment.  This compares to the average GDP per capita in Ecuador 
of USD 6,346 in 2014. To avoid the problem of self-selection bias, i.e. only including 
entrepreneurs that could expect to benefit from accessing financing, we randomly selected 
three groups of entrepreneurs: 250 currently active microfinance clients, 250 who had 
payment difficulties, and another 250 microentrepreneurs who choose not to renew their 
loans with the bank.  
By collaborating with D-Miro we were able to collect detailed financial data (income 
statement and balance sheet) on each microentrepreneur and the corresponding 
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microenterprise.  Roughly 100 credit officers work at Banco D-Miro, all of whom have 
Master’s-level education. Some of them have worked for the other commercial banks 
previously, and in meeting most of these credit officers we could conclude that this group 
has strong and advanced financial abilities. The credit officers make the overall 
assessments of the risk and creditworthiness of the clients, and they manually collect the 
financial data, partly through manually filled out loan application forms and partly through 
subsequent home visits. It is our assessment that overstating financial results is prevented 
due to strong internal audits within the bank. In addition, the credit officers are 
incentivized to implement sound of credit and size, but also on level of provisions and 
defaults. Prior to granting credit approval to a microenterprise, the branch manager, who 
is the credit officers’ superior, reviews the data to further enhance the quality of the credit 
assessment. As a credit default by the microenterprise would be a negative outcome for 
the branch manager as well as the credit officer, this process provides better-quality data 
than an entirely self-reported measure of entrepreneurial performance. The credit officer 
estimates the value of all the assets and equity of the microenterprise, and for reasons of 
caution can be expected to be conservative in their estimates. The data are very detailed 
and allow for a fine-grained analysis of both income statements and balance sheet items, 
even the separation of family and business income and assets, thus allowing us to focus 
specifically on the performance of the microenterprise. Data relating to both the balance 
sheet and the income statement are obtained during the credit-screening process at the 
moment when the entrepreneur is seeking financing for the opportunity he/she has 
identified.  
 In addition to the data collected through the survey and the data collected by the 
credit officers of D-Miro, Ecuador’s microfinance institutions and banks are by law 
required to report credit information to a credit bureau, which provides us with more 
individual credit information than is commonly available in emerging economies (World 
Bank, 2013), or even in developed countries. The largest credit bureau, and the one used 
by Banco D-Miro, is Equifax CreditReport. At the time of the loan application, the credit 
officer incorporates debt held at other financial institutions, and a complete balance sheet 
and income statement is created prior to each new loan. This process provides a complete 
picture of the microentrepreneur’s financial situation, including loans from other financial 
institutions. All loans granted by D-Miro were approved by D-Miro, but loans with other 
financial institutions are granted and assessed by credit officers of these banks. 
To ensure a higher response rate to our survey, D-Miro offered each respondent a 
free calendar, to be picked up at the nearest office. All in all, full responses were obtained 
from 755 microfinance clients or ex-clients, whose data we were also able to supplement 
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with historical financial data for the period 2005-2013. The respondents were then split 
into two groups for comparison, of which, at the time of the most recent loan application 
in the early part of 2013, 480 had debt and 275 did not. Over the time period 2005-2013, 
for the same group of entrepreneurs, we obtained 2,171 observations, of which 1,202 
were with debt and 969 without. Most of the microentrepreneurs had small businesses in 
their homes, such as a little kiosk, a restaurant, or a slightly more capital-intensive service 
such as a hardware store or a tinsmith. This implies that at each point in time, we obtain a 
measure of a historic balance sheet debt component, financial leverage (period t-1), and a 
current estimate of the firm performance (period t). 
In assessing the data, we are performing both a cross sectional analysis and a panel 
study analysis. Since many of the independent variables do not vary over time, the panel 
study will not be able to include them, wherefore the panel analysis primarily includes the 
variables that change each year. However, robustness checks are performed over several 
years and across varying industries. 
 
Measures 
Firm performance. Schumpeter (1934) describes the success of entrepreneurs in terms of an 
entrepreneurial profit. The empirical entrepreneurship literature uses various measures of 
performance; such as efficiency, growth, profit, size, liquidity, success/failure, and market 
share. Among these measures, efficiency, growth and profit are the most common 
(Murphy et al., 1996). An increasing number of researchers are also using a return to 
capital measure (De Mel et al., 2008; McKenzie & Woodruff, 2008). A comprehensive 
measure would consider the amount invested, the investment life, the cash flow and the 
resulting residual value at the end of the economic life of the firm (Madden 1998), but 
such detailed financial statement data is generally only available for publicly traded firms 
and not microenterprises in the informal economy. 
This study addresses shortcomings of past research through a unique research 
design, which allows us to create detailed income and balance sheet statements for the 
microenterprise, using data collected through a triangulation of three sources: the credit-
screening process of a major microfinance bank, access to debt data from the national 
credit bureau, and a survey of entrepreneurs operating in the largely informal and poor 
coastal regions of Ecuador.  
This study will make use of three measures of firm performance: 1) Profits 2) 
Return on Assets (ROA) and 3) Sales growth. ROA is computed as net profit divided by 
total assets. This provides for a longitudinal performance dimension, as the asset value (or 
equity) is an historical figure and the net profit a current figure. To avoid having outliers 
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drive the results, the yearly ROAs were winsorized at the 5 percent level, such that for the 
cross-sectional analysis firms with total assets of less than USD 3,200 had their asset value 
set to USD 3,200 (a similar approach to Hvide and Møen 2010; Tukey 1962). For the 
longer panel data the corresponding lower cut-off value was USD 1,000 for assets. While 
the median ROA remained the same, the variance dropped significantly, thus making the 
unadjusted high variance of returns less problematic, and still capturing the return 
variability of 95 percent of the firms.  
 
Table 1 
The unaccounted opportunity cost of self-employment by the entrepreneur 
  
Minimum 
wage (USD 
per month) 
Adjustment 
factor 
Opportunity 
cost (USD 
per month) 
2005 150 88% 132 
2006 160 92% 147 
2007 170 92% 156 
2008 200 87% 173 
2009 218 83% 182 
2010 240 83% 200 
2011 264 91% 240 
2012 292 91% 266 
2013 318 91% 289 
2014 340 91% 309 
Source: Own estimates, National Statistics and Census Institute of 
Ecuador (INEC) and Canelas (2014) 
 
In addition, since the entrepreneur does not pay a formal salary to him/herself, we 
added a proxy number for the opportunity cost of their labour into the reported income 
statement, in line with suggestions from past research (Scott Shane & Venkataraman, 
2000). This was estimated using the minimum wage, but while the minimum wage is 
intended to set a wage floor, the actual floor may be much lower in the informal sector if 
formal jobs or alternatives are not available, which is empirically shown to hold true 
(Bargain & Kwenda, 2011). Canelas (2014) finds, using data from the National Statistics 
and Census Institute of Ecuador, that informal wage workers earned, on average, 91 
percent of the minimum wage during 2010-2012 (see Table 1). We therefore assumed that 
the opportunity cost of labour for the informal sector in Ecuador in 2013 was equal to the 
actual minimum wage of USD 318 multiplied by 91 percent, that is USD 289, and also 
made adjustments to previous years’ figures using similar estimates (Table 1). When the 
opportunity cost of the microentrepreneur’s own “salary” was taken out, we found that 
the microenterprises’ mean ROE was reduced from 171 percent to 87 percent and the 
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mean ROA from 141 percent to 68 percent. The winsorization lowered the means to 77 
percent and 61 percent respectively (see Table 2). The median remained unchanged 
however. Since longitudinal data is not necessarily available for every year, sales growth is 
computed as the average reported sales in the years 2012 and 2013 as compared to the 
average reported sales in 2009 through 2011. 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics (full sample with observations from the years 2005-2013) 
  
Observations without debt 
(n=969) 
Observations with debt 
(n=1,202) 
Full panel sample 
(n=2,171) 
  Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Net sales (USD) 19,101 0 216,000 30,369 1,800 360,000 25,340 27,529 
Net income (USD) 3,475 -5,736 71,808 7,197 -1,968 101,940 5,536 7,138 
Unadjusted ROA (%) 186% -21% 7200% 104% 13% 1103% 141% 318% 
Adjusted ROA (%) 78% -1371% 5280% 60% -175% 618% 68% 199% 
Winsorized ROA (%) 61% -174% 2611% 61% -163% 618% 61% 93% 
Asset turnover 5.7 .2 182.6 3.2 .3 41.3 4.3 7.8 
Profit margin (%) 16% -114% 97% 22% -109% 81% 19% 16% 
Debt/assets (%) 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 97% 11% 17% 
Debt/equity (%) 0% 0% 0% 43% 0% 3297% 24% 97% 
Total assets (USD) 9,092 68 61,700 15,848 330 269,800 12,833 14,289 
Employees (#) 1.6 0 15.0 1.7 0 15.0 1.7 1.8 
Urban (%) 90% 17% 100% 86% 20% 100% 88% 17% 
Education level 1.6 0 3.0 1.6 0 3.0 1.6 .6 
Age 42.5 19.0 67.0 43.3 22.0 66.0 43.0 10.7 
Note: Adjusted and unadjusted ROE and ROA refer to adjustment for the opportunity cost of labour. The data 
relate to observations of 755 randomly selected firms during the time period 2005-2013. 
 
 
Debted entrepreneur dummy. Some microentrepreneurs decide not to use debt, even when 
they have the chance to get debt, while others acquire new debt after repaying the 
previous loan. The debt variable is constructed such that entrepreneurs who have sought 
microcredit from Banko D-Miro is given the value “1”, and entrepreneurs that do not 
have take on new debt are given the value of “0”.  
 
Leverage. In this study we will look at firms with debt and others without. In total we have 
one group with varying levels of leverage (1,202 observations) and one group with no 
debt, zero leverage, (969 observations) at the time of seeking a new loan with Banco D-
Miro. We capture this relationship in the panel data through a dummy variable, debt dummy. 
In addition, we measure actual leverage as debt divided by total equity. Equity is used as 
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using assets may cause multicollinearity. The debt on the balance sheet was taken up prior 
to the measured income, thus providing a longitudinal performance dimension. In 
addition, as a robustness check, a binary measure of debt financing is included in the panel 
analysis. 
 
Human Capital Investments. In this study we concentrate on two measures of investment, 
one being the level of education achieved, where we utilize a categorical measure with 
three levels, each being approximately 6 years apart (basic, upper secondary and post 
upper secondary, where equidistance is assumed. In addition, in line with many other 
studies we use the entrepreneur’s age less years of schooling as an indication of 
experience.  
 
Size. We use total assets, here winsorized at the 5 percent level (bottom cut-off only), as a 
measure of size. The measure is logarithmically transformed.  
 
Number of Employees. This is the number of employees including the owner. However, since 
formal employment contracts are not used in the informal sector, and the concept of 
being employed is not easily understood, we have asked instead the respondents the 
following question: “how many individuals help out in your business apart from yourself”6 
We are using a slightly relaxed assumption on the number of employees as employees as a 
concept does not exist in the informal economy. Rather, these are to be seen as 
individuals helping out in the business, and by using a maximum of 15 such individuals, 
this is assumed to comply with the typical definition of at most 10 full time equivalents. 
 
Control variables. We control for the entrepreneur’s gender as many microfinance programs 
favour women over men, although in a study by Berrone et al. (2014) on microenterprises 
in Argentina (both formal and informal) they find no support that gender influences 
performance (measured as the entrepreneur´s perception of several business performance 
indicators). The same study found support for the fact that level of education had an 
impact on perceived performance, and also find evidence that rural entrepreneurs achieve 
                                            
 
 
 
 
 
6 In Spanish the original question was formulated as ”¿Cuántas personas ayudan en su negocio actualmente aparte 
de usted? 
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higher perceived performance. We also control for degree of rural as opposed to urban 
location, and industry, using the definitions proposed by the United Nations for the 
informal sector (United Nations 2008, 279-281). Often, the informal sector is numerically 
dominated by manufacturing, repair services and trade. In the context of the informal 
sector of Ecuador, the sample is dominated by wholesale and retail trade (59 percent), of 
which the most common forms are clothing establishments, goods and grocery retail, 
bazars and cosmetics, followed by a number of smaller commercial businesses of varying 
kinds. Following wholesale and retail trade in terms of frequency are manufacturing (18 
percent), restaurants (7 percent), other personal service activities (4 percent), agriculture, 
forestry and fishing (3 percent), transportation (3 percent), construction (2 percent), repair 
services (2 percent), education, human health and social work activities (1 percent). 
Furthermore, the urban or rural location of a microenterprise may also explain differences 
in performance (Honig, 1998; Masakure, Cranfield, & Henson, 2008). Therefore, we also 
control for this using the ratio of urban to rural persons living within the city area to 
which each microentrepreneur belongs, using data from the National Statistics and Census 
Institute of Ecuador (INEC, 2011). 
 
Model 
The following regression model measures the relationship between microenterprise 
performance and the various independent variables: 
 
Firm PerformanceI,t = b0 + b1DI,t + β2SI,t + b3EI,t + b4XI,t + b5GI,t+ β6UI,2010 + β8II,t+ eiI,t 
where  
 
b0 = constant 
 
DI,t = debt financed (1 or 0) for firm I in year t in model 1, or leverage, measured as debt/equity 
for firm I in year t in model 2. Debt is taken up prior to the assessment, i.e. t-1. 
 
SIt = log size of firm I in year t (total assets) 
 
EI,t = level of education (0, 1, 2 or 3) of owner of firm I in year t 
 
XI,t  = age (continuous) of entrepreneur of firm I in year t 
 
GI,t = gender (1 or 0) of owner of firm I in year t  
 
UI,2010 = degree of urban setting (versus rural) of location of entrepreneur of firm I in year 2010 
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II,t = industry dummies (1 or 0) for firm I in year t 
 
eiI,t = the error term 
 
 
Analysis and results 
Descriptive statistics 
The panel data are from 2005-2013 and the cross-sectional data are from 2013. As shown 
in Table 3, the average annual revenue of the microenterprises over the time period is 
USD 25,340, and the average revenue in 2013 is USD 27,587. These types of detailed 
financial statistics have generally not been available in previous research (Copestake et al., 
2001; Honig, 1998). 
ROA is skewed to the right within our sample of enterprises, as none of the 
entrepreneurs in our sample would have been able to obtain, or offered, a loan unless they 
had been able to show a positive number. These high unadjusted performance figures, 
with an average ROA of 141% are higher than the ones observed in previous research on 
microenterprises in emerging countries (De Mel et al., 2008; McKenzie & Woodruff, 
2008). However, when we adjust the firms’ financial returns for the opportunity cost of 
labour (Scott Shane & Venkataraman, 2000), we find that the adjusted average ROA 
drops to 68 percent. We trimmed the tails slightly through winsorization, thus deleting 
extreme observations to avoid stretching the regressions. The median ROA remain 
unchained, but the average winsorized and adjusted ROA is 61 percent. These measures 
are similar to those calculated using the data from 2013 only, for which the average 
winsorized ROA is 60 percent. As discussed earlier, this is the financial return that the 
entrepreneur needs to weigh against the cost of financing, or hurdle rate. The minimum 
observed ROA of -1,371 percent indicates that some microentrepreneurs would not 
benefit from taking out a loan with an interest rate of 26 percent, the average rate offered 
by D-Miro at the time. In fact, roughly one third of the sample enterprises earned an 
ROA below 26 percent, once the figures have been adjusted for the opportunity cost of 
labour (see Table 2). 
In terms of background statistics, our sample includes 12 percent rural 
microentrepreneurs, while 35 percent have completed primary school, 59 percent have 
completed secondary school or have gained some sort of secondary school degree, and 
only 4 percent have attained a higher degree beyond secondary education. In a similar 
study, Magill and Meyer (2005) find that, among urban Ecuadorian entrepreneurs, 46 
 87 
percent have completed primary school, 41 percent received at least some secondary 
education, and 12 percent an education beyond secondary level. They note that these 
education levels are higher than for the general population. Our sample is therefore a 
representation of the informal economy in Ecuador, where few people have higher 
degrees beyond secondary education. Honig (1998) finds that education has a positive 
impact on the financial success of businesses, especially university education, but since 
such persons rarely are part of the informal economy, we believe our sample is less 
stretched than Honig (1998). He also finds that those with only primary education 
perform better than those with secondary education. 
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Table 4  The financial performance of microenterprises in 2013: OLS regression 
analysis 
Variables ROA  Profits  
Sales 
growth   
              
H1: Debted dummy .090 * .041  .194 ** 
  (2.589 ) (1.506 ) (3.413 ) 
H2: Leverage .225 *** .210 *** -.025  
  (4.453 ) (5.259 ) (0.000 ) 
H4: Economies of scale             
       Ln size -.330 *** .568 *** .065  
  -(8.969 ) (19.578 ) (0.000 ) 
       (Ln size)2 .154 *** .327 *** -.137 * 
  (4.420 ) (11.912 ) -(2.120 ) 
       # of employees .100 * .080  .042  
  (2.003 ) (2.036 ) (0.500 ) 
       # of employees2 -.063  -.038  -.060  
  -(1.291 ) -(0.973 ) -(0.718 ) 
H3: Human Capital Investments             
       Education -.010  -.030  -.026  
  -(0.291 ) -(1.113 ) (0.266 ) 
       Entrepreneur age -.012  -.061 * -.181 ** 
  -(0.333 ) -(2.106 ) (0.036 ) 
       Entrepreneur aage2 -.074 * -.081 ** .102  
  -(2.117 ) -(2.960 ) (0.003 ) 
H5a: Nr of employees x leverage -.087  -.101 * -.036  
  -(1.711 ) -(2.533 ) (0.012 ) 
H5b: Nr of employees x education -.026  -.014  -.041  
  -(0.751 ) -(0.532 ) (0.595 ) 
Controls             
Gender .052  .044  -.046  
  (1.433 ) (1.539 ) (0.124 ) 
Urban vs rural -0.092 ** -0.075 ** -0.256 *** 
  -(2.713 ) -(2.774 ) (0.006 ) 
N 755  755  298  
r2 .194  .498  .158  
Adjusted r2 .169  .483  .140  
∆r2 (H1-H4) .154 *** .454 *** .078 *** 
∆r2 (H5) .004  .005 * .002  
Notes. The estimation method is ordinary least squares. Betas are standardized. Industry dummies 
are included, but not reported. t-values are given within parentheses. Data as of early 2013. ∆r2 is 
over and above the control variables. 
* Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level; *** significant at the .1% level 
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In a previous baseline study, Magill & Meyer (2005) found that for urban 
Ecuadorian enterprises, 46% had finished primary school, 41% had some or had 
completed a secondary education with 12% having an education beyond the secondary 
education. They note that these levels are higher than for the general population. Our 
sample include rural microentrepreneurs and finds that 35% have completed primary 
school, 59% had finished or had some sort of secondary school degree, with only 4% 
attaining a higher degree beyond secondary education. 
 
Regression results 
In Table 4, we show the cross-sectional results using data available at the end of 2013. We 
are also performing a panel analysis on the same data set, with the exception of time 
invariant variables (e.g. education, gender, etc.).  
 The regression in Table 4 indicates that, when controlling for gender, urban/rural, 
and industry, there is a significant positive association between those who decide to take a 
loan and subsequent performance (ROA and Sales growth). This provides support to 
hypothesis 1 – i.e. that entrepreneurs taking on a loan have better microenterprise 
performance than those who not. However, the same support is not provided with 
respect to the panel data regressions.  
Regarding hypothesis 2, the cross-sectional analysis shows a positive association 
between ROA and Profits. The panel analysis in Table 5 supports only the positive 
association with profits, thus partly confirming hypothesis in terms of increased income 
generation, but that it has no effect on ROA or growth. In other words, the increased 
debt does not enhance the operating efficiency, ROA, or have any positive effect on 
growth, but it does add extra income. In terms of hypothesis 3, the cross-sectional analysis 
indicates that there is negative relationship between age, as a measure of experience, and 
profit generation. When we applied an alternative quartic term for age, in line with 
suggestions by Lemieux (2006), it provided less explanatory power than using age2. Our 
results do not show the hypothesized positive and curvilinear (concave) relationship 
between age and income in the informal economy, but in fact an even accelerating 
declining relationship. This suggests that the younger and less experienced entrepreneurs 
in the informal economy of Ecuador today earn higher income than the older 
entrepreneurs in our sample.  
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Table 5 
Panel data (2005-2013) regression with microenterprise fixed effects 
Variables ROA 
 
Profits 
 
Sales 
growth  
ROA 
 
Profits 
 
Sales 
growth  
                          
H2: Debt dummy .022  .066 *** -.107              
  (1.016 ) (3.196 ) -(1.879 )             
H2: Leverage             .018  .054 *** -.022  
              (1.027 ) (3.255 ) -(0.587 ) 
H3: Ln size -3.944 *** -1.887 *** 0.14  -3.941 *** -1.879 *** .123  
  -(11.221 ) -(5.714 ) 0.179 ) -(11.215 ) -(5.691 ) (0.156 ) 
H3: (Ln size)2 3.114 *** 2.075 *** -0.027  3.115 *** 2.079 *** -.027  
  (8.602 ) (6.099 ) -(0.034 ) (8.605 ) (6.110 ) -(0.034 ) 
                          
Fixed effects controls                       
Entrepreneur id Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Years Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 2171  2171  1168  2171  2171  1168  
r2 .718  .750  .374  .718  .751  .371  
Adjusted r2 .568  .619  -.027  .568  .619  -.032  
Notes. Entrepreneur ID used as fixed-effects. Betas are standardized. H2 and debt dummy indicates whether or not an 
entrepreneur has debt or not, and is different from H1 where we are looking at entrepreneurs who specifically did not 
refinance.    
t-values are given within parentheses.                   
* Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level; *** significant at the .1% level   
 
To test our fourth hypothesis we apply both cross-sectional and panel data tests. 
We find that the results of both tests support this economies of scale based hypothesis: 
that the relationship between firm size and microenterprise performance follows a positive 
and concave curvilinear trend for ROA and profit generation. However, we did not find a 
significant association between microenterprise size and growth. Lastly, our fifth 
hypothesis is partly supported in that the relationship between leverage and performance 
is positively moderated with an increasing number of employees, see Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 Number of employees compared with profits in 2012 
 
 
 
Discussion 
Our findings indicate that microentrepreneurs in the informal economy, who take 
on a loan, have a higher income, than firms who do not take on a loan. We argue that the 
microentrepreneurs’ risk aversion imply that they a priori require a high expected return in 
order to take on new debt, and this helps to explain the ex post higher financial return for 
such debt. Given the weak legal protection available to microentrepreneurs in the case of 
default, the risk of “bankruptcy” (legally not possible since the business isn’t legal in the 
first place) may deter the entrepreneur from seeking financing (in line with Myers (1977). 
Our findings lend support to the applicability of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979) to the issue of financing in the informal economy.  While the returns are potentially 
huge in the informal economy, the consequence of defaulting on a loan is also 
considerable.   
Furthermore, the resource-based theory suggests that firms who use unique and 
non-imitable resources to create a sustainable advantage will create above average returns. 
When lacking such resources themselves, entrepreneurs can turn to borrowing to 
purchase such resources. On the basis of this argument, the findings indicate however that 
taking on microcredit, as a way to access resources, does not enhance firm performance, 
when measured as ROA. This is not surprising given the weak competitive advantages of 
most microenterprises, as entrepreneurs engage in generic or similar business concepts, 
such as a restaurant, retailing, or construction business etc. As our sample indicates, 59% 
of our sample were engaged in wholesale and retail trade, which is quite representative for 
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the informal economy world wide. However, we do see that entrepreneurs taking on more 
debt have more income, which at the end of the day can be used for consumption or 
reinvestments. Thus, while using microcredit does not enhance the relative returns of the 
business (ROA) more income is created, thus helping the poor entrepreneur and his/her 
family. This positive relationship between the use of debt financing and performance is 
important, as previous research has unsuccessfully sought to relate microfinance to 
improved income generation or poverty alleviation (Khandker, 2005). 
Furthermore, we see no effect from debt financing on microenterprise growth. 
This   might explain why anecdotal evidence suggests that microfinance has not 
transformed a lot of micro-enterprises into larger income generating firms. Indeed, 
microfinance is often met by skepticism among microentrepreneurs, as stated in a study 
by Magill and Meyer (2005): “Credit is not seen as a positive tool to grow a business, but 
rather as a cost or penalty to be avoided at almost any cost” (p. 118). They therefore 
recommend that donor organizations and MFIs exercise caution when “focusing on credit 
as a solution to the problems facing microentrepreneurs”. Our results indicate that it is 
not a panacea, but it provides more income, which is still an accomplishment. In addition, 
our results support the previous view put forth by Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) that 
most microenterprises face diminishing economies of scale. However, at some point 
economies of scale actually matter, wherefore returns and profits turn positive just like 
Adam Smith once suggested with his example of the simple pin-business. 
In this study we apply education and age as proxies for human capital investments. 
Previous research suggests a positive return to human capital investments (Unger et al. 
2011), even in the informal economy (Berrone et al., 2014). However, Honig (1998) 
discovered a reversed relationship were entrepreneurs with less education performed 
better, suggesting that the value of experience outweigh the added value from incremental 
education. Our results question previous findings in this context. First of all we can 
attribute no positive effect from education on microenterprise performance. This might 
be explained by the lack of entrepreneurs with higher education, as most 
microentrepreneurs in the informal economy of Ecuador do not attend more than six 
years of schooling (Magill & Meyer, 2005). However, our sample is slightly biased towards 
individuals with a few more years of schooling, therefore even more showing the poor 
impact of education on performance. From the sample, we can observe that 34% of the 
microentrepreneurs have completed 6 years of primary school, with an additional 60% 
finishing secondary school (an additional 6 years). 
In addition, contrary to (Thapa, 2015) our results indicate some impact from micro 
entrepreneurs’ experience on performance. We find that older entrepreneurs are 
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associated with lower profits and experience lower growth. While this may be a cohort 
effect, it could be seen as an indicator of the lack of value added experience among 
microentrepreneurs’ in the informal economy. It may also be a result of lower risk taking 
among the slightly older generation, as compared to the younger ones. In fact, in this 
study we observe that younger more inexperienced entrepreneurs earned a higher profit 
than older and more experienced ones. Alternatively, this could possibly also be a result of 
a higher willingness to take risk among the younger microentrepreneurs, compared to the 
older generation. 
Past research (Honig, 1998) suggests that microenterprise heterogeneity, such as in 
terms of number of employees or industry, could affect the relationship between our 
independent variables and enterprise performance. We also observe this to hold true in 
terms of industry, where the findings are not universal for all industries, such as 
manufacturing, but the individual industries are too narrow in our sample to make 
definitive conclusions. Future research could look into why some industries in the 
informal economy are more easily affected by micro finance whereas others are not. It 
may be that certain industries, such as retailing and restaurants, simply are more 
competitive, where extra resources do not enhance performance. 
However, our data suggests that with an increasing number of employees and 
leverage comes for low and medium leveraged firms an increased profit, but for highly 
leveraged firms the relationship turns slightly negative. This suggests that the 
heterogeneity that past research found is more a matter of economies of scale rather than 
heterogeneity. 
Among the control variables, rural-based microenterprises have higher 
performance than others, in line with Berrone et al. (2014). The impact of the gender of 
the microentrepreneur is not conclusive, but our robustness testing show that it may 
matter when considering the dominating wholesale and retail trade sector. Future studies 
on the informal economy may want to address difference between urban and rural 
locations. Lastly, the informal sector is typically dominated by a few industries, and we do 
find that debt financing has somewhat different impacts, although directionally the same, 
in the two largest industries of the sample, wholesale retail stores and manufacturing 
businesses. 
 
Conclusion 
In this study we find that microenterprises that take on micro debt are more 
profitable and have higher sales growth than businesses which do not take on debt. We 
argue that this is a self selection mechanism because of the high risk and importantly the 
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consequences of bankruptcy to the individual. However, among those who use microdebt, 
we see that it generates a higher profit figure, but we do not observe an improved 
operating performance (ROA) or growth. When viewing these findings through the lens 
of the resource-based theory, this suggests that the resources obtained and used by the 
microentrepreneurs are not providing a sustainable competitive advantage such that 
higher returns are achieved, or growth. In addition, the resource of microcredit does not 
transform the businesses into larger profit making businesses, and it does not help create a 
more profitable business. We further observe a curvilinear relationship (negative which 
turns positive) between microenterprise size and their performance, illustrating the limited 
growth trajectory of a microenterprise in an informal economy. With reference to the 
resource-based theory our interpretation is that firm size is not improving performance 
because the resources are not unique or new, in fact odds are high that most other 
microentrepreneurs in the neighborhood are making the same resource changes, hence 
adding more demand for their common inputs (raw material, or local retail products) and 
putting downward pressure on the selling prices. In addition, our results show no impact 
from human capital investments, such as education or experience. If anything, experience 
appears to be linked to a stagnating business, possibly as a result of a lower appetite to 
risk. Lastly, we are seeing a positively moderating effect of the number of employees on 
leverage linked to performance from low and medium leveraged firms, providing support 
of the idea that economies of scale, when viewed as humans, positively moderate the 
relationship. 
The study is not without limitations. Measuring financial performance in the 
informal economy is challenging, as we must analyze unaudited financial figures that are 
subjectively reported by the credit officer from the microbank. We tried to improve the 
applied performance measures (ROA) by adjusting our estimate for the opportunity cost 
of labour, but we were limited in that we used a national average labour cost figure for all 
enterprises. In terms of the robustness of our tests and the various measures of 
performance, our regressions show that our main results do not change regardless of 
whether or not we include the opportunity cost of the labour of the entrepreneur. 
Furthermore, in the one-year cross-sectional test we tried to control for other potentially 
confounding variables such as gender, location, or industry (Tables 4), whereas with the 
panel data we were able to control for firm-specific unobserved effects (Table 5).  
Performance and debt is inevitably linked, but the direction of causality could go 
both ways. In this paper we emphasize the selection-effect whereby it is the expected high 
financial returns that make microentreprenurs accept debt.  We acknowledge that we have 
not eliminated all possibly endogeneity possibilities in relation to this issue.  Our study 
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looks at microenterprises that have access to debt (so we eliminate the adverse selection of 
possible borrowers), and that either decided to take a loan, or did not continue to take 
more loans. In our fixed-effect panel regression we do however take care of this bias, as 
we control for firm-specific historical effects (such as past profitability).  
In this study we focus on one country (Ecuador) and the clients of one 
microfinance provider (D-Miro), and this significantly limits our ability to generalize from 
our results. Specifically, there might be institutional and cultural variables that make 
generalizing beyond Ecuador difficult. The fact that D-Miro is pursuing social goals, even 
though this is the norm in the industry, might impact the self-selection of 
microentrepreneurs that seek financing from this particular microfinance institution.  
In terms of policy recommendations for practitioners, this study highlights that, 
while debt has a positive impact on the bottom line, it has no significant effect on the 
operating efficiency or the growth of the microenterprise. This indicates that the theory of 
capital constraint is not fully applicable to the informal economy. Microfinance 
institutions and donor organizations need therefore to apply caution when extending 
credit to microentrepreneurs and be aware of the limited performance impact, and also 
the diminishing economies of scale. Particular attention must be paid to the competitive 
landscape and prioritize financing resources that helps the microenterprise to creating 
something new – the essence of entrepreneurship. Financing more of the same type of 
businesses may generate more income, but it not aiding the entrepreneur in incrementally 
lifting the business to improved performance. As a result of these findings, future research 
should look more at how small and medium size businesses (that is larger than 
microenterprises) in the informal economy are affected by resource availability and access 
to financing. These firms might be able to attract resources that achieve economies of 
scale, similar to the economies of scale of formal enterprises, such that they benefit more 
from access to loans, and thus be a more suitable target for economic development.  
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Faces of Informality 
A shoemaker in Guayaquil, Ecuador 
 111 
7.2. Research essay 2: The Impact of Entrepreneur Characteristics on the 
Financing of Micro-firms in the Informal Economy 
 
 
  112 
The Impact of Entrepreneur Characteristics on the Financing 
of Micro-firms in the Informal Economy 
 
PONTUS ENGSTRÖM 
 
 
Abstract: 
This study seeks to explain the strategic financing decisions of micro-firms in 
the informal economy. We extend pecking-order and tradeoff theory with new 
insights from human capital theory, specifically focusing on financial literacy. 
Based on data from 500 micro-entrepreneurs in Ecuador’s informal sector, this 
study reveals that entrepreneur characteristics and firm characteristics are 
important drivers of entrepreneurs’ strategic financing decisions. In particular, 
the study shows that micro-entrepreneurs with stronger financial literacy skills 
are more likely to seek debt financing, thus illustrating the importance of human 
capital development. 
 
Keywords: microfinance, capital structure, micro-firms, informal economy, 
financial literacy 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Financing growth is a key strategic challenge for micro-entrepreneurs worldwide, even 
more so in developing economies, where smaller firms are significantly financially 
constrained (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2008). Microfinance providers 
commonly provide microcredit to poor micro-firms, as access to capital can reduce 
poverty among their clients (Morduch, 1999a). Indeed, the demand for microcredit, 
which often extends into the informal economies7 of developing countries, is soaring 
with annual growth rates between 15 and 20 percent (Etzensperger, 2015).  
Past research has extensively studied entrepreneurial financing in the developed 
world (e.g., Cassar, 2004; Gartner et al., 2012), but few studies have examined the role of 
micro-firms, which are the engine of the informal economy.8  In fact, limited research has 
investigated what drives microenterprises’ demand for financial services in developing 
countries. Moreover, research has typically shown that firm characteristics outweigh 
entrepreneur characteristics in financing decisions (Cassar, 2004). A recent literature 
review reveals the lack of theoretical underpinnings in most studies on entrepreneurs’ 
behaviors in the informal economy (Webb, Bruton, et al., 2013), particularly regarding 
their financing choices. While several factors may explain this gap, it likely stems at least 
partially from this topic’s challenging research environment, where reliable data are 
difficult to obtain and personal safety is a major concern. Thus, we see a major research 
gap that needs to be filled with both new theory and appropriate data. We see this study 
as an answer to recent calls for research on the funding of micro-entrepreneurs in the 
informal economy (Berrone et al., 2014; Moss ., 2014; Webb et al., 2013).  
This study investigates two interrelated research questions: (1) What are the 
determinants of the decision to seek external debt financing (or not)? (2) What are the 
determinants of the capital structure—also commonly referred to as leverage (debt-to-
                                            
 
 
 
 
 
7 By the informal economy, we mean businesses activities that are similar to those of formal businesses, though 
“occurring outside of formal institutional boundaries” (Webb, Bruton, et al., 2013), i.e., not complying fully 
with all legal, regulatory, and tax requirements (Perry et al., 2007; Portes et al., 1989). Activities that would 
otherwise be considered illegal, such as the production or distribution of illicit drugs, are not included in this 
definition. 
8 For example, 35 percent of GDP in Latin America and the Caribbean and 13 percent of GDP in high-income 
OECD countries (Buehn & Schneider, 2012) are estimated to come from the informal economy, and jobs 
created in the informal economy affect 50–80 percent of the working population in south and southeast Asia, 
sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America (Charmes, 2012). 
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equity ratio)? In particular, we explore the role of entrepreneur characteristics in the 
informal economy context and the ways in which the roles of the entrepreneur and the 
micro-firm are intertwined. Apart from testing the classic pecking-order theories, i.e., an 
emerging capital structure based on available financing, and static tradeoff theories, i.e., a 
capital structure based on a cost-benefit analysis (Myers & Majluf, 1984), in a new 
context, we extend the analysis to consider several other entrepreneur characteristics that 
are important in the informal economy. For instance, in a population in which only 50% 
of each cohort finishes secondary schooling, other measures of human capital skills, such 
as the vital concept of financial literacy, should be considered. 
In this study, we argue that the factors driving entrepreneurs’ financing choices 
are fundamentally different in the informal economy and in the formal economy. In 
particular, we suggest that entrepreneur characteristics—such as age, financial literacy 
skills and marital status—have an impact on entrepreneurs’ strategic choices, but even 
firm characteristics will vary. The consequences of firm failure will have a more severe 
impact on informal economy entrepreneurs than on formal economy entrepreneurs 
because of the lack of protection in the case of default in the informal economy, which 
partially explains the difference between formal firms and informal firms. In fact, 
bankruptcy is not a legal option in the informal economy because the firm does not exist 
in a legal sense. As such, if a micro-firm fails, the founding entrepreneur can face severe 
economic hardship without a legal avenue to relieve this hardship, whereas laws govern 
business bankruptcies and individual civil bankruptcies in a formal economy. In this 
regard, behavioral economics challenge the idea that people make purely rational and 
deliberate decisions (J. S. B. T. Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2003) and suggest that 
individuals focus and act more on the fear of possible losses than the certainty of gains 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). We expect this effect to be even stronger among 
entrepreneurs in the informal sector.   
Studying the informal economy and its entrepreneurs is challenging. While a large 
portion of the world’s population is involved in informal business activity, individual 
operations are typically small and thus fall outside of regulatory interest and/or capacity. 
Bookkeeping does not exist, and proper credit analysis is often impossible because few 
national credit bureaus allow microfinance institutions to verify the total debt situation 
with the micro-entrepreneur. In addition, microfinance institutions often lack 
experienced personnel and may rely on external aid organizations to set up policies and 
practices, which are then not followed. In addition, the research context of the informal 
economy is often associated with high crime rates. Obtaining detailed and reliable data on 
 115 
the informal economy is thus difficult, as entrepreneurs in this context seldom maintain 
financial records and commonly mix family and business transactions. 
Many of the aforementioned research challenges have been overcome with our 
unique research design. First, we have been cooperating with the leading Ecuadorian 
microbank, Banco D-Miro, which has vast experience in microfinance and has 
transformed itself from an unregulated entity into a regulated one, thereby significantly 
enhancing its governance structure and internal policies. Second, Ecuador represents a 
context with many informal entrepreneurs, especially along the coastal areas, where 
informal business is widespread and growing (Albornoz et al., 2011) and involves more 
than 80 percent of the population (World Bank, 2012). Third, this study combines data 
from detailed credit assessments of individuals with data obtained from a national credit 
bureau (a particularly unique feature of Ecuador), thus providing a full picture of a micro-
entrepreneur’s overall debt-financing situation. While no meaningful separation exists 
between short-term and long-term debt, most debt was taken up for one year. Fourth, 
through an extensive telephone survey that successfully reached 500 entrepreneurs, we 
were able to receive behavioral data from the entrepreneurs. We also made 
complementary interviews in various districts to complement and support our research 
design.9  
In this study, we separate financing from internal or personal sources from 
external debt financing in line with the empirical approach of Cassar (2004) and Gartner 
et al. (2012). The cooperating microfinance bank recently approved and offered debt 
financing—or additional financing to repeat clients—to all the entrepreneurs included in 
this study, which implies that we are specifically excluding those who were not deemed 
credit worthy and cases in which financing decisions would never take place. Given that 
these firms operate in the informal economy with generally limited financing options, no 
added complexity related to quasi-equity financing exists (Cassar, 2004). 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews relevant theories of 
financing and capital structure decisions, and the subsequent section develops various 
                                            
 
 
 
 
 
9 To safeguard interviewers’ personal safety, the research team used dedicated drivers, who agreed to take the 
team to the informal and often more dangerous zones of Guayaquil, which illustrates the challenges associated 
with obtaining good data in the informal economy. Even with these safeguards, our research team was stopped 
and robbed once by several armed men. 
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hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the method used in the empirical tests, the data, and the 
constructs used. A discussion of the results of the empirical analysis and their 
implications follows in Section 5. The concluding section reviews the limitations of this 
study and discusses ideas for future research.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Theories of entrepreneurial financing 
Two theories in the general finance literature explain why a particular type of financing 
(internal or external) may be preferred to another: pecking-order theory and tradeoff theory 
(Frank and Goyal, 2008; Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Pecking-order theory 
suggests that capital structure emerges as a result of the various financing options 
available to a firm. In the informal economy, limited financing options are available, 
creating high barriers to entrepreneurship (Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 
2008). Thus, many small informal businesses ultimately have a limited amount of debt—
or even no debt—on their “balance sheets” (they rarely compile actual financial 
statements).  
In the case of informal firms, greater information asymmetries exist between the 
firm (represented by the entrepreneur) and the potential debt providers, such that the risk 
to an external financier is higher than of an insider (i.e., the entrepreneur), who has more 
information about the business. For example, credit officers (from the microbank in our 
case) have to spend considerable time and effort to ensure that an asset is actually owned 
by the micro-entrepreneur. The lack of audited financial statements, even basic 
accounting numbers, is another source of this information asymmetry. This asymmetry 
leads to a type of market failure, or mispricing, which is characterized by the cost of 
capital being set too high, thus resulting in the entrepreneur’s preference for inside 
financing (inside equity) over external financing (debt or equity). 
Based on pecking-order theory, equity is assumed to be the least-preferred option, 
only to be used as a last resort. In the informal economy, outside equity is rarely available, 
although some microfinance providers have begun offering this form of financing in 
addition to debt financing (Oikocredit, 2015). Much of the inside equity comes in the 
form of family investments, which are considered an internal form of financing here. As 
few external financing options are available, the tradeoff is simply between external and 
internal financing. Internal financing is often achieved through the entrepreneur’s savings 
or interest-free loans from family and friends. 
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Tradeoff theory suggests that the firm weighs the costs and benefits of alternative 
forms of financing (Titman & Wessels, 1988), “holding the firm’s assets and investment 
plans constant” (Myers 1984: 577). Within the informal economy, taxation is not typically 
a consideration; therefore, in a strict interpretation of existing research, tradeoff theory in 
the informal economy suggests that external debt financing carries no tax incentive, apart 
from the cost of interest, which is often considerable in the informal context (here 
typically approximately 30% per annum in nominal terms), leaving debt as a potential 
contributor to business failure. Tradeoff theory assumes that other forms of financing are 
available, such as equity, which is typically not the case in the informal sector. Therefore, 
we argue that applying tradeoff theory must also include weighing the expected net 
present value of new competencies, networks, and investment opportunities against the 
costs of, for instance, less entrepreneurial control or even the risk of personal economic 
failure (because bankruptcy is not a legal option in the informal economy). 
 
Human capital and the psychology of financing 
When an entrepreneur makes a decision to take on debt financing, we argue that he or 
she must have a certain skill set and psychological aptitude. Based on human capital theory 
(Becker, 1994), we argue that a positive relationship exists between a micro-
entrepreneur’s human capital and the decision to finance. In micro-firms in the informal 
economy, the individual entrepreneur – that is, the owner – is generally the one who 
possesses the primary human capital, whereas human capital is a collective resource that 
comes from many specialists in larger firms. As such, linking the concept of financial 
literacy to firm performance is easier in a microenterprise than in a larger company, 
where many individuals’ competences and skills contribute to firm performance. An 
entrepreneur’s human capital is essentially his or her aggregate skill set, which originates 
from education, training, and experience. Extant research has shown that entrepreneurs 
with higher levels of education are more likely to be successful (Unger et al., 2011). 
Entrepreneurs who lack sufficient education or business experience may find basic 
numerical calculations challenging, and they often fail to fully understand basic financial 
concepts, such as inflation, compound interest, and risk. In developing countries, the 
education level is even lower because children are commonly pushed into the labor force 
at an early age (International Labor Affairs Bureau, 2012). This lack of education, 
particularly business education, makes these micro-entrepreneurs vulnerable to simplified 
“rules of thumbs” and basic heuristics. For example, Magill and Meyer (2005) claim that, 
among informal economy entrepreneurs in Ecuador, debt “is not seen as a positive tool 
 118 
to grow a business, but rather as a cost or penalty to be avoided at almost any cost” (p. 
118). 
Prospect theory suggests that individuals put more weight on certain outcomes than 
they do on uncertain outcomes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and that they assign more 
weight to extreme outcomes, including both positive outcomes (e.g., winning the lottery) 
and negative outcomes (e.g., going bankrupt). For instance, imagine an opportunity 
yielding a certain income of 100 dollars compared with an opportunity yielding a 
probable income of 110 dollars. Although the mathematical expectation in the latter case 
is to receive 110 dollars, many would prefer to take the certain 100 dollars. For a firm in 
the informal economy, the risk of not receiving the expected income can lead to failure, 
with grave – sometimes even mortal – consequences (Bateman, 2010). Because informal 
micro-firms are not bound by bankruptcy laws, fear of the consequences of bankruptcy 
can lead them to never even attempt many potentially high-returning projects (S.-H. Lee, 
Yamakawa, Peng, & Barney, 2011). Because no laws govern situations that would lead to 
bankruptcy in the informal sector, the micro-entrepreneur is less protected than he would 
be in the formal sector. Thus, we expect informal industry entrepreneurs to require a 
higher expected financial return than formal industry entrepreneurs to take on risky 
investment decisions supported by debt. 
 
Entrepreneurs’ characteristics and financing choices 
Human capital 
Because practically all small firms in the informal economy are owner-managed, 
individual owner characteristics matter – not only from a signaling perspective but also 
from a business perspective. Previous research has been rather inconclusive about the 
relationship between individual characteristics and financing choices, possibly because 
more individuals collectively affect the decision making in larger firms or because the 
measures used have been too broad. For instance, once firm characteristics are 
considered, Cassar (2004) finds no link between nascent Australian entrepreneurs’ 
education and industry experience and their financing decisions. However, in line with 
Coleman and Cohn (2000), Gartner et al. (2012) find that a higher level of education and 
industry experience are significantly correlated with the use of external funding sources. 
However, apart from education, Coleman and Cohn (2000), like Cassar (2004), find firm 
characteristics to be more important than entrepreneur characteristics.  
We argue that, while firm characteristics are expected to be important, the 
importance of the entrepreneur characteristics cannot be ignored in the informal 
economy, where we believe the owner’s human capital matters. However, in the informal 
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economy, many entrepreneurs do not complete basic schooling and venture into 
employment or entrepreneurship either out of necessity (Reynolds, Bygrave, Autio, Cox, 
& Hay, 2002) or because of a poor education system in need of reform (Van Damme, 
Aguerrondo, Burgos, & Campos, 2013). For example, in Ecuador, more than 50 percent 
of urban entrepreneurs have not finished primary school (Magill & Meyer, 2005). As 
such, a human capital investment in the informal economy may be manifested through 
not only years of schooling but also experience. Our first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1 In the informal economy, an entrepreneur’s human capital investment is positively 
related to debt financing. 
 
 A recent meta-analysis concludes that specific skills and knowledge are more 
strongly related to an entrepreneur’s success than are human capital investments, such as 
education and work experience (Unger et al., 2011). For instance, when taking out a loan, 
an important skill is the ability to comprehend concepts such as compound interest, 
inflation, and risk – i.e., financial literacy (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014). A lack of financial 
literacy is not only a problem in developing countries; previous research has shown that, 
even in the United States, less-educated and poorer individuals are less likely to benefit 
from refinancing their mortgages, even when interest rates are falling (Campbell, 2006). 
Financial literacy can thus be expected to be an important aspect in a micro-
entrepreneur’s debt-financing decision, which leads us to our next hypothesis: 
 
H2 In the informal economy, a high level of financial literacy is positively related to 
debt financing. 
 
Previous research suggests that married couples will be more likely to take on 
more debt because they potentially have two income streams (Scherr, Sugrue, & Ward, 
1993). Others argue that married men are more likely to take risks (Rees & Shah, 1986). 
However, married couples do not necessarily have access to two income streams. Married 
couples may sometimes have two incomes, but income streams are more unpredictable in 
the informal economy, given the lack of formality and stringent employment contracts. 
Therefore, because marriage involves more responsibility, prospect theory leads us to 
expect a negative relationship with debt financing in the informal economy, given the 
couple’s fear of failure. As such, we present our third hypothesis below: 
 
H3 In the informal economy, marriage is negatively related to debt financing. 
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Research on entrepreneur gender has shown conflicting impacts on capital 
structure. Gartner et al. (2012) find no significant effect of gender on the choice between 
internal and external funding and, in turn, on capital structure, but Carter and Peter 
(1998) report a significant effect, finding that men use larger amounts of capital in 
starting businesses. A Dutch study revealed that female entrepreneurs use less financial 
capital than their male counterparts, but they use more debt in the composition of the 
financial capital (Verheul & Thurik, 2001). The Dutch study suggested that female 
entrepreneurs more likely to work part-time, more likely work in the service sector, more 
averse to risk, and less experienced in financial management; in addition, they network 
less and start smaller businesses. The informal economy and the practice of extending 
microcredit differ in this regard. Microfinance practitioners often prefer extending loans 
to women, not only because of their social mission to strengthen the status of women 
but also because of their belief that women have better financial management skills than 
men. As Percy Barnevik, the founder of Hand-in-Hand, once said, “men cannot be 
trusted not to drink or gamble the money away” (Brindle, 2008: 2). This preference 
points to potential differences in how men and females finance their businesses. 
 
H4 In the informal economy, gender is positively related to debt financing. 
 
Firm characteristics and financing choices 
Firm size 
Previous research has shown that firm size is an important factor in determining capital structure 
(Cassar, 2004; Degryse, de Goeij, & Kappert, 2012; Gartner et al., 2012; López-Gracia & 
Sogorb-Mira, 2008; Michaelas, Chittenden, & Poutziouris, 1999). In particular, tradeoff theory 
predicts that larger firm size results in more diversification and less volatility in earnings (Fama & 
French, 2002), making larger firms more attractive to lenders. In addition, larger firms can expect 
lower information asymmetries vis-à-vis lending institutions. Larger micro-firms are more likely 
to repay loans and to take on a larger amount of debt, thus lowering the banks’ transaction costs. 
By contrast, pecking-order theory predicts that larger firms may accumulate more internal 
resources and thus use less debt. Given that informal firms operate in a resource-constrained 
environment, tradeoff theory is likely more applicable here. Thus, we put forth the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H5 In the informal economy, firm size is positively related to debt financing. 
 
Asset structure 
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Previous research has suggested that firms with more tangible assets use more external 
financing methods as well as debt (Cassar, 2004; Degryse et al., 2012), as banks are 
expected positively view increased use of collateral. Tradeoff theory predicts that firms 
with more collateral will have fewer agency problems in relation to formal debt providers 
(i.e., banks), as collateral will lower the credit risk in the case of failure/bankruptcy. In a 
similar way, pecking-order theory suggests that the asymmetric information problem is 
mitigated when firms have more collateral (Degryse et al., 2012), which external lenders 
regard as a positive. Therefore, we hypothesize the following: 
 
H6 In the informal economy, asset structure, i.e., one with relatively more fixed assets, 
is positively related to debt financing. 
 
The intention to grow 
Entrepreneurs may wish to tap into the credit market to expand their businesses and 
exploit entrepreneurial opportunities (Webb, Bruton, et al., 2013). However, tradeoff 
theory suggests a negative relationship between growth and leverage because, while 
opportunities with a positive net present value may exist, the value of these new 
opportunities may primarily go to the debt holder. To avoid such conflicts, the 
entrepreneur might not use external debt financing. Pecking-order theory predicts a 
positive relationship between growth opportunities and entrepreneurs likelihood of 
seeking external debt financing. However, previous research has shown contradictory or 
inconclusive results regarding the relationship between the entrepreneur’s growth intent 
and his or her decision to seek external debt financing (Cassar, 2004; López-Gracia & 
Sogorb-Mira, 2008; Michaelas et al., 1999). In a review of the informal economy in 
Ecuador, Magill and Meyer (2005) find that most entrepreneurs remain unconvinced that 
debt can help grow their businesses. In their sample, some of the reluctance to take on 
debt was based on the cost of borrowing and fears about not being able to pay back the 
loans. To put this relationship to the test, we hypothesize the following: 
 
H7 In the informal economy, the entrepreneur’s intention to grow is positively related 
to debt financing. 
 
Firm profitability  
On the one hand, pecking-order theory predicts that the better the firm’s financial 
performance, the less it needs external debt financing, as it can rely on retained earnings 
to a greater extent (Degryse et al., 2012; Fama & French, 2002; Titman & Wessels, 1988). 
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On the other hand, tradeoff theory predicts a positive relationship between debt and 
profitability – typically because of an increased tax-deductibility benefit. Previous 
research on tradeoff theory has suggested that, among larger firms, the relationship 
between profitability and leverage is positive (Fama & French, 2002), whereas it is 
negative among smaller firms (López-Gracia & Sogorb-Mira, 2008; Michaelas et al., 1999; 
Van der Wijst & Thurik, 1993). There are also contradictory studies relating to larger 
firms, such as that of Rajan and Zingales (1995), who also note differences across 
countries. There may also be a bias in the extension of loans to more profitable 
customers if the MFI is working for profit ((Shahriar, Schwarz, & Newman, 2015). 
The general management literature has highlighted how having access to cash 
provides the firm with a resource cushion or organizational slack (Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert 
& March, 1963; Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, & Tansik, 1988). This cushion allows for 
experimentation, thereby lead the firm to undertake better projects than it would have if 
it had not had access to external financing. 
Therefore, previous studies point to a potentially curvilinear relationship between 
performance and the willingness to take on debt. In addition, because of the informal 
economy’s informality and lack of a social safety net, firms that take on external debt may 
require quite good returns to offset the risk of bankruptcy/failure, which is in line with 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Therefore, our next hypothesis is as 
follows: 
 
H8 In the informal economy, a positive and curvilinear (concave) relationship exists 
between a firm’s operating performance and debt financing. 
 
DATA AND METHOD 
 
Sample 
To create a research design that provides a strong test of the proposed model and 
hypotheses in the informal economy, many challenges had to be overcome that are 
generally more straightforward in the formal sector. These challenges included finding a 
representative sample (although, by definition, the population is not registered), obtaining 
reliable accounting data (when no auditor or taxperson checks the accounting quality), 
and ensuring a complete picture of the entrepreneurs’ financial situations (when 
entrepreneurs can draw on many sources of financing). While the data are cross-sectional, 
the independent variables are relatively time insensitive. 
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By collaborating with Banco D-Miro in Ecuador, a leading regulated microbank 
owned by a Norwegian nongovernmental organization (NGO), we have been able to 
gain access to a large sample of entrepreneurs in the informal economy. This approach is 
similar to that of Degryse et al. (2012), who used the Dutch bank Rabobank and its 
database of clients’ financial statements. We argue that the selected data are 
representative of entrepreneurs in the informal economy in several ways. First, in many 
ways, Ecuador is an ideal country in which to study the informal economy. Informality is 
widespread there, covering nearly 80 percent of the working population (World Bank, 
2012). Our sample of firms is particularly illustrative of informality, as 90 percent of them 
do not pay income tax, sales tax, or any other tax; the few that do pay taxes only pay, on 
average, 2 percent of their net incomes. 
Second, D-Miro is a pioneer of microfinance in Ecuador and specifically targets 
micro-entrepreneurs in areas of Ecuador that have many informal businesses. Once an 
unregulated bank, D-Miro has recently undergone a major transformation, becoming a 
regulated bank; as such, to obtain central bank approval, D-Miro has been subject to 
stricter processes and policies. Most of its clients are located in poor areas in the coastal 
region, which has no traditional banks. At the end of 2013, with 40,682 clients, D-Miro 
was the third-largest regulated microfinance institution in Ecuador, following Solidario 
(382,027 clients) and Creditfe (147,080 clients). A recent ranking of outreach, efficiency, 
and transparency named D-Miro the best microfinance institution in Ecuador and the 
eighth best in South America (Martínez, 2014), out of a total of 229 microfinance 
institutions. 
Third, to capture the complete financial situation of these firms, we also used data 
from the national credit bureau, including their clients’ other banking relationships. The 
surveyed clients each used between one and six microfinance banks, with most using only 
one bank, a common feature among smaller firms in the formal economy (Ang, 1992). 
Through this approach, D-Miro and its clients illustrate the role of micro-entrepreneurs 
in Ecuador’s informal economy. 
Fourth, the selected population includes both debt-seeking and non-debt-seeking 
banking clients. Moreover, D-Miro uses a strict loan application process, whereby the 
credit officer, supervised by a branch manager, approves a loan based on the business’ 
current earnings. As such, all the clients investigated here were performing sufficiently 
well to be considered for external debt financing. In other words, these businesses had a 
proven track record and were not in their early stages. However, one limitation is that 
these entrepreneurs were all approved as bank customers, meaning that our approach 
does not capture the behavior of entrepreneurs who want a loan but are unable to obtain 
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one. The behavior that we captured thus relates specifically to credit-worthy informal 
entrepreneurs with sustainable cash flow-generating businesses, which implies that, to 
some extent, we excluded non-sustainable business discoveries from our sample. 
To the best of our knowledge, the entrepreneurs covered in this study did not 
receive any grants or consulting support from this microfinance institution, which may 
sometimes be the case with other microfinance institutions. By contrast, these 
entrepreneurs needed to demonstrate their ability to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities 
on their own. When an individual applies for a loan, he or she signals that an 
entrepreneurial process has preceded this event. Some of the entrepreneurs were new 
clients, while others had previously received loans from D-Miro. In general, credit 
officers work closely with 300 to 400 clients, and, for each new client, they spend time 
ensuring that the entrepreneur’s assets are indeed owned by him or her and not by 
someone else. To obtain information from the entrepreneurs, 3,468 phone calls were 
placed, producing complete interviews with 755 firms, of which 255 were excluded 
because the firms belonged to another firm category (clients with delayed payments). 
Each interview lasted approximately 20 minutes and was conducted in Spanish by a 
professional Ecuadorian call center that was supervised by a team of three researchers 
and an experienced marketing manager. 
 
Measures 
Human capital 
Education is a broad measure of human capital investment. We used level of education 
(i.e., basic, upper secondary, or post-upper secondary) as such a measure. Each level is 
approximately six years apart from the next; thus, equidistance is assumed. Years of 
education may have an effect on the type of business that an individual sets up. In 
addition to education, human capital can also be measured in terms of loan experience, 
which we captured as the number of loans that an individual has previously received. To 
capture general work experience, we used the entrepreneur’s age, a measure that may also 
be correlated with the entrepreneur’s risk attitude.  
 
Financial literacy 
Financial literacy is used to measure a person’s ability to comprehend three key financial 
concepts: compound interest, inflation, and risk/diversification (Lusardi & Mitchell, 
2014). The first two questions that we asked our respondents were taken directly from 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2011a), whereas the third was adapted to better fit the context of 
the informal economy. The first question is designed to capture the participant’s ability to 
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do simple calculations (i.e., numeracy) and his or her understanding of the idea of 
compound interest; the second question incorporates the concept of inflation; and the 
third addresses risk and diversification, as shown below: 
1. Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2 percent per 
year. After five years, how much do you think you would have in the account if 
you left the money to grow: more than $102, exactly $102, less than $102? 
2. Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1 percent per year and 
inflation was 2 percent per year. After one year, would you be able to buy more 
than, exactly the same as, or less than today with the money in this account? 
3. Do you think that the following statement is true or false: Investing everything in 
one opportunity usually provides a more certain economic reward than investing 
smaller amounts in many different opportunities?  
 
Debt financing 
In this analysis, two dependent variables are used: 1) leverage, calculated as total debt 
divided by total assets, and 2) a dummy variable that indicates whether the entrepreneur 
decided to renew his or her loan. Importantly, the clients who chose not to renew their 
loans voluntarily “left” the microbank, and they do not represent the clients to whom the 
microbank did not want to extend another loan. Thus, the results are demand driven and 
not supply induced. Using the dummy variable, we captured entrepreneurs’ financing 
decisions about whether to seek external financing through debt. In theory, equity could 
also be a source of external financing, but it was not yet available to this group of 
entrepreneurs. Due to our unique access to information, we captured the micro-
entrepreneur’s total debt, including its sub-components. For example, we were able to 
distinguish between business assets and non-business household-related assets. This 
distinction is important because many of these businesses are located in the 
entrepreneur’s home. Non-business assets are defined as assets that are uniquely used for 
the household and that are not included in our definition of firm assets. 
 
Firm size 
In line with past studies, we define firm size as the log of total assets (Cassar, 2004) 
because the assets are related to the business’ collateral. We believe that our measure is 
superior, as we explicitly focus on business-related assets. 
 
Asset structure 
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In line with Cassar (2004), asset structure is defined as non-current assets divided by total 
assets. This definition helps us distinguish between more and less capital-intensive firms. 
 
Growth intent 
Cassar’s (2004) study of start-ups in a developed country’s formal economy uses 
entrepreneurs’ growth intent and applies a dichotomous variable based on entrepreneurs 
answering “yes” to any of the following: “During the next 3 years, does the business 
intend to (1) significantly increase production levels, (2) open new locations, and (3) 
introduce new goods or services?” (p. 12). When we applied Cassar’s survey instrument 
to our sample of entrepreneurs in Ecuador’s informal economy (who potentially had a 
more limited understanding of the question), the answers yielded little variability: 709 out 
of the 755 entrepreneurs answered “yes,” which made using this measure difficult. 
Instead, in line with the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (Xavier, Kelley, Kew, 
Herrington, & Vorderwülbecke, 2013), we created an alternative scaled variable based on 
the respondents’ answers to the following two questions: (1) If you want to grow your 
business, how many persons do you want to work with you? (2) Besides you, how many 
persons work in your business? These questions were phrased in Spanish. We found 
more variability in these responses, ranging from 9 to 37 employees. 
 
Firm prof i tabi l i ty  
For firm profitability, we computed a return-on-assets (ROA) measure, deducting the 
opportunity cost of the entrepreneur’s labor. This adjusted ROA was created using the 
financial data gathered by D-MIRO’s credit officer. We subtracted the opportunity cost of 
labor – namely, the indirect compensation for the entrepreneur’s work – from the return 
part of the ROA, as suggested by Shane and Venkataraman (2000). Using data from the 
National Statistics and Census Institute of Ecuador, Canelas (2014) shows that, on 
average, informal wage workers earned 91 percent of the minimum wage from 2010–
2012. We thus estimated the opportunity cost of labor in Ecuador’s informal economy in 
2013 to be the actual minimum wage (i.e., USD 318) multiplied by 91 percent (i.e., USD 
289), reducing the median ROA from 63 percent to 37 percent. To capture the potential 
concavity of returns, we squared the ROA term. 
 
Controls 
Micro-entrepreneurs may display different characteristics depending on whether they are 
located in an urban or rural environment (Honig, 1998). Therefore, obtaining data from 
the National Statistics and Census Institute of Ecuador, we used the ratio of urban to 
rural persons who lived within the city area of the micro-firm to control for location 
 127 
(INEC, 2011). In addition to controlling for location, we also controlled for the size of 
the household (the number of dependents) and the business’ industry. The industry 
definitions used were those proposed by the United Nations for the informal economy 
(United Nations 2008: 279–281). Recent research call for more information on whether 
MFIs select clients based on industry (Shahriar et al., 2015). Often, the informal economy 
is numerically dominated by manufacturing, repair services, and trade. In the context of 
Ecuador’s informal economy, the sample is dominated by wholesale and retail trade (52 
percent), of which the most common forms are clothing retail, goods and grocery retail, 
bazaars, and cosmetics.  
 To test our hypotheses, we performed two forms of regression. First, we used a 
logit regression to determine the influence of the independent variables on the micro-
entrepreneur’s debt-financing decision. The debt versus no debt decision is particularly 
relevant in the informal sector, as a number of businesses have not taken on debt (36 
percent of the sample). For the level-of-debt decision, we applied an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression, explaining the proportion of financing from debt, which is in 
line with previous research on the formal economy. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive statistics 
As shown in Table 1, the average micro-firm in our sample has only 13 percent debt to 
total assets compared to an average leverage of 61 percent (with a median of 75 percent) 
in Cassar's (2004) study in a developed country and 49 percent in a study by Degryse et 
al. (2012). The low number that we observe is consistent with other studies on informal 
economies and perhaps reflects the entrepreneurs’ general skepticism toward debt 
financing (Magill & Meyer, 2005), but it could also reflect high interest rates and a lack of 
relevant debt products (i.e., lines of credit or long-term loans).  
The average ROA among our sample firms is 45 percent (adjusted for the 
opportunity cost of the entrepreneur’s labor). This profitability can be compared with the 
15 percent observed for small firms in the formal economy in Degryse et al. (2012), 
which indicates that the financial returns are, on average, much higher among micro-
firms in the informal economy than among small firms in developed economies. 
However, the downside risk of business failure is also much higher in the informal sector. 
In fact, 32 percent of the surveyed firms had an adjusted ROA below their marginal cost 
of capital (median yearly nominal interest-rate expenses of 26.5 percent). We argue that 
this extremely high variability in profit is an important characteristic of the informal 
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economy, which can help explain how an entrepreneur views business risks 
(bankruptcy/failure) in a context with no bankruptcy protections. Such high returns 
signal that these entrepreneurs require a significant risk premium to counter the high risk 
of failure or default. 
When we measured financial literacy among the surveyed micro-entrepreneurs, on 
average, only 1.1 out of three questions were answered correctly. This figure is low when 
compared to the results for formal entrepreneurs in developed economies (Lusardi & 
Mitchell, 2011c, 2014). Micro-entrepreneurs in the informal economy are thus distinctly 
different from entrepreneurs in the formal economy, justifying our argument for the 
expanded use of theory (by including human capital theory and prospect theory).  
On average, the entrepreneurs in this sample had previously gone through three 
loan cycles (taking out a loan and then paying it off), with some having gone through as 
many as 16 loan cycles, who were thus considered more experienced microbank clients. 
A total of 41 percent of the sample entrepreneurs were men, and 36 percent of the 
entrepreneurs were married. The average number of children per household was 1.9, and 
the highest number of children per household was 7. 
 
Table 5 Descriptive data  
 
  Definition Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables         
Leverage Total debt/total assets 0.13 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Loan renewal Dummy, with decision to renew as 1 and non-renewal as 0 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Firm characteristics         
Firm size (log) Log of total assets 9.51 0.69 8.10 11.80 
Asset structure Non-current assets/total assets 0.86 0.14 0.12 1.00 
Growth intent Dummy, 1 if number of desired employees > current number 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 
ROA unadjusted (Net income - opportunity cost of labor)/total assets 0.45 0.44 -1.65 4.78 
ROA ROA winsorized at 5% level 0.43 0.37 -1.10 1.93 
Human capital         
Education Three levels (basic, secondary and post-secondary) 1.63 0.58 0.00 3.00 
Financial literacy From 0 to 3, where 3 is the highest level of literacy 1.06 0.99 0.00 3.00 
Loan experience Number of loans previously taken out 3.27 2.62 1.00 16.00 
Age Age of entrepreneur 43.00 10.74 19.00 67.00 
Other entrepreneur characteristics         
Civil status Dummy, 1 for married and 0 for not married 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Dependents Number of children in the household 1.93 1.44 0.00 7.00 
Controls         
Gender Dummy, 1 for male and 0 for female  0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Urban vs. rural Degree of the location’s urbanity (from 0 to 1) 0.88 0.17 0.17 1.00 
Industries Wholesale, manufacturing, restaurants, agriculture, transportation, personal services, education 
and health, construction, repair services 
Note: All values are denominated in USD because that is the official currency in Ecuador. 
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Multivariate analysis 
Table 2 presents the results of our logit and OLS regressions. The logit regression shows 
the influence of the independent variable on the financing choices made. The OLS 
regression shows the proportion of debt financing, or leverage, explained by the 
independent variables. A multicollinearity check was performed on each independent 
variable against the others, and no reported variance inflation factor (VIF) was above 2.6; 
hence, multicollinearity does not appear to be a concern (Hair, Black, Babin, & 
Anderson, 2010).  
Our first hypothesis tests whether an entrepreneur’s human capital investment 
(i.e., education/experience) is positively related to debt financing. We find that the level 
of education does not influence the financing choice or the level of leverage. Our measure 
of education assumes equidistance, as each school level is separated by approximately six 
years. In addition, the entrepreneur’s age, as a proxy for work experience, does not 
appear to influence the financing decision as we expected. However, the age squared 
term is significant, which indicates that the higher entrepreneurial age, the more business 
experience and the higher the likelihood of taking on debt. We did not find previous loan 
experience to have a significant impact on a person’s decision to take out more loans or 
on the level of leverage; however, at p = .083, the effect is positive. In conclusion, our 
various measures of human capital only partly, via age2, support Hypothesis 1. 
If we instead consider the outcome of human capital investments in line with the 
meta-analysis of Unger et al. (2011) – i.e., with regard to relevant skills – the results are 
more in line with our expectations. We hypothesized that a higher level of financial 
literacy is positively related to debt financing, and our results show an impact on both the 
decision to seek debt financing and the level of leverage, thus firmly supporting 
Hypothesis 2.  
Our third hypothesis regarding the negative impact of marriage on debt financing 
is partly supported, as those who are not married are more likely to take out a loan than 
those who are married. However, marital status did not affect the loan amount. As such, 
unmarried individuals—that is, those with less responsibility—are more likely to choose 
external financing. Nonetheless, when we used the number of dependents or the 
interaction between gender and the number of dependents as a measure, we did not find 
a significant effect. However, our fourth hypothesis—that gender would have an 
impact—was not supported, thereby suggesting that gender is not necessarily a 
determinant of leverage. 
We included the entrepreneur’s urban location as a further control variable; it had 
no influence on the financing choice but had a significant impact on the amount of debt 
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taken on. This result may be supply driven, as a credit officer may consider the trouble 
and cost of obtaining and providing services to a client who is located far from an urban 
office. Therefore, location may have an impact on the amount of leverage taken on, thus 
giving some support to tradeoff theory. Industry controls were included in our analysis, 
but they had no impact on the logit regression. However, the OLS regression indicates 
that firms in the transport industry and those in the education and health sectors tend to 
have higher degrees of leverage. 
In terms of the traditional firm characteristics used in previous research to explain 
financial decision making (e.g., Cassar, 2004), we found that micro-firm size significantly 
influences both the decision to take on debt and the level of leverage, thus supporting 
Hypothesis 5 and the underlying tradeoff theory of financing.  
We found that asset structure has a significant effect on the decision to take on debt 
financing, thus supporting Hypothesis 6. Our analysis also indicates that growth intent 
(Hypothesis 7) does influence the decision to take out a loan in the informal economy, 
something that previous research in the context of the formal economy has struggled to 
show. However, the level of leverage is not related to growth intent; therefore, 
Hypothesis 7 is only partly supported. 
A micro-firm’s profitability (ROA) is shown to have a significant association with 
its leverage, and we observe that the squared term (ROA2) appears to have a positive 
curvilinear (concave) relationship with the financing decision but not with actual leverage. 
This finding lends partial support to Hypothesis 8. We emphasize that this effect is not 
supply driven (i.e., no selection bias exists) because all of our sample’s firms had access to 
debt financing (i.e., they had already been approved for debt financing). 
While not specifically studied here, Shahriar et al. (2015) ask whether MFI´s 
decision to lend is influenced by the type of business. Among the controls, not reported, 
we note that there are such differences, e.g. that agricultural clients are more likely to take 
on a loan, whereas clients in repair services are less likely. In terms of leverage, it was 
found that transportation and education related businesses had a higher leverage. 
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Table 2 Logit and OLS explaining the use and proportion of external financing 
 
 Logit    OLS    
Variables B  Std. 
Error 
Sig. B        Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Constant -8.657  1.943 0.000 12.087  17.012 0.478 
Entrepreneur characteristics      
H1a: Education -0.248 0.178 0.164 -0.861 1.459 0.555 
H1b: Age -0.008 0.011 0.486 0.075 0.091 0.410 
H1c: Age2 0.003 ** 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.007 0.770 
H1d: Loan experience 0.069 0.043 0.109 0.600 0.345 0.083 
H2: Financial literacy 0.287 ** 0.106 0.007 2.290 ** 0.851 0.007 
H3: Married -0.722 ** 0.228 0.002 -1.942 1.843 0.293 
H4: Gender -0.048 0.380 0.900 -2.673 1.881 0.156 
Other entrepreneur characteristics      
Dependents 0.182 0.111 0.100 1.310 0.923 0.156 
Gender x dependents -0.189 0.149 0.206 -0.906 1.227 0.461 
Firm characteristics        
H5: Size (log) 0.669 *** 0.177 0.000 5.063 *** 1.548 0.001 
H6: Asset structure 0.022 * 0.009 0.018 -0.258 *** 0.073 0.000 
H7: Growth intent 0.087 * 0.041 0.034 -0.327 0.282 0.248 
H8: ROA 0.013 ** 0.005 0.007 0.1508 *** 0.035 0.000 
H8: ROA2 0.000 ** 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.140 
Other control variables       
Urban vs. rural 0.014 0.629 0.983 -13.558 ** 5.145 0.009 
Industry controls Yes   Yes    
N 500   500    
-2 Log likelihood 577.4       
χ2 6.393       
Cox and Snell R2 0.183       
Nagelkerke R2 0.243       
F statistic     4.832 ***   
R2     0.184   
Adjusted R2     0.146   
Note: Industry dummies included but not reported. ROA is winsorized at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level, *** significant at the 0.1% level. 
 
Implications 
This section discusses the aforementioned measures and the implications of our findings. 
This study develops a multi-theory model that attempts to explain the capital structure of 
firms in the informal economy. Our theoretical contribution is making these theories 
applicable to micro-firms in the informal economy. We did so by adding dimensions of 
human capital theory (Hypotheses 1 and 2) and by considering other entrepreneur 
characteristics (Hypotheses 3 and 4) that had previously been tested with conflicting 
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results and that had not been examined in this context. In addition, we applied the 
standard capital structure model based on pecking-order theory and tradeoff theory 
(hypothesis 5 through 8) in a new context. 
With regard to human capital investments and financial literacy, our results 
indicate that the poor educational systems in these countries do not provide adequate 
guidance in terms of why some entrepreneurs choose financing and others do not. While 
this finding is in line with Cassar (2004), it contradicts the findings of Gartner et al. 
(2012) in the formal economy. We do not find these results surprising, given that 
individuals spend, on average, five years in school in Ecuador (as did the entrepreneurs in 
this sample). A new school reform in Ecuador (Buen Vivir) might improve the 
educational system in the future, although little improvement is noted in the levels 
affecting the informal economy (primary and secondary education) (David, 2011). As a 
proxy for experience, age did not yield any insights, but our results indicate that the 
likelihood of taking on debt increases with age.  
One clear take-away from this study is that micro-entrepreneurs who are more 
financially literate are more prone to select external debt financing and to prefer higher 
levels of leverage. As such, teaching finance to enhance financial literacy among 
entrepreneurs in the informal economy will likely have a positive impact on their 
decisions to use debt financing. With regard to financing decisions, our findings further 
emphasize the importance of financial literacy to decision making (Lusardi & Mitchell, 
2014) in an under-researched and undereducated context. If entrepreneurs’ level of 
understanding of basic finance were increased, would more entrepreneurs at least 
consider using more financing, contingent, of course, on the credit worthiness of the 
business idea? However, whether debt financing improves the informal business should 
be the subject of further research. Today, many charitable organizations and government 
organizations, including the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, UNICEF, and the World 
Bank, are beginning to focus more on the issue of teaching financial literacy. As this 
study suggests, the actual skills needed in this context include an understanding of basic 
financial concepts, such as compound interest, inflation, and diversification of risk. To 
attain such skills, individuals will need to improve their numeric capabilities as well as 
their cognitive and analytical decision making.  
We also found that unmarried micro-entrepreneurs choose more external debt 
financing, which may reflect their risk assessments, as they may feel able to take on more 
risk because they do not have a family to consider. However, having more dependents 
(children) does not make entrepreneurs more reluctant to take on debt.  
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Contrary to existing research, our findings on firm size and asset structure in the 
informal economy reveal a different relationship than that among larger firms in the formal 
economy. In our results, size affects the entrepreneur’s decision to take on debt, but, 
compared with previous findings on formal firms, our findings attribute more weight to 
firm size in the financing decision. Asset structure shows a negative relationship with 
leverage, possibly because of the greater need for working capital. In the informal 
economy, the relationship is reversed in terms of the level of leverage. This finding 
contradicts previous research (Cassar, 2004; de Jong, 1999; Degryse et al., 2012; G. C. 
Hall, Hutchinson, & Michaelas, 2004; Michaelas et al., 1999; Sogorb-Mira, 2005) and 
suggests that firms in formal and informal economies reason differently. In informal 
economies, a firm with little working capital risks becoming illiquid, which increases the 
risk of bankruptcy. Therefore, in the informal economy, firms are not necessarily aiming 
to invest in fixed assets when seeking financing; instead they aim to expand their working 
capital. 
We also found that micro-entrepreneurs’ growth intent is associated with micro-
firms’ interest in seeking external debt financing, but it is not associated with the level of 
leverage, which is in line with Cassar (2004), who found some support for a relationship 
between growth intent and the use of bank financing among formal businesses in the 
United States. These findings expand those of Magill and Meyer's study (2005), showing 
that growth intent is a reason for taking out a loan, though it is not linked to the loan 
amount. 
Furthermore, our analysis showed that the average financial performance of the 
micro-firms in this study is higher than that of comparable firms in the formal economy. 
However, the variability of returns is also higher than has been found in studies on the 
formal economy (e.g., Miller and Leiblein 1996), suggesting that the downside risk or the 
risk of failure in the informal economy is much greater than that in the formal economy. 
This finding illustrates the consequences of human behavior through prospect theory, 
i.e., that entrepreneurs in the informal economy require a significant safety margin when 
taking out a loan to compensate for the risk of economic failure in this case.  
 Lastly, we found that rural entrepreneurs tend to use more leverage than urban 
entrepreneurs, but location does not influence the decision to use external debt financing 
in the first place. The higher cost of providing services to a rural entrepreneur compared 
with an urban entrepreneur, which is in line with tradeoff theory, may explain this 
finding.  
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Limitations of this research 
This study is not without limitations, which represent possible lines of future research. 
For instance, some institutional and cultural variables may make generalizing these 
findings beyond Ecuador difficult. This study is further limited to entrepreneurs who 
have approached a particular microfinance institution: D-Micro. For example, D-Micro’s 
pursuit of social goals—although such goals are the norm in the industry—might have an 
impact on the self-selection of entrepreneurs that approach this particular microfinance 
institution. Lastly, our model only differentiates between external debt financing and 
internal financing. Further differentiation, for instance, external equity or financing by 
family and friends, can be performed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, we developed a model and corresponding hypotheses regarding micro-
entrepreneurs’ strategic financing choices in the informal economy, operating at the 
intersection between the formal and informal economies. We investigated the 
determinants of the strategic decision to use external financing from a formal 
microfinance institution and the drivers of the subsequent level of leverage. Our research 
context involved 500 entrepreneurs from the informal economy of Ecuador, a country 
where informality is more the norm than the exception.  
This study suggests that, in contrast to previous research on the formal economy 
of developed countries, several characteristics of the entrepreneur help explain his or her 
financing behavior in the informal economy. We show that specific skills, such as 
financial literacy, influence micro-firms’ use of debt in the informal economy. Our results 
indicate that those who are more financially literate are likely to use more debt financing. 
Another interesting entrepreneur characteristic is marital status; we observed that 
unmarried entrepreneurs are more likely to take on debt, suggesting that they may be 
more able/willing to take on business risks. 
In terms of firm characteristics, we found that, contrary to Gartner et al. (2012) 
but in line with Cassar (2004) and tradeoff theory, firm size is related to both the decision 
to seek formal external financing and the level of leverage. The positive association could 
signal, on the one hand, smaller firms’ unwillingness to take on debt and, on the other 
hand, formal microfinance institutions’ preference for larger firms. Profitability was 
found to have a curvilinear relationship with the decision to use external financing and a 
positive association with profitability (ROA). Thus, firms with higher profitability are 
more willing to take on debt, but microfinance institutions also prefer firms with better 
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operations. Both size and profitability can be considered inversely related to the risk of 
bankruptcy, which both the individual entrepreneur and the bank will consider in the 
financing decision . We found that asset structure is positively related to the decision to 
seek external financing but that it is negatively related to the level of leverage, likely 
because of the need for working capital in these “fixed-asset-light” informal industries. 
An entrepreneur’s growth intent was shown to be positively related to his or her decision 
to take out a loan, but it was found to have no impact on the level of leverage. This 
finding contrasts with previous research, which has shown little support for the effect of 
growth intent. Lastly, the entrepreneur characteristics and firm characteristics were found 
to be equally important in explaining the decision to finance, which differs from the 
findings of previous research on mostly formal firms. 
In terms of control factors, the results show no difference in the likelihoods of 
rural and urban entrepreneurs selecting external debt financing, but they reveal that rural 
entrepreneurs have more leverage relative to urban micro-firms in the Ecuadorian 
context. 
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Faces of Informality 
A shop owner in Guayaquil, Ecuador 
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Financial Literacy, Role Models and Microenterprise Performance in the 
Informal Economy 
 
By Pontus Engström and Alexander McKelvie10 
 
 
Abstract 
This study focuses specifically on how financial literacy and role models help to 
explain microenterprise performance in the informal economy. Grounded in the 
resource-based view of the firm, we argue that financial literacy is important and 
leads to improved firm performance (return on assets and profits). In addition, 
we study the impact of knowing successful role models, which positively 
influences firm performance (return on assets). Although financial literacy is 
seen to help performance, future research may also need to explore how other 
skills, such as marketing skills, may have a greater impact on other financial 
performance measures, such as sales growth. 
 
Keywords: microfinance, informal economy, financial literacy, microenterprise 
performance 
 
 
Introduction 
Despite the importance of the informal economy for the entrepreneurial pursuits of 
individuals and for employment, research into informal microenterprises has remained 
scant (Webb, Bruton, et al., 2013; Webb et al., 2009). In this paper, we extend the 
research on entrepreneurship in the informal economy to examine how skills such as 
financial literacy and the close proximity of entrepreneurial role models help 
microentrepreneurs achieve better performance in their microenterprises. Drawing upon 
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the resource-based theory (Barney, 1991) and human capital theory (Becker, 1994), we 
examine whether financial literacy impacts performance and whether the presence of role 
models alleviates resource deficiency if skills and know-how are lacking. 
 We argue that mainstream entrepreneurship research mostly focuses on the “right 
tail” of human capital, specifically people with high levels of education, experience and 
expertise, thus overlooking the “left tail”, which concerns entrepreneurs who are weak in 
terms of formal competencies. With more than 200 million poor individuals globally 
receiving microfinance services, compared to 13 million in 1997 (Reed et al., 2014), the 
extension of microcredit is no longer a small industry; its growth rate is in the double 
digits (MicroRate, 2013).  
Our interest in the informal economy is based on the fact that the majority of 
economic activity in many developing countries takes place in such ‘shadow’ 
microenterprises (Bruton et al., 2008; Webb et al., 2009; C. C. Williams & Nadin, 2012). 
These microenterprises are commonly overlooked because they operate mostly out of 
view of government regulations, government statistics and interaction with established 
institutions. For many developing countries, such as Ecuador, Tanzania and India, 
employment in the informal economy affects more than 80% of the population (ILO, 
2013). Furthermore, the importance of such informal economic microenterprises is 
shown by the fact that such activity is seen as the modus operandi of individuals seeking to 
exit poverty (Bruton et al., 2013).  
A focus on entrepreneur financial literacy is important for two reasons. First, 
although entrepreneurship is commonly based on the idea that individuals discover an 
opportunity prior to their decision to exploit it (Scott Shane & Venkataraman, 2000), a 
growing body of research is emerging that looks at the bridge between these two stages – 
the bridge of opportunity evaluation (Wood & McKelvie, 2015). In this study, we argue 
that the ability to assess an opportunity financially, i.e., financial literacy, is critical in the 
evaluation phase. Webb, Bruton, et al. (2013) describe this important aspect of research 
on the informal economy under the rubric of ‘resource allocation’. Fundamentally, if 
entrepreneurs in the informal economy lack a basic understanding of rudimentary 
financial concepts and tools, how can they accurately evaluate an entrepreneurial 
opportunity such that it leads to good performance? In addition, existing research shows 
conflicting benefits of financial literacy in emerging economies; for instance, in a South 
African context, Webb, Morris, et al. (2013) find a negative relationship with 
microenterprise growth, whereas Bruhn and Zia (2013) report improvements in business 
performance and sales for female-run businesses in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a 
qualitative study, Bruton, Khavul, and Chavez (2011) also find that an important 
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characteristic of borrowers in better-performing businesses is their “awareness of interest 
rates and the time value of money” (p. 727). With the World Bank and other nonprofit 
organizations actively promoting financial literacy to help economic development, it is 
vital to understand and measure its impact on the target group, i.e., the microenterprise. 
Second, past studies on the impact of human capital on microenterprise 
performance often apply measures such as entrepreneur education and previous work 
experience. However, research shows that the outcome of education and work 
experience – such as skills and knowledge – are better predictors of firm performance 
(Unger et al., 2011). In fact, research on the informal economy of Jamaica found a 
negative relationship between education and microenterprise performance (Honig, 1998). 
Therefore, entrepreneurship research incorporating the notion of human capital needs to 
consider specific skills obtained rather than the number of years spent obtaining skills 
(Hanushek & Woessmann, 2008). This study therefore bridges previous research on 
financial literacy in the developed world (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014) with the informal 
economy. 
Lacking skills and knowledge, microentrepreneurs may turn to role models for 
both inspiration and support. Research on role models has shown that individuals tend to 
make decisions on the basis of social cues (Aldrich 1999, cited in Minniti 2005). This 
implies, for example, that decisions to expand a business, enter a new business, or make 
other changes are made through the indirect influence of others. Whereas financial 
literacy addresses an individual’s ability to assess the benefits and costs of an 
entrepreneurial opportunity, role models help reduce the ambiguity in decision-making 
(Minniti, 2005). 
Motivated by the factors shown above, our study offers several unique 
contributions to the literature. First, we outline a model of microenterprise performance 
in the informal economy, adding empirical tests to such a model. To overcome a singular 
view of performance, such as focusing solely on profits, growth, or efficiency, we are 
specifically able to analyze these microenterprises through three forms of firm 
performance – sales growth, profits and return on assets (ROA). This is notable as 
scholars are only beginning to develop robust empirical insights into microenterprises 
that operate outside of the purview of established institutions and where access to 
microenterprise performance data is very rare (Bruton et al., 2008; Webb et al., 2009). 
Second, we extend theoretical discussions of human capital and the “ability” in evaluating 
opportunities into the realm of a tangential area, that of financial literacy. In doing so, we 
provide an alternate metric (financial literacy) of human capital, compared to the level of 
education, into how microenterprise performance is affected. This is important for 
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microenterprises in the informal economy (Drexler, Fischer, & Schoar, 2014; Field, 
Jayachandran, & Pande, 2010), where relatively little work related to entrepreneurship has 
been done. Lastly, microentrepreneurs may alleviate a lack of certain skills and knowledge 
either through advise or social cues provided by role models (Minniti, 2005) . 
This article is organized as follows. The next section presents a review of the 
literature on financial literacy, human capital theory, role models and previous research 
linked to microenterprise performance. We then present the method used and the 
empirical setting, which is followed by the results and a concluding discussion. 
 
Theory 
The resource-based view holds that a microenterprise’s resources, tangible or intangible, 
are critical to its performance (Barney 1991). In the context of microenterprises, the 
enterprise’s resources are nearly synonymous with the entrepreneur’s resources (tangible 
and intangible) as these businesses are usually centered around one individual. To 
sustainably outperform the competition, it is important that this skill or resource be 
unique and non-imitable. Apart from business-related assets and finances, the 
entrepreneur´s own human capital, defined as knowledge and skills, is considered vital to 
success (Unger et al., 2011), but when lacking skills or feeling ambiguous about a decision, 
entrepreneurs may also turn to known role models (Minniti, 2005). 
Human capital is often enhanced through education or experience. In many 
developing countries, such as Ecuador, Sri Lanka and Tanzania, many individuals leave 
school after five years, implying that the perceived marginal benefit of more schooling 
does not outweigh the perceived incremental cost. Unger et al. (2011) argue that education 
and experience are only indirect measures of human capital, instead showing that the direct 
outcome of human capital investments, such as skills and knowledge, provides a better 
link to performance. In other words, what you learn is more important than how many years of 
education you have. Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) argue that: 
 
“there is strong evidence that the cognitive skills of the population –  rather than mere school 
attainment – are powerfully related to individual earnings, to the distribution of income, and 
to economic growth.” (p.607)  
 
Unger et al. (2011) find no support for human capital being more important to 
microenterprise performance in less developed countries than in developed ones. 
However, Van der Sluis et al. (2005) find that one year extra of entrepreneurship 
education in the developing world leads to an increase in enterprise income by 5.5%. Yet, 
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one of the more frequently cited studies on the value of human capital in the informal 
economy of Jamaica (Honig, 1998) finds no clear linkage between formal education level 
and the income levels of individuals, where in fact those with only primary education 
earned more money than those who had junior secondary education. This suggests a 
negative relationship between education and performance. However, those with 
vocational training or college training earned more, suggesting again that skills are more 
critical. Moreover, in another mostly informal context, Berge, Bjorvatn, and Tungodden 
(2014) find a positive impact among male entrepreneurs when learning business skills in 
Tanzania.  
Research in general points to the importance of human capital investments and, 
specifically, to the outcome of such investments. However, in developing countries, many 
people leave school early, leading to undeveloped basic skills. There are many reasons for 
leaving school early, including the cost of schooling (even indirect costs such as food, 
uniforms, travel, etc.), the cost of extra tutoring to make up for poor-quality teaching or 
the opportunity cost of not being able to provide extra income to one’s family (Ardiente 
& Guiking, 2015).  
However, despite a lack of schooling, we argue that a rudimentary understanding 
of basic finance is still expected to help entrepreneurs make decisions via mental 
accounting, which suggests that the perceived value of undertaking an opportunity 
surpasses the perceived loss. In the space between the discovery phase and the 
exploitation phase of the entrepreneurial process (Scott Shane & Venkataraman, 2000), an 
entrepreneur´s ability to evaluate the perceived opportunity demands a certain level of 
financial literacy that, even in developed markets, is not universal (Lusardi & Mitchell, 
2011d). Financial literacy is generally described to be important to human economic 
decision-making (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014). We have too often seen the cost of financial 
ignorance, for instance in the US subprime crisis (Gerardi, Goette, & Meier, 2010) or the 
microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh (CGAP, 2010). This is particularly important in an 
informal economy with frequently high interest rates and high inflation. For instance, in 
microfinance, the interest rate charged may be 30-50%, or even higher, with an inflation 
rate of 6-8%.  
Prior research on financial literacy is linked to intended pension planning or saving 
behavior. This line of research shows a meaningful impact on pension and saving 
behavior, i.e., that causality begins with knowledge (of finance) and ends with a behavior 
(a decision in this case). Assessing an opportunity requires the ability to make numerical 
calculations (Lusardi, 2012). In a qualitative study, Bruton et al. (2011) find that an 
important characteristic of borrowers in better-performing businesses is their “awareness 
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of interest rates and the time value of money” (p. 727), suggesting that financial literacy is 
vital to success. However, there is no a consensus around the utility of financial literacy. In 
the developing world, for example, in India, research on microenterprises indicates that 
the cognitive ability of microentrepreneurs is low and that rather than thinking about 
interest rates, they think about how much they owe on a weekly or monthly basis (Tiwari, 
Khandelwal, & Ramji, 2008), thus calling into question whether financial literacy as a 
concept is even meaningful. The theory of mental accounting (Thaler, 1985) suggests that 
individuals make decisions based on a higher expected value based on the perceived 
benefit (concave curve) vs. the perceived loss (convex curve). This implies that an 
individual must be able to assess an opportunity based on how much cash it will bring in 
relative to the investments needed. This qualitative approach seems to suggest that those 
who are more financially literate would indeed perform better. 
Secondly, the ability of an entrepreneur to engage in planning is positively related to 
performance (Baum, Locke, & Smith, 2001; Frese et al., 2007), and in this process, 
financial literacy is a prerequisite for successful financial planning (Lusardi, 2012). An 
entrepreneur must be able to weigh the expected return from making an investment in 
one category against the expected return from making the same investment in another 
category, where the risk/return characteristics should be the basis for the evaluation 
(Fama & MacBeth, 1973). Thus, in this study, we explore the degree to which better 
performing entrepreneurs in the informal economy understand the basic financial 
concepts of compound interest rates, inflation and risk diversification, such that human 
capital investment positively affects financial literacy, which in turn positively affects the 
discovery and exploitation of opportunities that is manifested through improved 
microenterprise performance. 
However, the economics of financial literacy have not been researched (Lusardi & 
Mitchell, 2014), especially in the developing world, where the extension of microcredit is 
still experiencing double-digit growth globally, reaching hundreds of millions of 
individuals, not the least through the recent growth of mobile currencies. To address this 
research gap, and in line with previous research on pension and savings in the formal 
economy (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014), we argue: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Among microenterprises in the informal economy, there is a positive 
association between an entrepreneur´s financial literacy and microenterprise financial 
performance. 
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Entrepreneurship research traditionally assumes that individuals in a financial 
decision-making situation are faced with uncertainty, such as the probability of failure. 
The entrepreneur knows that there is a chance that the opportunity may not work. In an 
informal economy, the consequences of failure are not subject to a judicial system. 
Consequently, failure may haunt an individual on a personal level for the rest of his or her 
life. Although the range of possible outcomes is known to the entrepreneur, and although 
he or she may be able to do simple numeric exercises as described above, he or she may 
still face ambiguity about which decision to take (March & Olsen, 1976). The future road 
map is simply too fuzzy or complex to the individual. We argue that this is even more 
important in an informal economy, where human capital is less developed, where financial 
literacy is relatively poor, and where many entrepreneurs are likely faced with much 
ambiguity. Therefore, lacking a key decision-making resource, such as advice or vital 
information, the entrepreneur may need to look for advice, either directly or indirectly, 
from a role model.  
Lacking financial advisors, or lacking trust in the financial advisors that do exist, 
entrepreneurs may instead benefit from role models. On the one hand, role models may 
provide concrete advice, but the presence of others also helps to provide social cues 
(Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986), thus helping to reduce the ambiguity in a decision (Minniti, 
2005). We argue that this is particularly important in the informal economy, where we 
know that human capital and financial literacy skills are less developed. That an external 
network is beneficial in an informal economy was shown by Honig (1998), who studied 
the impact of semiweekly church attendance and found that marital status had a positive 
effect on entrepreneur income. However because social capital, often used by sociologists, 
can be used to describe a variety of things (Durlauf, 2002), such as good behavior 
(Putnam, 2000) or labor market conditions (Cooper, Woo, & Dunkelberg, 1989), in this 
study we specifically focus on the existence of role models.  
Prior research on role models has mostly focused on the influential aspects of role 
models, such as their impact on entrepreneurial intentions (Bosma et al., 2012). However, 
role models continue to be influential even after the entrepreneurial intention stage. 
Entrepreneurs use role models as a source of information, and lacking specific skills may 
cause them to turn to the role model for advice or even to be inspired to follow the role 
model. With more entrepreneur role models available, more information about 
frustrations, benefits and other requirements is available. The social environment 
therefore “contributes to reducing the ambiguity associated with entrepreneurial 
decisions” (Minniti 2005, p.5). As such, we argue that it is important to have role models 
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as part of one´s network as they may lower the ambiguity in decision-making. We 
therefore hypothesize that:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Among microenterprises in the informal economy, there is a positive 
association between the usage of role models and microenterprise financial performance. 
 
Method 
Sample 
We draw upon a unique sample of microenterprises in Ecuador, a country with 
widespread informality covering more than 80% of the working population (Canelas, 
2014; World Bank, 2012). It therefore offers a valid context to understand firms in the 
informal economy. Moreover, our study focuses specifically on microenterprises, which 
provide jobs and income to more than one-third of all households in western and mostly 
informal parts of Ecuador. By collaborating with the leading microfinance institution in 
Ecuador11, Banco D-Miro, we were able to not only use their detailed financial data 
collected from their credit analyses, including data from a national credit bureau, but also 
to conduct a complementary telephone survey, reaching 750 microentrepreneurs. In other 
words, we have a full picture of the total financial position of the clients (including debt 
with other banks), as well as credit analysts’ best assessments of the value of assets, such 
as machines, cars, inventories, or houses. Given our focus on microenterprise financial 
performance, we have excluded the value of family assets. 
 
Measures 
Dependent variable. Our dependent variable is microenterprise performance. The literature 
suggests a multidimensional approach to measuring performance (Combs, Crook, & 
Shook, 2005), separating performance into financial and operational measures. 
Performance can also be measured at different levels, that of the entrepreneur, the 
microenterprise or society. In this study, we are concerned with the levels of the 
entrepreneur and the microenterprise. The rich dataset allows us to measure performance 
across several dimensions (e.g., in line with Bosma et al. 2004). Because these 
microenterprises are small, typically self-employed or with one or two employees, our 
                                            
 
 
 
 
 
11 According to a global ranking by Microfinance Investment Exchange (Martínez, 2014). 
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first measure of performance is the annual profit generated by the microenterprises. Profit 
relates to the amount of money the entrepreneur has left at the end of the day. This 
money may be used in various ways, such as for consumption, to invest in a house or 
education, or, alternatively, it may be reinvested into the business. However, by only 
looking at the profit number, we ignore assets that are used to generate those profits. For 
instance, it is difficult to say that one firm generating USD 100 is performing equally as 
well as another business generating USD 100. For example, one business may employ 
USD 500 to generate that USD 100 and another might employ USD 1,000. Therefore, 
we also employ a second measure relating profits to the assets employed in the business, 
i.e., return on assets (ROA). This is a measure of performance that relates more directly to 
the microenterprise and its use of assets. It is therefore a measure of efficiency. ROA is 
calculated as net income divided by total assets. Because these are microenterprises, the 
assets are typically very low, which may create huge variations in returns. In line with 
other research (e.g., Hvide and Møen 2010), we have Winsorized the assets at the 5% 
level and replaced asset values below USD 3,200 with USD 3,200 (Hvide & Møen, 2010). 
Moreover, in most of these businesses, the entrepreneur is not being paid a salary, 
wherefore the opportunity cost of labor accordingly needs to be deducted (Scott Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000). By comparing the wages of workers in the formal sector versus 
those in the informal sector, it is estimated that the informal wage is 91% of the actual 
minimum wage in Ecuador during the period 2010-2012 (Canelas, 2014), or $289. By 
adding an opportunity cost of labor, the average returns in our sample dropped from 
141% to 68%. The Winsorization removed another 7% from the average, but halved the 
standard deviation to 93%. Lastly, we use a longitudinal third measure of microenterprise 
performance. Given that all credit assessments are not done every year, we use a binary 
dummy variable where we compare average sales in 2014 and 2015 with average sales 
during the period 2009-2013, whereby firms growth is coded as 1 if firms grow their sales 
and as 0 if there is no improvement or a decrease in sales levels. This method allows us to 
circumvent missing data issues resulting from the informal nature of the firms and their 
financial assessment. Growth as a measure of performance is important such that we may 
understand whether or not the microentrepreneur is able to grow, with the assumption 
that with more growth, the microenterprise will be able to earn higher profits. Research 
on new venture growth shows that few jobs actually evolve into larger firms (Z. J. Acs & 
Armington, 2006), particularly smaller businesses suffering from the liability of smallness 
(Carroll, 1983). 
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Independent variables. Our first independent variable is financial literacy. Building upon a 
previously tested concept (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011a), we used three questions to test the 
entrepreneurs’ understanding of financial concepts. The first question was designed to 
capture the ability to perform simple calculations (numeracy) and the understanding of the 
idea of compound interest. The second question incorporated the concept of inflation. 
The third addressed risk and diversification. In our test, the third question is modified 
compared to the original questions (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011a, 2011c) to be relevant to 
the informal economy. In the original question, the concept of “stock” or “mutual fund” 
was used, i.e., share investment, and by changing this to “opportunity”, it became more 
synonymous with the word used when taking a loan and using the money for a hopefully 
value-enhancing opportunity. The survey, which included questions for the test, was 
conducted using a professional call center at Banco D-Miro that was supervised by a team 
of three researchers and a manager during the entire process. By first pre-testing the 
questions on a sample of 60 individuals, we obtained sufficient variability in the responses 
and were able to validate that our modified question number fulfilled the same criteria of 
being simple, relevant, brief and differentiable among individuals. In addition to the 
survey carried out in Ecuador, the same questions were also tested in another informal 
context, in microfinance clients in Dar es Salaam and Arusha, Tanzania. The questions, 
which for our survey in Ecuador were translated into Spanish by the research team in 
close collaboration with the head of the call center, were as follows: 
 
1. Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. 
After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left 
the money to grow: more than $102, exactly $102, less than $102? 
2. Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and that 
inflation was 2% per year. After 1 year, would you be able to buy more than, 
exactly the same as, or less than today with the money in this account? 
3. Do you think that the following statement is true or false? Investing everything in 
one opportunity usually provides a more certain economic reward than investing 
smaller amounts in many different opportunities.12 
                                            
 
 
 
 
 
12 In studies of developed countries, the question read: “Do you think that the following statement is true or 
false? Buying a single company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.” (Lusardi & 
Mitchell, 2014) 
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Our second independent variable is role models. Many previous studies equate exposure to 
entrepreneurs to having “role models” (BarNir, Watson, & Hutchins, 2011; Bosma et al., 
2012; Franco, Haase, & Lautenschläger, 2010; Liñán & Chen, 2009; Van Auken, 
Stephens, Fry, & Silva, 2006) without considering whether or not the role models were 
seen to be successful. To us, exposure does not equate to an individual having a role 
model. To circumvent this issue, we developed four items that reflect both exposure to 
and usage of role models. On a scale from 1 through 5, interviewees were asked to 
indicate their level of agreement with the following four statements: 
 
1. I am personally familiar with successful entrepreneurs. 
2. In my network of friends and colleagues, there are successful entrepreneurs. 
3. I regard some of the entrepreneurs I know as role models. 
4. Some entrepreneurs I know have been a source of influence for me. 
 
We offered respondents the response scale of strongly disagree, disagree, neither disagree 
or agree, somewhat agree and fully agree, rather than the numerical statements of a 5-
point scale. We elected to do this as the numerical statements resulted in poor variability 
in our pilot test. Through this modification we saw improved the variability in the 
responses. The results of these four questions were averaged to obtain a single measure 
of role model. 
 
Control variables. Because firm performance can be affected by numerous other factors, we 
control for microenterprise specific measures, including leverage (debt / equity), size of assets, 
industry, number of employees and degree of urban location. The informal economy is often 
dominated by certain industries, and for industry specifications, we created dummy 
variables using the standard industrial classifications relevant to the informal economy 
(United Nations, 2008), such as wholesale, construction, repair shops, restaurants, etc. For 
degree of urban location, we used data from national statistics in Ecuador (INEC, 2011) 
combined with the location of the particular entrepreneur in our study. This gave us a 
degree (e.g., a percentage) of urbaneness in the specific location. In addition, we control 
for various entrepreneur characteristics, such as gender, age, and level of education, as well as 
previous loan experience, measured as the number of previous loans taken.  
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Results 
In terms of understanding the concepts of financial literacy, as seen in Table 1, only 2.6% 
of the individuals answered all three questions correctly. On the other hand, only 5.5% 
answered no questions correctly. The interest question was answered correctly by 45.3% 
of respondents; the inflation question, by 37.8%; and the risk question, by 29.2%. The 
interest rate question therefore appears to have been the easiest, followed by the inflation 
question and, finally, by the risk question. 
 
Table 1. Financial literacy compared across economies 
 
  
Informal 
Economy US Italy Romania 
Interest question         
More than $102 (correct) 45.3% 64.9% 40.0% 41.3% 
Exactly $102 4.5% 11.3% 25.0% 11.5% 
Less than $102 2.5% 9.2% 6.8% 8.2% 
Do not know 47.3% 13.5% 28.2% 34.4% 
Refused to answer 0.4% 1.0% na 4.6% 
          
Inflation question         
More 14.7% 11.2% 6.2% 11.5% 
Exactly the same 8.6% 9.0% 3.8% 11.4% 
Less (correct) 37.8% 64.3% 59.3% 31.8% 
Do not know 38.8% 14.2% 30.7% 40.4% 
Refused to answer 0.1% 1.4% na 4.9% 
          
Risk question         
False (correct) 29.2% 51.8% 52.2% 13.5% 
True 48.3% 13.3% 14.2% 14.7% 
Do not know 22.1% 33.7% 33.6% 63.5% 
Refused to answer 0.4% 1.2% na 8.3% 
          
Cross question consistency 
Interest & inflation 41.5% 46.2% 31.5% 20.5% 
All correct 2.6% 30.2% 24.9% 3.8% 
None correct 5.5% 12.3% 26.4% 40.1% 
At least one "does not 
know" 60.9% 42.4% 44.9% 75.5% 
All do not know 11.4% 4.7% 19.9% 29.8% 
          
Year of data 2013 2009 2007 2011 
Number of observations 755 1488 3992 1030 
Source: The US data are as reported in Lusardi and Mitchell (2011d), Italian data are from 
Fornero and Monticone (2011), and Romanian, from (Beckmann, 2013). 
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The correlation matrix (Table 2) reveals a strong correlation between two of the three 
dependent variables. Profits and ROA are 40% correlated, whereas sales growth is not 
correlated with our other performance measures. Other research on new ventures 
highlights a positive relationship between sales and profitability (Delmar, McKelvie, & 
Wennberg, 2013), although this research tends to involve formal economy and non-
microenterprises. We have not been able to find other research that has this level of detail. 
This negative relationship was therefore unexpected but does not necessarily affect our 
hypotheses. It nevertheless highlights the importance of using difference measures of firm 
performance. In terms of the independent variables, we observe a positive correlation 
between Role Models and Financial Literacy. The correlation table shows a significant and 
negative correlation between financial literacy and a squared age term (J. A. Mincer, 1974), 
suggesting that although younger persons are more financially literate, there is also 
improvement as people become older. It is encouraging to see that level of education 
correlates positively with financial literacy, thus perhaps indicating that higher financial 
literacy can be achieved through more education. Although we highlight some of the 
statistically significant relationships, on the whole, they are all very small (i.e., lower than 
0.3), with the only exceptions being select relationships with our performance variables. 
As a result, we do not view multicollinearity as a significant concern for our data. This is 
furthered by the fact that the VIFs are under 1.3, which is well below the recommended 
cut-off of 10 (Hair et al., 2010). 
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In the regression analysis, shown in Table 3, we find significant relations between 
financial literacy and ROA (Model 1) and financial literacy and profits (Model 2). 
However, no statistically significant relationship was found with sales growth (Model 3). 
As such, we have only partial support for Hypothesis 1, which argues that higher levels of 
financial literacy are positively associated with microenterprise financial performance. 
Furthermore, role models are seen to be significantly and positively related to ROA 
(Model 1) but have no impact on profits (Model 2) or sales growth (Model 3). Again, this 
provides partial support for Hypothesis 2. 
Among the controls, we find that at loan experience, leverage, size (smaller) and 
location (rural) are all statistically significant related to ROA (Model 1). Loan experience, 
age (younger), gender (being a male), leverage, size (larger), number of employees and 
location (rural) all have a statistically significant relationship with profit (Model 2). Lastly, 
loan experience and size (smaller) are related to sales growth (Model 3).  
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Table 3. OLS regression relating Financial Literacy and Role Models with Micro-
enterprise performance 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 ROA  Profit  
Sales 
growth 
(Logit)  
H1: Financial literacy .090 ** .082 ** -.011  
 (2.617 ) (2.834 ) (0.180 ) 
    
H2: Role models .091 ** .048  -.273  
 (2.614 ) (1.681 ) (0.281 ) 
Controls    
Loan experience .132 *** .173 *** .182 * 
 (3.678 ) (5.717 ) (0.074 ) 
Age -.066  -.138 *** -.011  
 -(1.805 ) -(4.488 ) (0.019 ) 
Age2 -.032  -.031  .000  
 -(0.916 ) -(1.085 ) (0.002 ) 
Level of education -.018  -.034  -.123  
 -(0.520 ) -(1.114 ) (0.291 ) 
Gender (male = 1) .064  .064 * -.271  
 (1.768 ) (2.105 ) (0.398 ) Leverage (debt / 
equity) .159 *** .125 *** .161  
 (4.694 ) (4.407 ) (0.769 ) 
Size ln -.336 *** .558 *** -1.322 *** 
 -(9.061 ) (17.914 ) (0.321 ) 
Nr of employees .066  .083 ** .114  
 (1.890 ) (2.834 ) (0.106 ) Urban location (%) -.105 ** -.100 ** 1.325  
 -(3.055 ) -(3.480 ) (1.069 ) n 755  755  219  F statistic 8.77 *** 27.569 ***  R2 .196  .434   Adjusted R2 .174  .418   -2 Log likelihood   208.9  χ2   40.2 *** 
Cox and Snell R2   .167  Nagelkerke R2   .246  ΔR2 (H1) .011 ** .008 **  
ΔR2 (H2) .008 ** .002   Displayed beta is standardized. t-value within parenthesis. Profits are winsorized at 5% level. 
Industry controls are included but not reported. ΔR2 is over and above control variables. 
∗ Significant at the 5% level; ∗∗ significant at the 1% level; ∗∗∗ significant at the .1% 
level. 
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Discussion and conclusion 
Our assessment shows that financial literacy has a very important impact on 
microenterprise performance when measured as ROA or profits. Sales growth, however, 
is not related to financial literacy. However, it is not negatively related to financial literacy, 
as was previously found by Webb, Morris, et al. (2013). We argue that our sample of 
microentrepreneurs, all of whom were approved for credit by a microfinance institution 
based on their past performance (i.e., is not forward looking), indicates that in the 
evaluation of an opportunity, those who are more financially literate make better 
investment decisions, possibly by taking more calculated business risks. In addition, those 
microentrepreneurs who know another successful entrepreneur as a role model also make 
better investment decisions and achieve a higher ROA, similar to the effect of financial 
literacy. However, for role models, we did not see any impact on profits or sales growth. 
Furthermore, adding to previous research on financial literacy (Lusardi & Mitchell, 
2014), our empirical results reveal a consistent pattern of positive results for the effects of 
financial literacy on microenterprise performance, specifically ROA and profits. Sales 
growth, however, remains unaffected, which indicates that neither microfinance or 
teaching financial literacy will help microenterprises grow out of poverty. Our results 
confirm the idea that in the informal economy, level of education or previous experience 
has no impact whatsoever on microenterprise performance, although previous loan 
experience is positively related to all three measures of performance. However, in contrast 
to studies that capture human capital through measures such as higher education and 
previous entrepreneurial experience (Bosma et al., 2004; Unger et al., 2011), our applied 
and context appropriate view of financial literacy has stronger predictive power. Our 
findings suggest that in contrast to previous research on highly impoverished markets and 
the role of financial knowledge (Webb, Morris, et al. 2013), an emphasis on basic financial 
literacy skills has an impact on subsequent microenterprise performance. Specifically 
focusing on the left tail of human capital, where we find low levels of financial literacy 
compared to the formal economy, our findings show that basic numeric skills and the 
ability to understand basic financial concepts adds significant value to the microenterprises 
and their owners through improved operating efficiency (ROA) and higher profits. 
However, sales growth was unaffected. Future research may therefore wish to study the 
implications of other skills, such as improved marketing skills, which some research 
indicates have a positive effect on microenterprise growth (Webb, Morris, et al. 2013).  
In terms of the levels of financial literacy, as seen in Table 1, the results are for the 
most part comparable to those of other developing countries, such as Romania 
(Beckmann, 2013). A more striking difference is the number of individuals who answered 
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“do not know”, 47.3%, which is significantly higher than that reported in the other studies 
(Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014). However, the number of individuals answering none of the 
questions correctly was relatively low at 5.5%. Together with the fact that 11.4% answered 
all questions with “I don´t know”, which is low compared with Italy and Romania, we 
interpret this as a positive sign that the interviewed microentrepreneurs gave the questions 
serious thought. The interest rate question was answered in line with Romania and Italy 
(Beckmann, 2013; Fornero & Monticone, 2011); the inflation question, in line with 
Romania; and the risk question, better than Romania; we conclude that the levels of 
financial literacy that we observed are representative of the informal economy of Ecuador 
and are likely representative of many other similar contexts around the world. Other 
higher OECD countries generally score much higher than the informal economy, thus 
also confirming the link with improved financial literacy as a measure of a human capital 
skill and general economic development. As our comparison shows, the basic financial 
literacy of the informal economy is well below the basic understanding of higher income 
and more formal economies. It is important to note that the comparison of the results in 
Table 1 shows the results from a survey among the informal economy of Ecuador 
compared with the broad population of, to a degree, more formal economies from 
previous studies. 
Working with a microfinance institution in Ecuador has allowed us to study the 
informal economy, partly addressing calls by Godfrey (2011) for research at the 
intersection between some formality and informality, the structural informal economy, 
and calls for research on legitimate forms of microenterprises transitioning to the formal 
economy (Webb et al. 2013). Our research shows that human capital, particularly skills 
such as financial literacy, is a key resource for microentrepreneurs in the informal 
economy. This is in line with the resource-based theory of the firm, and shows that it is 
applicable even in an impoverished informal economy, contrary to the findings of Webb, 
Morris, et al. (2013). Our research also highlights the importance of using different forms 
of performance measurement to better understand the effects of a resource. In addition, 
knowing successful entrepreneurs also helps generate better returns (ROA) through better 
investment decisions.  
In terms of our results on role models, we did find support that knowing 
successful role models helped microentrepreneurs achieve a higher ROA than those who 
did not. This adds further evidence that the existence of role models may reduce the 
ambiguity in decision-making and possibly enhance returns through higher risk-taking. 
However, we did not see a significant relationship with profits (unless we allow a 10 
percentage-point threshold). The explanation for this is that while profits (the numerator) 
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stay flat, the asset component (the denominator) is reduced. This implies that firms that 
use role models may not only make better investment decisions with higher ROAs, but 
these businesses also achieve improved asset utilization, i.e., a more efficient use of 
existing resources.  
 Lastly, our control variables show several interesting findings, which may be 
subject to future research. Our measure of loan experience, number of previous loans 
taken with this microfinance institution, is significantly and positively related to a higher 
ROA, higher profits and higher sales growth. Contrary to the meta-analysis by Unger et al. 
(2011), we do not observe any direct causal effect of human capital investments, such as 
education level and experience, apart from a significant and negative relationship between 
age and profits, implying that younger microentrepreneurs earn higher income. Honig 
(1998) even found a negative relationship between level of education and success. Our 
findings therefore illustrate that financial literacy is a better predictor of firm performance 
outcomes than broader measures of human capital investments, such as education, 
reinforcing the message that future researchers should focus more effort on measuring 
skills, rather than level of education. Gender shows a slight bias toward male 
entrepreneurs and income, but there is no effect on ROAs or sales growth. Our measure 
of size is showing that with increased size, ROAs and sales growth diminish, but profits 
increases. This seems consistent, especially because it is easier to make a higher return on 
assets and grow sales at higher rates when the business is very small. Our measure of the 
number of controls shows some association with profits, implying the existence of 
positive economies of scale. The urban location measure shows that firms located in more 
rural areas tend to have higher returns and profits than firms in urban locations. Sales 
growth was not impacted. This may be due to a selection preference by the local credit 
officer, who will prefer to spend time on larger and more profitable rural businesses rather 
than less profitable ones due to the time it takes to reach the rural entrepreneur. 
This study is not without limitations. First, the study focuses on the informal 
economy of Ecuador, wherefore it becomes difficult to generalize the findings to the 
informal economy globally. Second, the sample of selected microentrepreneurs is not at 
the bottom of the pyramid (London & Hart, 2004) but is more concerned with stable 
cash-flow generating businesses that are able to receive financing. We therefore cannot 
generalize these findings to all microenterprises. This also means that our sample does not 
include those who are not running a sufficiently profitable business to be eligible for 
financing, although our sampling method made sure to also include microentrepreneurs 
who, despite having received a loan, experienced problems in paying the loan back. We 
also realize that we are attempting to draw conclusions based on partly cross-sectional 
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data, although we have sought to use more longitudinal dimensions in our dependent 
performance variables. For instance, sales growth became difficult to measure, as we did 
not have historic or future estimates of microentrepreneurs for all years.  
To conclude, our findings send a signal to policymakers that although financial 
literacy can be expected to help firms run more efficiently, make better investment 
decisions and generate more profits, it has no impact on sales growth, which is the 
ultimate way to scale a business for more earnings and more employment. In addition to 
financial literacy, our results on role models show that being acquainted with a successful 
entrepreneurial role model has a positive impact on ROA but does not provide any effect 
on profits or sales growth. Therefore, mentorship programs linking experienced and 
successful (profitable) entrepreneurs with microentrepreneurs may be a complementary 
strategy in poverty alleviation programs. Lastly, although not tested here specifically, we 
conclude that there may be other relevant skills worthy of further research that are more 
important for helping microenterprises grow in the informal economy, such as, for 
instance, marketing skills. 
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8. Appendix 1 – Complete Survey 
8.1. Spanish version 
Encuesta  
Versión 1.6 
 
Buenos días, Sr/Sra. (NOMBRE DEL CLIENTE). Soy (NOMBRE ENTREVISTADOR) y le estoy llamando 
de Banco D-MIRO. Estamos realizando un estudio de nuestros clientes. Estamos colaborando con la Universidad de Agder 
en Noruega en este proyecto. Toda la información que nos provea será confidencial. Su colaboración es muy importante para 
nosotros y nos ayudará a mejorar el servicio a nuestros clientes en el futuro. Por su colaboración va a recibir un obsequio que 
podrá retirarlo en su agencia. Me gustaría hacerle algunas preguntas, ¿contamos con su colaboración? 
 
A. Razones por las cuales el cliente no ha renovado su crédito / Razones  por  t ener  deuda 
pendien te   
 Indíquenos su grado de acuerdo o desacuerdo sobre la razón por la cual usted no ha renovado su 
crédito. 
 T
otalm
ente en 
desacuerdo 
B
astante en 
desacuerdo 
N
i acuerdo ni 
desacuerdo 
B
astante de 
acuerdo 
T
otalm
ente de 
acuerdo 
A1. El servicio de D-MIRO es malo      
A2. Mi negocio está yendo mal      
A3. La tasa de interés de los préstamos en D-MIRO es demasiada alta      
A4. Últimamente he tenido problemas con mi familia      
A5. Últimamente he tenido problemas con mi salud      
A6. Últimamente he tenido problemas con la salud de mi familia      
A7. Últimamente alguien en mi familia perdió el empleo      
A8. Tengo demasiada deuda      
A9. Los otros bancos tienen productos mejores      
A10. D-MIRO me dio créditos de monto menor al que yo necesitaba      
A11. Es difícil llegar  a las Agencias de D-MIRO      
A12. Pagar el crédito significa mucho estrés       
A13. El plazo es demasiado corto       
A14. No quiero deuda por ahora, quiero descansar      
A15. Mi negocio está produciendo suficiente dinero y por eso no necesito prestar 
por ahora      
A16. Los créditos anteriores no me ayudaron en el negocio      
A18. No puedo pagar a través de internet o mi celular      
A19. Últimamente en mi negocio he hecho inversiones con mucho riesgo y perdí dinero      
A20. Me robaron      
A21. Saqué el crédito y lo compartí con otras personas      
A22. Estamos esperando por la aplicación del seguro de vida      
A23. Tengo problemas con la fecha de pago que me dieron para el crédito      
A24. Falleció un familiar mío      
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A25. Mi garantizado tiene deuda pendiente      
A26. Familiares míos tienen deudas pendientes con el banco      
A27. Soy un cliente antiguo y deseo obtener mi crédito sin garante      
 
A28. ¿Cuál de las declaraciones anteriores describen de la mejor manera el motivo por or el cual usted tiene 
una deuda pendiente? 
  Elija una: ___________________________ 
 
 A29. ¿Cuál de las declaraciones anteriores) describen de la mejor manera porque usted no ha renovado su 
crédito? 
  Elija una: ____________________________ 
 
 
B. Servicio 
 Indíquenos su satisfacción con los siguientes servicios. 
 
M
uy m
alo 
M
alo 
R
egular 
B
ueno 
M
uy B
ueno 
B1. La longitud de las colas      
B2. El profesionalismo del personal de D-MIRO      
B3. El proceso de renovación de un crédito (fácil, se demora mucho, etc.)      
B4. La amabilidad del personal de D-MIRO      
      
 
C.  El crédito 
 
C1. Imaginemos que usted pudiera pedir cualquier monto de crédito ¿qué monto solicitaría?     
Monto: $___________ 
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D. Deuda pendiente 
 
Indíquenos su grado de acuerdo o desacuerdo.  
 Totalm
ente en 
desacuerdo 
B
astante en 
desacuerdo 
N
i acuerdo ni 
desacuerdo 
B
astante de 
acuerdo 
T
otalm
ente de 
acuerdo 
D1. Tener una deuda pendiente con cualquier institución afecta mi calidad de mi 
vida      
D2. En qué medida hago mi mejor esfuerzo para pagar las cuotas de D-MIRO en 
la fecha de vencimiento      
 
 
E. Educación financiera 
 
E1. Suponga que usted tiene $100 en una cuenta de ahorros y la tasa de interés en la cuenta es del 2% al año. 
Imagina que el dinero lo deja por 5 años en esa cuenta. Después de cinco años, ¿cuánto tendría en la cuenta? 
  Elija una: 
 
   Más de $102 Exactamente $102  Menos de $102   No lo sé  
 
E2. Imaginemos que la tasa de interés en su cuenta de ahorros es 1% al año y que la inflación es 2% al año. 
Después de un año, el dinero que está en la cuenta le permitiría ¿comprar más que hoy?, ¿lo mismo que hoy? o 
¿menos que hoy?   
  Elija una: 
 
  Más    Lo mismo  Menos  No lo sé  
  
 E3. ¿Cree usted que la siguiente declaración es verdadera o falsa? Invertir el dinero en una sola oportunidad por 
lo general me da mayor ganancia  económica que si invertiría el mismo dinero en pequeñas cantidades y en varias 
oportunidades diferentes.  
  Verdadero   Falso   No lo sé 
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F. Intenciones de crecimiento 
 
 F1. ¿Quiere usted ampliar su negocio en los próximos años, por ejemplo introducir nuevos productos, servicios 
o contratar más personas?  Responda Si o No.    Sí       No 
 
 F2. Si quisiera  ampliar su negocio ¿cuántas personas desearía tener trabajando con usted? ___________ 
 
 F3. ¿Cuántas personas ayudan en su negocio actualmente aparte de usted? _________ 
 
 
G. Experiencias 
 
Por favor especifique el número de años: 
 
G1. ¿Cuántos años usted ha trabajado en total, en su vida entera? (Considere incluso si ha trabajado en relación 
de dependencia.) Años: ______ 
 
G2. ¿Cuántos años usted ha trabajado en su negocio propio?  (Sumar todos los negocios anteriores al actual si 
fuere el caso.)  Años: _______ 
 
 
H. Éxito de emprendimiento 
 
Califique de las siguientes opciones. 
 
Pésim
o 
M
uy m
alo 
M
alo 
R
egular 
B
ueno 
M
uy B
ueno 
E
xcelente 
H1. ¿Qué tan exitoso usted se considera como emprendedor?        
H2. ¿Qué tan exitoso usted considera el nivel de rendimiento de su negocio?        
 
 H3. Aproximadamente, ¿cuánto vende al mes en su negocio?  $________ 
 H4. Aproximadamente, ¿cuáles son los gastos mensuales de su negocio? $________ 
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I. Imagen corporativa 
 
M
uy lejos 
Lejos 
C
erca 
C
asi Perfecto 
Perfecto 
I1. Imagínese el banco perfecto. ¿Qué tan cerca de este banco está D-MIRO?      
 
 
Señale su grado de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones: 
 Totalm
ente en 
desacuerdo 
B
astante en 
desacuerdo 
N
i acuerdo ni 
desacuerdo 
B
astante de 
acuerdo 
T
otalm
ente de 
acuerdo 
I2. D-MIRO es un banco que me cuida      
I3. D-MIRO personaliza sus productos  a mis necesidades      
I4. Yo siempre recomendaré D-MIRO a otras personas.      
I5. Confío totalmente en D-MIRO      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cómo usted siente que se aplican a D-MIRO los siguientes términos.  
 Totalm
ente en 
desacuerdo 
B
astante en 
desacuerdo 
N
i acuerdo ni 
desacuerdo 
B
astante de 
acuerdo 
T
otalm
ente de 
acuerdo 
I6. Profesionalismo      
I7. Sirviendo a los pobres      
I8. Da a todos las mismas oportunidades      
I9. Eficiencia      
I10. Justicia      
I11. Moderno      
I12. Barato      
I13. Fomentando la igualdad de género      
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J. Relaciones con otros bancos 
 
Señale su grado de acuerdo o desacuerdo con la siguiente afirmación: Totalm
ente en 
desacuerdo 
B
astante en 
desacuerdo 
N
i acuerdo ni 
desacuerdo 
B
astante de 
acuerdo 
T
otalm
ente de 
acuerdo 
J1. Tener más de un banco le da a usted más posibilidades de acceder a un crédito      
 
J2. ¿Qué piensa usted acerca del servicio de Banco D-MIRO en comparación con otros bancos? 
 
Elija una: 
 
 Mucho peor  Peor  Igual   Mejor   Mucho mejor 
 
J3. ¿Qué piensa usted acerca de la tasa de interés de Banco D-MIRO en comparación con otros bancos? 
 
Elija una: 
 
 Más alto  Alto  Igual   Menor Mucho menor 
 
 
J4. ¿Qué piensa usted acerca de la flexibilidad con respecto al monto de los créditos de Banco D-MIRO en 
comparación con otros bancos? (en otros bancos le dan más dinero) 
 
Elija una: 
 
 Mucho peor  Peor  Igual   Mejor   Mucho mejor 
 
 
Responda Si o No 
 
J5. ¿Usted ha recibido un nuevo crédito en un otro banco después de su último crédito en D-MIRO? 
          Si  No 
 
 
K. El grado de diferenciación entre TODOS los bancos  incluyendo a D-MIRO 
 
N
inguna 
diferencia 
A
lgunas 
pequeñas 
diferencias 
A
lgunas 
diferencias 
M
uchas 
diferencias 
G
randes 
diferencias 
K1. Indique en qué medida usted cree que  hay diferencias significativas entre los 
bancos en el Ecuador.      
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L. Costos de cambiar 
 
Señale su grado de acuerdo o desacuerdo con la siguiente afirmación. 
 
 Totalm
ente en 
desacuerdo 
B
astante en 
desacuerdo 
N
i acuerdo ni 
desacuerdo 
B
astante de 
acuerdo 
T
otalm
ente de 
acuerdo 
L1. Cambiarse a otro banco implica mucho esfuerzo      
 
 
Q. Ejemplos 
 Señale su grado de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones. 
 Totalm
ente en 
desacuerdo 
B
astante en 
desacuerdo 
N
i acuerdo ni 
desacuerdo 
B
astante de 
acuerdo 
T
otalm
ente de 
acuerdo 
Q1. Personalmente, estoy familiarizado con los empresarios exitosos      
Q2. En mi red de amigos y familiares hay empresarios exitosos      
Q3. Considero que algunos de los empresarios que conozco son ejemplo para mi      
Q4. Algunos empresarios que conozco han influenciado sobre mí      
 
 
R.  Influencia de los padres 
 
R1. ¿Por lo menos uno de sus padres alguna vez comenzó su propia empresa?  Sí  No 
 
 
 
Pésim
o 
M
uy m
alo 
M
alo 
R
egular 
B
ueno 
M
uy B
ueno 
E
xcelente 
R2. En caso afirmativo, señale el nivel de éxitos en la empresa de sus padres.        
 
 
 
 
  186 
 
 
 
S.  Satisfacción de la vida 
 Indique su grado de acuerdo o desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones sobre la Satisfacción de la 
vida. 
 Totalm
ente en 
desacuerdo 
B
astante en 
desacuerdo 
N
i acuerdo ni 
desacuerdo 
B
astante de 
acuerdo 
T
otalm
ente de 
acuerdo 
S1. En muchos aspectos mi vida está cerca de mi ideal      
S2. Las condiciones de mi vida son excelentes      
S3. Estoy satisfecho con mi vida      
S4. Hasta ahora he conseguido las cosas importantes que quiero en la vida      
S5. Si pudiera vivir mi vida de nuevo, cambiaría casi todo      
 
 
T. Productos nuevos 
 
Si fuera posible; señale en qué medida habría usado los siguientes servicios.  
 
 
N
unca 
C
asi nunca 
A
lgunas V
eces 
Frecuentem
ente 
M
uy frecuentem
ente 
T1. Consultar el estado del crédito o el saldo de mi cuenta de ahorros en el 
internet.      
T2. Consultar el estado del crédito o el saldo de mi cuenta de ahorros en el celular.      
T3. Una cuenta de ahorros con una tarjeta de débito      
 
 
 
V. La probabilidad de dejar D-MIRO 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
V1. Por favor indique la probabilidad de dejar de ser cliente de D-MIRO en 
los próximos 12 meses. Usar una escala de 0 (ninguna posibilidad) a 10 
(completamente seguro). 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 Completamente seguro  
9 Casi seguro 
8 Muy probable 
7 Probable 
6 Muy buena posibilidad 
5 Bastante buena posibilidad 
4 Buena posibilidad 
3 Alguna posibilidad 
2 Leve posibilidad 
1 Muy leve posibilidad 
0 Ninguna posibilidad 
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Muchas gracias por su colaboración. Y no se olvide de acercarse a la agencia a retirar su 
obsequio. Indique a la persona de balcón de servicios que usted participo en una encuesta. 
 
Note: 
 
All questions were originally phrased in English before being translated into Spanish. Section E is from Lusardi & 
Mitchell (2014), where E3 is adapted to this context. Question F1 is adapted from Cassar (2004). I1, I4, I5, K, L is 
based on Beerli, Martin, & Quintana (2004) but adapted to this context. Section S is based on Diener, Emmons, 
Larsen, & Griffin (1985). Sections H, Q and R were developed in collaboration with Dr. Rotem Shneor. Section V is 
based on Juster (1966) and Garland (2002) but adapted to this context.  
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8.2. English version (transcribed) 
Survey 
Version 1.6 
 
Good day, Mr. / Ms . (CUSTOMER NAME). I am ( INTERVIEWER NAME ) and I 'm calling from Banco 
D-MIRO. We are conducting a survey among our customers. We are collaborating with the University of Agder in Norway 
in this project, and all information is kept confidential. Your collaboration is very important to us and will help us improve 
our service to our customers in the future. For your participation you will receive a gift that you may pick up at your local 
bank office. I would like to ask you some questions, do we have your cooperation? 
 
A. Reasons why the client has not renewed its loan / reasons for having outstanding debt  
Please indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement on the reason why you have not renewed 
your credit. 
 
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 D
is
ag
re
e 
So
m
ew
ha
t d
is
ag
re
e 
N
ei
th
er
 a
gr
ee
 n
or
 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
So
m
ew
ha
t a
gr
ee
 
Fu
lly
 a
gr
ee
 
A1. The service at D-MIRO is bad      
A2. My business is performing poorly      
A3. The interest rate on loans in D-MIRO is too high      
A4. Lately I have had problems with my family      
A5. Lately I have had problems with my health      
A6. Lately I have had problems with the health of my family      
A7. Lately someone in my family lost their job      
A8. I have too much debt      
A9. The other banks have better products      
A10. D-MIRO gave me less credit than I needed      
A11. It is difficult to reach the D-MIRO offices      
A12. Paying credit involves a lot of stress      
A13. The loan terms are too short       
A14. I do not want debt right now, I want to rest      
A15. My business is generating sufficient capital, where I do not need a loan      
A16. Previous loans did not help in the business      
A18. I cannot pay through internet or my mobile phone      
A19. Lately I have done some risky investments and lost money      
A20. I have been robbed      
A21. I used the credit and shared it with others      
A22. We are waiting for the application of life insurance      
A23. I have problems with the payment date that I have for my loan      
A24. A relative of mine has died      
A25. My guarantees have outstanding debt      
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A26. My family has outstanding debts with the bank      
A27. I am on old customer and with to obtain credit without a guarantor      
 
A28. Which of the above statements describe the best way the reason why you have outstanding debt? 
  Select one: ___________________________ 
 
 A29. Which of the above statements describe in the best way why you have not renewed your credit? 
  Select one: ____________________________ 
 
 
B. Service 
 Indicate your degree of satisfaction with the following services 
 
V
er
y 
ba
d 
B
ad
 
R
eg
ul
ar
 
G
oo
d 
V
er
y 
go
od
 
B1. The length of the cues      
B2. The professionalism of the staff of D-MIRO.      
B3. The process of credit renewal (easy or much delays etc.)      
B4. The friendliness of the staff of D-MIRO      
      
 
C.  The loan 
 
C1. Imagine that you could ask for any loan amount, what amount would you ask for? $___________ 
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D. Pending debt 
 
Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement 
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 
D
is
ag
re
e 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
N
ei
th
er
 a
gr
ee
 
no
r 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
ag
re
e 
Fu
lly
 a
gr
ee
 
D1. To have an outstanding debt with any institution affects my quality of life      
D2. To the best extent I do my best to pay fees of D-Miro on the due date.      
 
 
E. Financial literacy 
 
E1. Suppose you have $100 in a savings account earning 2 percent interest a year. After five years, how much 
would you have? 
  Select one: 
 
   More than $102 Exactly $102 Less than $102   I do not know  
 
E2. Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account is 1 percent a year and inflation is 2 percent a year. 
After one year, would the money in the account buy more than it does today, exactly the same or less than 
today? 
  Select one: 
 
  More    The same  Less  I do not know  
  
 E3. Do you think that the following statement is true or false? Investing everything in one opportunity usually 
provides a more certain economic reward than investing smaller amounts in many different opportunities.    
  True    False   I do not know 
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F. Growth intentions 
 
 F1. Do you intend to expand the business significantly over the next years, introduce new products or services 
or hire more people? Answer Yes or No.    Yes      No 
 
 F2. If you want to expand your business how many people would be working with you? ___________ 
 
 F3. How many people help you in your business, besides yourself? _________ 
 
 
G. Work experience 
 
Please specify the number of years: 
 
G1. How many years have you worked in total, in your life? (consider also years where you have been 
employed). Years: ______ 
 
G2. How many years have your worked with your own business? (Add up the total of years from all your 
previous businesses). Years: _______ 
 
 
H. Entrepreneurial success 
 
 Please rate the following options: 
 
A
pp
al
lin
g 
V
er
y 
ba
d 
B
ad
 
R
eg
ul
ar
 
G
oo
d 
V
er
y 
go
od
 
E
xc
el
le
nt
 
H1. How successful do you consider yourself as an entrepreneur?        
H2. How successful do you consider the performance level of your business?        
 
 H3. Approximately, how much do you sell for each month?  $________ 
 H4. Approximately, how much are the monthly expenses of our business? $________ 
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I. Image 
 
V
er
y 
fa
r 
fr
om
 
Fa
r 
fr
om
 
C
lo
se
 
A
lm
os
t p
er
fe
ct
 
Pe
rf
ec
t 
I1. Imagine the perfect bank. How close is this bank to D-MIRO?      
 
 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements 
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 D
is
ag
re
e 
So
m
ew
ha
t d
is
ag
re
e 
N
ei
th
er
 a
gr
ee
 n
or
 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
So
m
ew
ha
t a
gr
ee
 
Fu
lly
 a
gr
ee
 
I2. D-MIRO is a bank that takes care of me.      
I3. D-MIRO customizes its products to my needs.      
I4. I always recommend D-MIRO others.      
I5. I fully trust D-MIRO.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
How do you feel that the following statements/terms apply to D-MIRO? 
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 D
is
ag
re
e 
So
m
ew
ha
t d
is
ag
re
e 
N
ei
th
er
 a
gr
ee
 n
or
 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
So
m
ew
ha
t a
gr
ee
 
Fu
lly
 a
gr
ee
 
I6. Professionalism      
I7. Serving the poor      
I8. Giving everyone the same opportunities      
I9. Efficiency      
I10. Justice      
I11. Modern      
I12. Inexpensive      
I13. Promoting gender equality      
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J. Other bank relations 
 
Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with  
the following statement: 
St
ro
ng
ly
 D
is
ag
re
e 
So
m
ew
ha
t d
is
ag
re
e 
N
ei
th
er
 a
gr
ee
 n
or
 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
So
m
ew
ha
t a
gr
ee
 
Fu
lly
 a
gr
ee
 
J1. Having more than one bank gives you more opportunities to access credit      
 
J2. What do you think about the service of Banco D-MIRO compared to other banks? 
 
Select one: 
 
 Much worse Worse Equal  Better   Much better 
 
J3. What do you think about the interest rate of Banco D-MIRO compared to other banks? 
 
Select one: 
 
 Much higher Higher Equal  Lower Much lower 
 
 
J4. What do you think about flexibility regarding loan amounts of Banco D-MIRO compared to other banks? 
(who lend more money) 
 
Select one: 
 
 Much worse Worse Equal  Better   Much better 
 
 
Answer Yes or No! 
 
J5. Have you received a new credit in another bank after your last credit D-MIRO?   
        Yes  No 
 
 
K. The degree of differentiation among all banks including D-MIRO 
 
N
o 
di
ff
er
en
ce
 
So
m
e 
sm
al
l 
di
ff
er
en
ce
s 
So
m
e 
di
ff
er
en
ce
s 
M
an
y 
di
ff
er
en
ce
s 
B
ig
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
K1. Indicate to what extent you believe that there are significant differences 
between banks in Ecuador.      
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L. Switching costs 
 
Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following statement. 
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 D
is
ag
re
e 
So
m
ew
ha
t d
is
ag
re
e 
N
ei
th
er
 a
gr
ee
 n
or
 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
So
m
ew
ha
t a
gr
ee
 
Fu
lly
 a
gr
ee
 
L1. Switching to another bank involves much effort      
 
 
Q. Role models 
 Indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. 
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Q1. I am personally familiar with successful entrepreneurs      
Q2. In my network of friends and colleagues, there are successful entrepreneurs      
Q3. I regard some of the entrepreneurs I know as role models      
Q4. Some entrepreneurs I know have been a source of influence for me      
 
 
R. Parental influence 
 
R1. Indicate if at least one of your parents has ever started their own business? Yes  No 
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R2. If yes, please rate the level of success in the business of your parents.        
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S.  Satisfaction in life 
 Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements about the Life Satisfaction. 
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S1. In many ways my life is close to my ideal      
S2. The conditions of my life are excellent      
S3. I am satisfied with my life      
S4. So far I have gotten the important things I want in life      
S5. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing      
 
 
T. New products 
 
Indicate to what extent you use the following services if they were available: 
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T1. Check the credit status or the balance of my savings account on the internet.      
T2. Check the credit status or the balance of my savings in my mobile phone      
T3. A savings account with a debit card in the phone.      
 
 
 
V. Likelihood of leaving D-MIRO 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
V1. Please indicate the probability of leaving D-MIRO over the next twelve 
months. Use a scale from zero (no chance) to ten (certain).            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation, and please do not forget to pick up your free gift at the local bank office. 
10 Certain, practically certain 
9 Almost sure 
8 Very probable 
7 Probable 
6 Good possibility 
5 Fairly good possibility 
4 Fair possibility 
3 Some possibility 
2 Slight possibility 
1 Very slight possibility 
0 No chance, almost no chance 
 
